[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"fda-warning-letters-search:[\"Full Vision Inc\",\"\",\"\",\"\",\"\",1]":3,"fda-latest-sync-dates":98},{"warningLetters":4,"total":97},[5,30,49,70],{"id":6,"raw":7,"subject":12,"body_html":14,"body_text":15,"firm_name":16,"letter_id":17,"created_at":18,"fei_number":19,"letter_url":20,"updated_at":21,"action_type":22,"case_status":23,"posted_date":24,"marcs_cms_no":19,"product_type":25,"closeout_date":19,"issuing_office":11,"recipient_name":26,"body_fetched_at":27,"delivery_method":28,"recipient_title":19,"reference_number":19,"action_taken_date":29,"medical_device_id":19,"response_letter_date":19},60,[8,9,10,11,12,13,13,13],"\u003Ctime datetime=\"2026-06-30T04:00:00Z\">06\u002F30\u002F2026\u003C\u002Ftime>\n","\u003Ctime datetime=\"2026-06-25T04:00:00Z\">06\u002F25\u002F2026\u003C\u002Ftime>\n","\u003Ca href=\"\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Fexcelvision-726714-fareva\">Excelvision - Fareva\u003C\u002Fa>","Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER)","CGMP\u002FFinished Pharmaceuticals\u002FAdulterated","","\n\n                            \n                            \n                            \n                            \n                                              \n  \n \n\n                 \n\n  \u003Chr>\n \n\n\u003Cdiv>\n  \u003Cdl>\n\n              \u003Cdt>Delivery Method:\u003C\u002Fdt> \n        \u003Cdd>Via Email Return Receipt Requested\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              \u003C\u002Fdd>\n      \n      \n              \u003Cdt>Product:\u003C\u002Fdt> \n        \u003Cdd>Drugs                          \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n             \n            \n            \n            \n              \n            \n            \n            \u003C\u002Fdd>\n      \n          \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>            \n\n\n\u003Chr>\n\n\u003Cdiv>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdl>\n\n        \u003Cdt>Recipient:\u003C\u002Fdt>\n\n                      \u003Cdd>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdiv>Recipient Name\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n              \u003Cdiv>Mr. Bernard Fraisse\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n          \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\u003C\u002Fdd>\n                                \u003Cdd>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdiv>Recipient Title\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n              \u003Cdiv>CEO\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n          \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\u003C\u002Fdd>\n          \n            \u003Cdd>Excelvision - Fareva\u003C\u002Fdd>\n\n          \n                      \u003Cdd>\u003Cp>\u003Cspan>1041 Chemin de la Digue du Rhône\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cspan>07300\u003C\u002Fspan> \u003Cspan>Tournon-sur-Rhône\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cspan>France\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n          \n          \n            \n            \u003Cdd>\n\n    \u003C\u002Fdd>\u003Cdd>\u003Cspan>\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Ca href=\"mailto:BFraisse@fareva.com\"> BFraisse@fareva.com  \u003C\u002Fa>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n\n          \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>            \n\n       \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdl>\n          \n          \u003Cdt>Issuing Office:\u003C\u002Fdt>\n        \n         \n          \u003Cdd>Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER)\u003C\u002Fdd>\n        \n         \n          \u003Cdd>\u003Cp>\u003Cspan>United States\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n        \n        \n        \n        \n        \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n    \u003Cdl> \n      \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>  \n      \n\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\n \n\n \n\n\u003Chr>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Warning Letter\u003C\u002Fstrong> 320-26-98\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>June 25, 2026\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Dear Mr. Fraisse:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspected your drug manufacturing facility, Excelvision, FEI 3007058211, at 27 Rue de la Lombardiere, Annonay, from January 12 to 22, 2026.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>This warning letter summarizes significant violations of Current Good Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) regulations for finished pharmaceuticals. See Title 21 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), parts 210 and 211 (21 CFR parts 210 and 211).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Because your methods, facilities, or controls for manufacturing, processing, packing, or holding do not conform to CGMP, your drug products are adulterated within the meaning of section 501(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&amp;C Act), 21 U.S.C. 351(a)(2)(B).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>We reviewed your February 12, 2026, response to our Form FDA 483 in detail and acknowledge receipt of your subsequent correspondence.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>During our inspection, our investigators observed specific violations including, but not limited to, the following.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>1. Your firm failed to thoroughly investigate any unexplained discrepancy or failure of a batch or any of its components to meet any of its specifications, whether or not the batch has already been distributed (21 CFR 211.192).\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>You failed to adequately investigate customer complaints for the various sterile \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug products (prescription and over-the-counter) you manufacture. Your investigations were not thorough, did not appropriately expand in scope, and lacked a scientifically supported determination of root causes. You also failed to identify and implement adequate and timely corrective actions and preventive actions (CAPAs).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Your product is intended to maintain sterility of its contents after \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> by the consumer. However, since our previous inspection in November 2024, your firm has received a substantial number of complaints related to the presence of contamination.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Visible evidence of contamination included mold, black specks, and discoloration on the tips and inner caps of containers for your \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug product, \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. Several complaint samples subsequently failed sterility testing. Notably, nine such non-sterility events have occurred in the last three years.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>You failed to adequately determine which hazards in your manufacturing operation and container-closure systems led to these critical, repeated incidents of contamination in your \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug products.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Specifically, you failed to adequately investigate potential container-closure integrity defects that would allow ingress of microbial contamination, which your product is intended to strictly preclude.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>You also failed to adequately assess potential sources of contamination from the manufacturing process as you neglected to evaluate relevant environmental and personnel monitoring (EM\u002FPM) data. For example, the microorganism recovered from the failed complaint sample sterility test involving \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> batch \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> was identified as \u003Cem>Alternaria alternata\u003C\u002Fem>. This was the same microorganism recovered in EM\u002FPM samples collected both before and after this batch was manufactured, including in the room where this batch was filled. Your complaint investigation report did not include this critical information.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Similarly, your firm also failed to adequately investigate numerous contamination complaints related to your \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> products.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Instead of conducting a thorough, scientifically supported, and evidence-based root cause analysis, your firm attributed most of the root causes to inadequate handling by customers who used your products and concluded that no further action was necessary.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>If contaminated, \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug products pose a heightened risk of harm because \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. Microbes introduced directly into \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> can pose a serious risk to consumers. Irreversible damage including \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> can occur, and in some cases, may progress to life-threatening systemic infection. In addition, some components in your \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drugs, such as \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, could serve as a nutrition source for contaminating microorganisms and promote their growth.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In your response, you state that you will revise the complaint procedure to include a comparison of the microorganisms recovered from complaint samples with those found during environmental monitoring and to describe how to proceed when a complaint sample fails sterility testing. You also acknowledge that the absence of a \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> in a formulation should be factored into your risk analysis when evaluating complaints. You also state that two of the aseptic processing lines will not be used to manufacture additional drug products for the U.S. market and they will be replaced with new processing lines.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Your response is inadequate. It provides no evidence to support the investigation conclusions of inadequate handling by customers. It also provides no explanation for how microorganisms contaminated these drug products if they were sterile when released. We are also very concerned about the suitability of your container-closure system and whether you can effectively assure that every unit released will function as intended throughout its labeled usage period. Finally, although your FDA 483 response includes a letter you sent to the product owner listing specific batches that must be evaluated for recall due to complaint samples with sterility failures, the letter included no decision to recall these batches.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>It is essential that these unpreserved formulations and associated presentations afford robust protection in each unit produced in order to prevent potential consumer harm resulting from contamination during use of your \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> products.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In response to this letter, provide:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cul>\u003Cli>A comprehensive, independent assessment of your overall system for investigating deviations, discrepancies, complaints, out-of-specification (OOS) results, and failures. Provide a detailed action plan to remediate this system. Your action plan should include, but not be limited to, significant improvements in investigation competencies, scope determination, root cause evaluation, CAPA effectiveness, quality oversight, and written procedures. Address how your firm will ensure all phases of investigations are appropriately conducted.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>An independent, retrospective review of investigations into all batches with potential microbial contamination or an OOS microbiological result (whether or not later invalidated). The investigations should be updated, wherever necessary, to detail your findings regarding the potential root causes of the contamination.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>An assessment of microbial hazard and patient risk associated with a unit that becomes contaminated in use. Provide your studies on the growth properties (microbial challenge studies) of each formulation in the event of in-use contamination, based on the maximum number of days of permitted use. In addition, in the event the formulation is deemed suitable following these studies, state whether your firm plans to reduce allowable use periods to no longer than 30 days.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>A comprehensive, independent evaluation of the suitability of the container-closure systems used for your \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug products that are intended to continuously protect against ingress of microbial contamination throughout the period of use. At minimum, provide an evaluation of the following:\u003Cbr>o Product design considerations\u003Cbr> A general description of each possible failure mode that could potentially permit ingress of microbial contamination over its used period\u003Cbr> Detailed description of all influential variables, on their own or in combination, that may lead to lost integrity (irrespective of whether it may be transient) at any time at point of manufacture, or during consumer use. Regarding the latter, address potential vulnerability to \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and durability issues. Influential variables should include but not be limited to:\u003Cbr>• internal pressure changes;\u003Cbr>• list of all possible out-of-tolerance characteristics or defects for each container-closure component;\u003Cbr>• each potential mechanical failure mode of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, etc.);\u003Cbr>• possible assembly errors;\u003Cbr>• potential for a defective \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, or microbial growth in the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>;\u003Cbr>• events leading to leaks or punctures;\u003Cbr>• all other potential variables.\u003Cbr> Compatibility of the product design with the specific container-closure system(s) (e.g., integrity, functionality).\u003Cbr>o Container-closure system capability and suitability of incoming lots\u003Cbr> Detailed container-closure system design and performance specifications that you require of the manufacturer (supplier) who performs the primary container-closure production steps prior to the final filling\u002Fclosing process performed at your facility.\u003Cbr> Summary of all studies done by your firm to evaluate whether the container-closure system design (and its related performance specifications) is appropriate to maintain the sterility of all marketed units throughout their use period.\u003Cbr> For each lot received from your supplier for the last three years, provide the numbers and types of defects obtained during manufacture of the container-closure system, as well as theoretical and actual yields.\u003Cbr> Whether any incoming container-closure lot was rejected by your firm.\u003Cbr> Process capability (e.g., Cpk, Ppk) of each significant step in the manufacturing assembly process for each of your product container-closure systems. Describe the various nonconformities that can occur, including a list of each defect type and its criticality classification, all in-process tests and limits, and maximum tolerances for each defect type.\u003Cbr> Other quality criteria used by your firm to evaluate suitability of each incoming lot of the pre-assembled product container-closure and its ability to assure backflow prevention (e.g., determining if any significant variances or deviations were associated with the specific lot)\u003Cbr>o Drug product manufacturing and stability\u003Cbr> All functionality tests, their purposes\u002Fcapabilities, and associated acceptance criteria\u003Cbr> A detailed list of defect types and tolerances, as well as theoretical and actual yields for drug product batches manufactured in the last three years.\u003Cbr> An analysis of when an investigation is triggered, how nonconforming units are removed, how process control is maintained, and how any recurring quality problems are addressed.\u003Cbr> An assessment of whether the process is capable of detecting and removing all nonconforming units and whether nonconformities are appropriately evaluated to determine root cause and appropriate follow-up action to prevent future nonconformities.\u003Cbr> A description of how you assure that every unit released in a batch will have a defect-proof mechanism that always prevents microbial ingress so as to protect consumers from severe infection risk throughout its used period.\u003Cbr>o During use and after opening of sealed units\u003Cbr> Human factors or other studies to determine if your container-closure systems reproducibly yield functionality that always protects products from contamination under repeated and anticipated consumer use, including under conditions of stress throughout the usage period and for the maximum number of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.\u003Cbr>o CAPAs and mitigations to be implemented based on the above data and independent assessment.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>A list in table format (e.g., spreadsheet) of each complaint for drug product with potential contamination (e.g., foreign matter, discoloration, possible fungi\u002Fbacteria) on the container\u002Fclosure system or in the product from the past three years as of the date of this letter, with the following columns:\u003Cbr>o Product type (\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>), whether it contains \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, batch number, and date of manufacture.\u003Cbr>o Date of complaint awareness, and whether a complaint sample was requested and received. If complaint sample was not initially received, describe how many follow-up attempts were made.\u003Cbr>o Complaint sample analysis results, including sterility test result, microbial identification, and date of analysis.\u003Cbr>o The potential or confirmed root causes.\u003Cbr>o If the product is \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, detail any examination of the complaint samples or a reserve sample that was performed to evaluate proper functioning of the container\u002Fclosure system.\u003Cbr>o If microorganisms were recovered, detail the number of times the same genus (include species if available) was recovered in EM\u002FPM of your aseptic processing facility within a year (before and after) the date of manufacture.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003C\u002Ful>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>2. Your firm failed to establish and follow appropriate written procedures that are designed to prevent microbiological contamination of drug products purporting to be sterile, and that include validation of all aseptic and sterilization processes (21 CFR 211.113(b)).\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>We observed poor aseptic practices during and after the setup of your filling line \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> which is used in the manufacture of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug products.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cul>\u003Cli>Personnel blocked unidirectional airflow to \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> with their gloves during installation of the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> assembly.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>An operator conducting line clearance after setup leaned their head and torso through \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> into the ISO 5 filling area and failed to disinfect the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> before \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003C\u002Ful>\u003Cp>In addition, the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> equipment on this line was poorly designed. The \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> partially blocked unidirectional airflow over the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> bowl and fully blocked unidirectional airflow over the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Your aseptic manufacturing processes should be designed, and operations executed, to prevent contamination hazards to your sterile product. Flaws in the design of cleanrooms and aseptic processing lines or improper execution of aseptic operations can promote influx of contamination into the critical processing area.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In your response, you state that you will revise your procedures for proper aseptic behavior and retrain personnel. You also state that third-party consultants will observe personnel and provide corrective feedback before commercial production resumes. In addition, you state that the effectiveness of these corrective actions will be evaluated by observing all media fill activities and trending EM\u002FPM results. You also state that the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> equipment has been modified to prevent the blocking of unidirectional airflow.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Your response is inadequate. It does not include establishing a program to routinely monitor personnel for proper aseptic technique during commercial production, which is especially important considering your previous attempts to correct poor aseptic behavior were unsuccessful. In addition, it does not mention evaluating other aseptic processing line equipment for design deficiencies that are similarly vulnerable to impeded unidirectional airflow.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In response to this letter, provide:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cul>\u003Cli>A remediation plan that better assures ongoing management oversight throughout the manufacturing lifecycle of all drug products. Provide a more data-driven and scientifically sound program that identifies sources of process variability and assures that manufacturing operations meet appropriate parameters and quality standards. This includes, but is not limited to, evaluating suitability of equipment for its intended use, ensuring quality of input materials, determining the capability and reliability of each manufacturing process step and its controls, and vigilant ongoing monitoring of process performance and product quality.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>A comprehensive, independent risk assessment of all contamination hazards with respect to all aseptic processes, equipment, and facilities including, but not limited to:\u003Cbr>o all human interactions within the ISO 5 area (e.g., risk reduction or elimination of manual interventions wherever possible)\u003Cbr>o equipment suitability (e.g., reliability, capability, ergonomics, placement) and sufficient cleanroom space\u003Cbr>o air quality in the ISO 5 area and surrounding room including, but not limited to, air volume and flow\u003Cbr>o facility layout\u003Cbr>o personnel flow and material flow (movement throughout all rooms used to conduct and support sterile operations and all material transfers)\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>A detailed remediation plan with timelines to address the findings of the contamination hazards risk assessment. Describe specific tangible improvements to be made to aseptic processing operation design and control at your facility and explain how this CAPA plan will robustly remediate your deficient sterile manufacturing operations. Include comprehensive changes to the design of both your aseptic processing lines and cleanrooms. Also, describe your plans for qualification and validation of your extensively remediated operations.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>Your systematic plan to assure adherence to appropriate aseptic practices, cleanroom behavior, and written procedures including, not but limited to, an assessment of the following with accompanying CAPA:\u003Cbr>o suitability of actual practices based on extensive retrospective review and prospective observation of aseptic processing operations\u003Cbr>o deficiencies in production management oversight and identification of specific improvements to ensure effective and routine supervisory oversight for all batches\u003Cbr>o frequency and depth of quality unit (QU) oversight (e.g., audit, ad hoc, daily interactions) of aseptic processing and its support operations\u003Cbr>o adequacy of written procedures\u003Cbr>o the risk assessment should also evaluate how poor aseptic technique and cleanroom behavior may have affected the quality and sterility of your drugs\u003C\u002Fli>\u003C\u002Ful>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>3. Your firm failed to maintain floors, walls, and ceilings of smooth, hard surfaces that are easily cleanable in aseptic processing areas and establish an adequate system for maintaining equipment used to control the aseptic conditions (21 CFR 211.42(c)(10)(i) and 211.42(c)(10)(vi)).\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cem>Facility Construction and Maintenance\u003C\u002Fem>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The floors, walls, and ceilings in your aseptic processing area are not constructed of smooth, hard surfaces that can be easily cleaned, or were not adequately maintained. Many ceilings and partitions in the classified areas of your \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> building are made of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> which you have stated is “not waterproof” and “cannot be decontaminated.” This material is in areas such as filling rooms, compounding rooms, machine part washing rooms, the weighing area, and corridors. This is especially concerning considering the numerous water incursions you have had in the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> classified areas between January 2024 and January 2026, along with numerous mold recoveries in the routine production data available between January 2024 and March 2025.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Any water leak in cleanrooms of an aseptic processing facility poses an unacceptable risk to environmental control and product sterility.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In addition, our investigators documented damage in the floors, ceilings, and walls in classified areas, including cracks and gaps that exposed the base materials underneath. Our investigators also documented cracked \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> material and apparent rust on the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> used in some of these areas. Given these multiple water incursions and other issues related to materials of construction, it remains unclear whether your facility infrastructure is suitable for aseptic manufacturing.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cem>Equipment Maintenance\u003C\u002Fem>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>During the inspection, we observed unsuitable conditions in the ISO 5 area of filling line \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> where aseptic processing is conducted. For example:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cul>\u003Cli>A handle above the cap bowl that holds sterile caps during filling was coated with what appeared to be flaking black paint.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>The \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> for the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, which are adjacent to sterile \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and open bottles, appeared to be corroded.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003C\u002Ful>\u003Cp>In your response to these equipment maintenance deficiencies, you state that these surfaces have been repaired and cleaned, and all other Grade A and B equipment surfaces have been inspected. You also state that procedures for the inspection of the aseptic processing equipment and overhead surfaces in lines \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> have been revised to require routine documented inspections and immediate escalation if issues are found.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Your response is inadequate. It does not sufficiently define routine inspections to determine state of repair of your aseptic processing facility, including but not limited to ensuring these inspections encompass all aseptic processing operations. In addition, it does not address investigating why responsible operations and QU personnel did not recognize and resolve these objectionable conditions when they occurred.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In your response addressing your facility deficiencies, you state that you will replace all \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> with smooth, non-porous, waterproof materials in all classified areas in August 2026. You also state that the damaged areas have been “repaired or temporarily sealed” and that you have created a procedure specifying the need for routine checks into facility conditions, including before resuming production after \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Your response is inadequate because it does not state that you will cease manufacturing all \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug products (including \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>) for the U.S. market until all comprehensive remediations in the design and maintenance of your facility and equipment have been implemented. In addition, it does not address investigating why your production personnel did not recognize or address the damaged surfaces when they first occurred.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In response to this letter, provide:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cul>\u003Cli>Your CAPA plan to implement routine, vigilant operations management oversight of facilities and equipment. This plan should ensure, among other things, prompt detection of equipment\u002Ffacilities performance issues, effective execution of repairs, adherence to appropriate preventive maintenance schedules, timely technological upgrades to the equipment\u002Ffacility infrastructure, and improved systems for ongoing management review. Your plan should also ensure that appropriate actions are taken throughout the company network.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003C\u002Ful>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>4. Your firm failed to establish an adequate system for cleaning and disinfecting the room and equipment to produce aseptic conditions (21 CFR 211.42(c)(10)(v)).\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Your aseptic processing operation is inadequately designed to prevent contamination of your sterile \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug products.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>For example, you do not sterilize critical equipment components, such as bowls, \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> that handle container\u002Fclosure parts, between batches. Instead, you disinfect the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> product ISO 5 (Grade A) filling lines \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> using sporicide and \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>It is critical to assure your firm has a program for cleaning and sterilization of all equipment that comes into contact with sterile product constituents (i.e., parts contacting sterilized formulation, containers, and closures).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In your response, you state that some of these parts cannot be \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> due to machine design, and you plan to start using sporicide between each batch, increase “microbiological sampling” by \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>%, and begin swabbing container\u002Fclosure contact equipment.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Your response is inadequate. It does not include an impact assessment of this violation on drug product that is currently on the U.S. market, nor a commitment for a CAPA to ensure use of sterilizable equipment in the future. The use of sporicide, increased sampling, and equipment swabbing are not acceptable substitutes for sterilizing your product contact equipment.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In response to this letter, provide:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cul>\u003Cli>A CAPA plan, based on the retrospective assessment of your cleaning and disinfection program, that includes appropriate remediations to your cleaning and disinfection processes and practices, and timelines for completion. Include the following as part of the assessment and CAPA plan:\u003Cbr>o a detailed summary of vulnerabilities in your process for lifecycle management of equipment cleaning and disinfection\u003Cbr>o a list of improvements, with an explanation how each will enhance cleaning and disinfection effectiveness\u003Cbr>o improved ongoing verification of proper cleaning and disinfection execution for all products and equipment and,\u003Cbr>o any other needed remediations\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>Provide a detailed summary of vulnerabilities in your process for lifecycle management of equipment cleaning and disinfection. Describe improvements to your cleaning and disinfection program, including enhancements to cleaning effectiveness; improved ongoing verification of proper cleaning and disinfection execution for all products and equipment; and all other needed remediations.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>A comprehensive assessment and remediation plan to ensure your QU is given the authority and resources to effectively function. The assessment should also include, but not be limited to:\u003Cbr>o a determination of whether procedures used by your firm are robust and appropriate\u003Cbr>o provisions for QU oversight throughout your operations to evaluate adherence to appropriate practices\u003Cbr>o a complete and final review of each batch and its related information before the QU disposition decision\u003Cbr>o oversight and approval of investigations and discharging of all other QU duties to ensure identity, strength, quality, and purity of all products\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>Describe how top management supports quality assurance and reliable operations, including but not limited to, timely provision of resources to proactively address emerging manufacturing\u002Fquality issues and to assure a continuing state of control.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003C\u002Ful>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Drug Production Ceased and Suspended\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>We acknowledge your commitment to cease production of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug products on line \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and suspend production of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug products on lines \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> for the U.S. market until they have been replaced.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>If you plan to resume any \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug product manufacturing operations regulated under the FD&amp;C Act, notify this office before resuming your \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug product manufacturing operations. You are responsible for resolving all deficiencies and systemic flaws to ensure your firm is capable of ongoing CGMP compliance. In your notification to the Agency, provide a summary of your remediations to demonstrate that you have appropriately completed all CAPAs.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Drug Recall\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>On April 7, 2026, FDA held a teleconference with you recommending you consider removing any batches of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug products currently in distribution from the U.S. market.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Between \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, you issued voluntary recalls of all \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug products currently in distribution from the U.S. market due to lack of sterility assurance. The company announcements were posted to the FDA website:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Repeat Violations at Facility\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In a previous warning letter (WL 320-25-70), FDA cited similar severe CGMP violations. The recurrence of these violations demonstrates that your firm’s corrective actions were neither effective nor durable. Notably, your failure to correct these issues led to unacceptable drug product being distributed to the U.S. market.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Ineffective Quality System\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Significant findings in this letter demonstrate that your firm does not operate an effective quality system in accord with CGMP. In addition to the lack of effective management oversight of your production operations, we found your QU is not enabled to exercise proper authority and\u002For has insufficiently implemented its responsibilities. Executive management should immediately and comprehensively assess your company’s global manufacturing operations to ensure that your systems, processes, and products conform to FDA requirements.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Additional Guidance on Aseptic Processing\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>See FDA’s guidance document \u003Cem>Sterile Drug Products Produced by Aseptic Processing—Current Good Manufacturing Practice\u003C\u002Fem> to help you meet the CGMP requirements when manufacturing sterile drugs using aseptic processing at https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Fregulatory-information\u002Fsearch-fda-guidance-documents\u002Fsterile-drug-products-produced-aseptic-processing-current-good-manufacturing-practice.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>CGMP Consultant\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Based upon the nature of the violations we identified at your firm, you should engage a consultant qualified as set forth in 21 CFR 211.34 to evaluate your operations and to assist your firm in meeting CGMP requirements if your firm intends to resume manufacturing drugs for the U.S. market. The qualified consultant should also perform a comprehensive six-system audit of your entire operation for CGMP compliance and evaluate the completion and efficacy of your CAPA before you pursue resolution of your firm’s compliance status with FDA.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Your use of a consultant does not relieve your firm’s obligation to comply with CGMP. Your firm’s executive management remains responsible for resolving all deficiencies and systemic flaws to ensure ongoing CGMP compliance.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Conclusion\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The violations cited in this letter are not intended to be an all-inclusive list of violations that exist at your facility. You are responsible for investigating and determining the causes of any violations and for preventing their recurrence or the occurrence of other violations.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>If you are considering an action that is likely to lead to a disruption in the supply of drugs produced at your facility, FDA requests that you contact CDER’s Drug Shortages Staff immediately, at drugshortages@fda.hhs.gov, so that FDA can work with you on the most effective way to bring your operations into compliance with the law. Contacting the Drug Shortages Staff also allows you to meet any obligations you may have to report discontinuances or interruptions in your drug manufacture under 21 U.S.C. 356C(b). This also allows FDA to consider, as soon as possible, what actions, if any, may be needed to avoid shortages and protect the health of patients who depend on your products.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>FDA placed all drugs and drug products offered for import into the United States from your firm on Import Alert 66-40 on April 27, 2026.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Correct any violations promptly. FDA may withhold approval of new applications or supplements listing your firm as a drug manufacturer until any violations are completely addressed and we confirm your compliance with CGMP. We may re-inspect to verify that you have completed corrective actions to any violations.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Failure to address any violations may also result in the FDA continuing to refuse admission of articles manufactured at 27 Rue de la Lombardiere, 07100 Annonay, Ardeche, France, into the United States under section 801(a)(3) of the FD&amp;C Act, 21 U.S.C. 381(a)(3). Articles under this authority that appear to be adulterated may be detained or refused admission, in that the methods and controls used in their manufacture do not appear to conform to CGMP within the meaning of section 501(a)(2)(B) of the FD&amp;C Act, 21 U.S.C. 351(a)(2)(B).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>This letter notifies you of our findings and provides you an opportunity to address the above deficiencies. After you receive this letter, respond to this office in writing within 15 working days\u003Cem>\u003Cstrong>\u003Csup>1\u003C\u002Fsup>\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fem>. Specify what you have done to address any violations and to prevent their recurrence. In response to this letter, you may provide additional information for our consideration as we continue to assess your activities and practices and\u002For submit a request to schedule an FDA inspection. If you cannot complete corrective actions within 15 working days, state your reasons for delay and your schedule for completion.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Send your electronic reply to CDER-OC-OMQ-Communications@fda.hhs.gov. Identify your response with FEI 3007058211 and ATTN: Russell Riley.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Sincerely,\u003Cbr>\u002FS\u002F\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Francis Godwin\u003Cbr>Director\u003Cbr>Office of Manufacturing Quality\u003Cbr>Office of Compliance\u003Cbr>Center for Drug Evaluation and Research\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>CC: Mr. Cédric Vandermeiren\u003Cbr>General Manager\u003Cbr>Excelvision\u003Cbr>Email: cvandermeiren.corporate@fareva.com\u003Cbr>\u003Cem>\u003Cstrong>____________________________\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fem>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cem>\u003Cstrong>1\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fem> Under program enhancements for the Generic Drug User Fee Amendments (GDUFA) reauthorization for fiscal years (FYs) 2023-2027, also known as the GDUFA III Commitment Letter, your facility may be eligible for a Post-Warning Letter Meeting to obtain preliminary feedback from FDA on the adequacy and completeness of your corrective action plans.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n              \n                                            \n              \n            ","Delivery Method:\n\nVia Email Return Receipt Requested\n\nProduct:\n\nDrugs\n\nRecipient:\n\nRecipient Name\n\nMr. Bernard Fraisse\n\nRecipient Title\n\nCEO\n\nExcelvision - Fareva\n\n1041 Chemin de la Digue du Rhône\n\n07300 Tournon-sur-Rhône\n\nFrance\n\nBFraisse@fareva.com\n\nIssuing Office:\n\nCenter for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER)\n\nUnited States\n\nWarning Letter 320-26-98\nJune 25, 2026\nDear Mr. Fraisse:\nThe United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspected your drug manufacturing facility, Excelvision, FEI 3007058211, at 27 Rue de la Lombardiere, Annonay, from January 12 to 22, 2026.\nThis warning letter summarizes significant violations of Current Good Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) regulations for finished pharmaceuticals. See Title 21 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), parts 210 and 211 (21 CFR parts 210 and 211).\nBecause your methods, facilities, or controls for manufacturing, processing, packing, or holding do not conform to CGMP, your drug products are adulterated within the meaning of section 501(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), 21 U.S.C. 351(a)(2)(B).\nWe reviewed your February 12, 2026, response to our Form FDA 483 in detail and acknowledge receipt of your subsequent correspondence.\nDuring our inspection, our investigators observed specific violations including, but not limited to, the following.\n1. Your firm failed to thoroughly investigate any unexplained discrepancy or failure of a batch or any of its components to meet any of its specifications, whether or not the batch has already been distributed (21 CFR 211.192).\nYou failed to adequately investigate customer complaints for the various sterile (b)(4) drug products (prescription and over-the-counter) you manufacture. Your investigations were not thorough, did not appropriately expand in scope, and lacked a scientifically supported determination of root causes. You also failed to identify and implement adequate and timely corrective actions and preventive actions (CAPAs).\nYour product is intended to maintain sterility of its contents after (b)(4) by the consumer. However, since our previous inspection in November 2024, your firm has received a substantial number of complaints related to the presence of contamination.\nVisible evidence of contamination included mold, black specks, and discoloration on the tips and inner caps of containers for your (b)(4) drug product, (b)(4). Several complaint samples subsequently failed sterility testing. Notably, nine such non-sterility events have occurred in the last three years.\nYou failed to adequately determine which hazards in your manufacturing operation and container-closure systems led to these critical, repeated incidents of contamination in your (b)(4) drug products.\nSpecifically, you failed to adequately investigate potential container-closure integrity defects that would allow ingress of microbial contamination, which your product is intended to strictly preclude.\nYou also failed to adequately assess potential sources of contamination from the manufacturing process as you neglected to evaluate relevant environmental and personnel monitoring (EM\u002FPM) data. For example, the microorganism recovered from the failed complaint sample sterility test involving (b)(4) batch (b)(4) was identified as Alternaria alternata. This was the same microorganism recovered in EM\u002FPM samples collected both before and after this batch was manufactured, including in the room where this batch was filled. Your complaint investigation report did not include this critical information.\nSimilarly, your firm also failed to adequately investigate numerous contamination complaints related to your (b)(4) products.\nInstead of conducting a thorough, scientifically supported, and evidence-based root cause analysis, your firm attributed most of the root causes to inadequate handling by customers who used your products and concluded that no further action was necessary.\nIf contaminated, (b)(4) drug products pose a heightened risk of harm because (b)(4). Microbes introduced directly into (b)(4) can pose a serious risk to consumers. Irreversible damage including (b)(4) can occur, and in some cases, may progress to life-threatening systemic infection. In addition, some components in your (b)(4) drugs, such as (b)(4), could serve as a nutrition source for contaminating microorganisms and promote their growth.\nIn your response, you state that you will revise the complaint procedure to include a comparison of the microorganisms recovered from complaint samples with those found during environmental monitoring and to describe how to proceed when a complaint sample fails sterility testing. You also acknowledge that the absence of a (b)(4) in a formulation should be factored into your risk analysis when evaluating complaints. You also state that two of the aseptic processing lines will not be used to manufacture additional drug products for the U.S. market and they will be replaced with new processing lines.\nYour response is inadequate. It provides no evidence to support the investigation conclusions of inadequate handling by customers. It also provides no explanation for how microorganisms contaminated these drug products if they were sterile when released. We are also very concerned about the suitability of your container-closure system and whether you can effectively assure that every unit released will function as intended throughout its labeled usage period. Finally, although your FDA 483 response includes a letter you sent to the product owner listing specific batches that must be evaluated for recall due to complaint samples with sterility failures, the letter included no decision to recall these batches.\nIt is essential that these unpreserved formulations and associated presentations afford robust protection in each unit produced in order to prevent potential consumer harm resulting from contamination during use of your (b)(4) products.\nIn response to this letter, provide:\nA comprehensive, independent assessment of your overall system for investigating deviations, discrepancies, complaints, out-of-specification (OOS) results, and failures. Provide a detailed action plan to remediate this system. Your action plan should include, but not be limited to, significant improvements in investigation competencies, scope determination, root cause evaluation, CAPA effectiveness, quality oversight, and written procedures. Address how your firm will ensure all phases of investigations are appropriately conducted.\nAn independent, retrospective review of investigations into all batches with potential microbial contamination or an OOS microbiological result (whether or not later invalidated). The investigations should be updated, wherever necessary, to detail your findings regarding the potential root causes of the contamination.\nAn assessment of microbial hazard and patient risk associated with a unit that becomes contaminated in use. Provide your studies on the growth properties (microbial challenge studies) of each formulation in the event of in-use contamination, based on the maximum number of days of permitted use. In addition, in the event the formulation is deemed suitable following these studies, state whether your firm plans to reduce allowable use periods to no longer than 30 days.\nA comprehensive, independent evaluation of the suitability of the container-closure systems used for your (b)(4) drug products that are intended to continuously protect against ingress of microbial contamination throughout the period of use. At minimum, provide an evaluation of the following:\no Product design considerations\n A general description of each possible failure mode that could potentially permit ingress of microbial contamination over its used period\n Detailed description of all influential variables, on their own or in combination, that may lead to lost integrity (irrespective of whether it may be transient) at any time at point of manufacture, or during consumer use. Regarding the latter, address potential vulnerability to (b)(4) and durability issues. Influential variables should include but not be limited to:\n• internal pressure changes;\n• list of all possible out-of-tolerance characteristics or defects for each container-closure component;\n• each potential mechanical failure mode of (b)(4), etc.);\n• possible assembly errors;\n• potential for a defective (b)(4), or microbial growth in the (b)(4);\n• events leading to leaks or punctures;\n• all other potential variables.\n Compatibility of the product design with the specific container-closure system(s) (e.g., integrity, functionality).\no Container-closure system capability and suitability of incoming lots\n Detailed container-closure system design and performance specifications that you require of the manufacturer (supplier) who performs the primary container-closure production steps prior to the final filling\u002Fclosing process performed at your facility.\n Summary of all studies done by your firm to evaluate whether the container-closure system design (and its related performance specifications) is appropriate to maintain the sterility of all marketed units throughout their use period.\n For each lot received from your supplier for the last three years, provide the numbers and types of defects obtained during manufacture of the container-closure system, as well as theoretical and actual yields.\n Whether any incoming container-closure lot was rejected by your firm.\n Process capability (e.g., Cpk, Ppk) of each significant step in the manufacturing assembly process for each of your product container-closure systems. Describe the various nonconformities that can occur, including a list of each defect type and its criticality classification, all in-process tests and limits, and maximum tolerances for each defect type.\n Other quality criteria used by your firm to evaluate suitability of each incoming lot of the pre-assembled product container-closure and its ability to assure backflow prevention (e.g., determining if any significant variances or deviations were associated with the specific lot)\no Drug product manufacturing and stability\n All functionality tests, their purposes\u002Fcapabilities, and associated acceptance criteria\n A detailed list of defect types and tolerances, as well as theoretical and actual yields for drug product batches manufactured in the last three years.\n An analysis of when an investigation is triggered, how nonconforming units are removed, how process control is maintained, and how any recurring quality problems are addressed.\n An assessment of whether the process is capable of detecting and removing all nonconforming units and whether nonconformities are appropriately evaluated to determine root cause and appropriate follow-up action to prevent future nonconformities.\n A description of how you assure that every unit released in a batch will have a defect-proof mechanism that always prevents microbial ingress so as to protect consumers from severe infection risk throughout its used period.\no During use and after opening of sealed units\n Human factors or other studies to determine if your container-closure systems reproducibly yield functionality that always protects products from contamination under repeated and anticipated consumer use, including under conditions of stress throughout the usage period and for the maximum number of (b)(4).\no CAPAs and mitigations to be implemented based on the above data and independent assessment.\nA list in table format (e.g., spreadsheet) of each complaint for drug product with potential contamination (e.g., foreign matter, discoloration, possible fungi\u002Fbacteria) on the container\u002Fclosure system or in the product from the past three years as of the date of this letter, with the following columns:\no Product type ((b)(4)), whether it contains (b)(4), batch number, and date of manufacture.\no Date of complaint awareness, and whether a complaint sample was requested and received. If complaint sample was not initially received, describe how many follow-up attempts were made.\no Complaint sample analysis results, including sterility test result, microbial identification, and date of analysis.\no The potential or confirmed root causes.\no If the product is (b)(4), detail any examination of the complaint samples or a reserve sample that was performed to evaluate proper functioning of the container\u002Fclosure system.\no If microorganisms were recovered, detail the number of times the same genus (include species if available) was recovered in EM\u002FPM of your aseptic processing facility within a year (before and after) the date of manufacture.\n2. Your firm failed to establish and follow appropriate written procedures that are designed to prevent microbiological contamination of drug products purporting to be sterile, and that include validation of all aseptic and sterilization processes (21 CFR 211.113(b)).\nWe observed poor aseptic practices during and after the setup of your filling line (b)(4) which is used in the manufacture of (b)(4) drug products.\nPersonnel blocked unidirectional airflow to (b)(4) with their gloves during installation of the (b)(4) assembly.\nAn operator conducting line clearance after setup leaned their head and torso through (b)(4) into the ISO 5 filling area and failed to disinfect the (b)(4) before (b)(4).\nIn addition, the (b)(4) equipment on this line was poorly designed. The (b)(4) partially blocked unidirectional airflow over the (b)(4) bowl and fully blocked unidirectional airflow over the (b)(4).\nYour aseptic manufacturing processes should be designed, and operations executed, to prevent contamination hazards to your sterile product. Flaws in the design of cleanrooms and aseptic processing lines or improper execution of aseptic operations can promote influx of contamination into the critical processing area.\nIn your response, you state that you will revise your procedures for proper aseptic behavior and retrain personnel. You also state that third-party consultants will observe personnel and provide corrective feedback before commercial production resumes. In addition, you state that the effectiveness of these corrective actions will be evaluated by observing all media fill activities and trending EM\u002FPM results. You also state that the (b)(4) equipment has been modified to prevent the blocking of unidirectional airflow.\nYour response is inadequate. It does not include establishing a program to routinely monitor personnel for proper aseptic technique during commercial production, which is especially important considering your previous attempts to correct poor aseptic behavior were unsuccessful. In addition, it does not mention evaluating other aseptic processing line equipment for design deficiencies that are similarly vulnerable to impeded unidirectional airflow.\nIn response to this letter, provide:\nA remediation plan that better assures ongoing management oversight throughout the manufacturing lifecycle of all drug products. Provide a more data-driven and scientifically sound program that identifies sources of process variability and assures that manufacturing operations meet appropriate parameters and quality standards. This includes, but is not limited to, evaluating suitability of equipment for its intended use, ensuring quality of input materials, determining the capability and reliability of each manufacturing process step and its controls, and vigilant ongoing monitoring of process performance and product quality.\nA comprehensive, independent risk assessment of all contamination hazards with respect to all aseptic processes, equipment, and facilities including, but not limited to:\no all human interactions within the ISO 5 area (e.g., risk reduction or elimination of manual interventions wherever possible)\no equipment suitability (e.g., reliability, capability, ergonomics, placement) and sufficient cleanroom space\no air quality in the ISO 5 area and surrounding room including, but not limited to, air volume and flow\no facility layout\no personnel flow and material flow (movement throughout all rooms used to conduct and support sterile operations and all material transfers)\nA detailed remediation plan with timelines to address the findings of the contamination hazards risk assessment. Describe specific tangible improvements to be made to aseptic processing operation design and control at your facility and explain how this CAPA plan will robustly remediate your deficient sterile manufacturing operations. Include comprehensive changes to the design of both your aseptic processing lines and cleanrooms. Also, describe your plans for qualification and validation of your extensively remediated operations.\nYour systematic plan to assure adherence to appropriate aseptic practices, cleanroom behavior, and written procedures including, not but limited to, an assessment of the following with accompanying CAPA:\no suitability of actual practices based on extensive retrospective review and prospective observation of aseptic processing operations\no deficiencies in production management oversight and identification of specific improvements to ensure effective and routine supervisory oversight for all batches\no frequency and depth of quality unit (QU) oversight (e.g., audit, ad hoc, daily interactions) of aseptic processing and its support operations\no adequacy of written procedures\no the risk assessment should also evaluate how poor aseptic technique and cleanroom behavior may have affected the quality and sterility of your drugs\n3. Your firm failed to maintain floors, walls, and ceilings of smooth, hard surfaces that are easily cleanable in aseptic processing areas and establish an adequate system for maintaining equipment used to control the aseptic conditions (21 CFR 211.42(c)(10)(i) and 211.42(c)(10)(vi)).\nFacility Construction and Maintenance\nThe floors, walls, and ceilings in your aseptic processing area are not constructed of smooth, hard surfaces that can be easily cleaned, or were not adequately maintained. Many ceilings and partitions in the classified areas of your (b)(4) building are made of (b)(4) which you have stated is “not waterproof” and “cannot be decontaminated.” This material is in areas such as filling rooms, compounding rooms, machine part washing rooms, the weighing area, and corridors. This is especially concerning considering the numerous water incursions you have had in the (b)(4) classified areas between January 2024 and January 2026, along with numerous mold recoveries in the routine production data available between January 2024 and March 2025.\nAny water leak in cleanrooms of an aseptic processing facility poses an unacceptable risk to environmental control and product sterility.\nIn addition, our investigators documented damage in the floors, ceilings, and walls in classified areas, including cracks and gaps that exposed the base materials underneath. Our investigators also documented cracked (b)(4) material and apparent rust on the (b)(4) used in some of these areas. Given these multiple water incursions and other issues related to materials of construction, it remains unclear whether your facility infrastructure is suitable for aseptic manufacturing.\nEquipment Maintenance\nDuring the inspection, we observed unsuitable conditions in the ISO 5 area of filling line (b)(4) where aseptic processing is conducted. For example:\nA handle above the cap bowl that holds sterile caps during filling was coated with what appeared to be flaking black paint.\nThe (b)(4) for the (b)(4), which are adjacent to sterile (b)(4) and open bottles, appeared to be corroded.\nIn your response to these equipment maintenance deficiencies, you state that these surfaces have been repaired and cleaned, and all other Grade A and B equipment surfaces have been inspected. You also state that procedures for the inspection of the aseptic processing equipment and overhead surfaces in lines (b)(4) have been revised to require routine documented inspections and immediate escalation if issues are found.\nYour response is inadequate. It does not sufficiently define routine inspections to determine state of repair of your aseptic processing facility, including but not limited to ensuring these inspections encompass all aseptic processing operations. In addition, it does not address investigating why responsible operations and QU personnel did not recognize and resolve these objectionable conditions when they occurred.\nIn your response addressing your facility deficiencies, you state that you will replace all (b)(4) with smooth, non-porous, waterproof materials in all classified areas in August 2026. You also state that the damaged areas have been “repaired or temporarily sealed” and that you have created a procedure specifying the need for routine checks into facility conditions, including before resuming production after (b)(4).\nYour response is inadequate because it does not state that you will cease manufacturing all (b)(4) drug products (including (b)(4)) for the U.S. market until all comprehensive remediations in the design and maintenance of your facility and equipment have been implemented. In addition, it does not address investigating why your production personnel did not recognize or address the damaged surfaces when they first occurred.\nIn response to this letter, provide:\nYour CAPA plan to implement routine, vigilant operations management oversight of facilities and equipment. This plan should ensure, among other things, prompt detection of equipment\u002Ffacilities performance issues, effective execution of repairs, adherence to appropriate preventive maintenance schedules, timely technological upgrades to the equipment\u002Ffacility infrastructure, and improved systems for ongoing management review. Your plan should also ensure that appropriate actions are taken throughout the company network.\n4. Your firm failed to establish an adequate system for cleaning and disinfecting the room and equipment to produce aseptic conditions (21 CFR 211.42(c)(10)(v)).\nYour aseptic processing operation is inadequately designed to prevent contamination of your sterile (b)(4) drug products.\nFor example, you do not sterilize critical equipment components, such as bowls, (b)(4) that handle container\u002Fclosure parts, between batches. Instead, you disinfect the (b)(4) product ISO 5 (Grade A) filling lines (b)(4) using sporicide and (b)(4).\nIt is critical to assure your firm has a program for cleaning and sterilization of all equipment that comes into contact with sterile product constituents (i.e., parts contacting sterilized formulation, containers, and closures).\nIn your response, you state that some of these parts cannot be (b)(4) due to machine design, and you plan to start using sporicide between each batch, increase “microbiological sampling” by (b)(4)%, and begin swabbing container\u002Fclosure contact equipment.\nYour response is inadequate. It does not include an impact assessment of this violation on drug product that is currently on the U.S. market, nor a commitment for a CAPA to ensure use of sterilizable equipment in the future. The use of sporicide, increased sampling, and equipment swabbing are not acceptable substitutes for sterilizing your product contact equipment.\nIn response to this letter, provide:\nA CAPA plan, based on the retrospective assessment of your cleaning and disinfection program, that includes appropriate remediations to your cleaning and disinfection processes and practices, and timelines for completion. Include the following as part of the assessment and CAPA plan:\no a detailed summary of vulnerabilities in your process for lifecycle management of equipment cleaning and disinfection\no a list of improvements, with an explanation how each will enhance cleaning and disinfection effectiveness\no improved ongoing verification of proper cleaning and disinfection execution for all products and equipment and,\no any other needed remediations\nProvide a detailed summary of vulnerabilities in your process for lifecycle management of equipment cleaning and disinfection. Describe improvements to your cleaning and disinfection program, including enhancements to cleaning effectiveness; improved ongoing verification of proper cleaning and disinfection execution for all products and equipment; and all other needed remediations.\nA comprehensive assessment and remediation plan to ensure your QU is given the authority and resources to effectively function. The assessment should also include, but not be limited to:\no a determination of whether procedures used by your firm are robust and appropriate\no provisions for QU oversight throughout your operations to evaluate adherence to appropriate practices\no a complete and final review of each batch and its related information before the QU disposition decision\no oversight and approval of investigations and discharging of all other QU duties to ensure identity, strength, quality, and purity of all products\nDescribe how top management supports quality assurance and reliable operations, including but not limited to, timely provision of resources to proactively address emerging manufacturing\u002Fquality issues and to assure a continuing state of control.\nDrug Production Ceased and Suspended\nWe acknowledge your commitment to cease production of (b)(4) drug products on line (b)(4) and suspend production of (b)(4) drug products on lines (b)(4) for the U.S. market until they have been replaced.\nIf you plan to resume any (b)(4) drug product manufacturing operations regulated under the FD&C Act, notify this office before resuming your (b)(4) drug product manufacturing operations. You are responsible for resolving all deficiencies and systemic flaws to ensure your firm is capable of ongoing CGMP compliance. In your notification to the Agency, provide a summary of your remediations to demonstrate that you have appropriately completed all CAPAs.\nDrug Recall\nOn April 7, 2026, FDA held a teleconference with you recommending you consider removing any batches of (b)(4) drug products currently in distribution from the U.S. market.\nBetween (b)(4), you issued voluntary recalls of all (b)(4) drug products currently in distribution from the U.S. market due to lack of sterility assurance. The company announcements were posted to the FDA website:\n(b)(4)\nRepeat Violations at Facility\nIn a previous warning letter (WL 320-25-70), FDA cited similar severe CGMP violations. The recurrence of these violations demonstrates that your firm’s corrective actions were neither effective nor durable. Notably, your failure to correct these issues led to unacceptable drug product being distributed to the U.S. market.\nIneffective Quality System\nSignificant findings in this letter demonstrate that your firm does not operate an effective quality system in accord with CGMP. In addition to the lack of effective management oversight of your production operations, we found your QU is not enabled to exercise proper authority and\u002For has insufficiently implemented its responsibilities. Executive management should immediately and comprehensively assess your company’s global manufacturing operations to ensure that your systems, processes, and products conform to FDA requirements.\nAdditional Guidance on Aseptic Processing\nSee FDA’s guidance document Sterile Drug Products Produced by Aseptic Processing—Current Good Manufacturing Practice to help you meet the CGMP requirements when manufacturing sterile drugs using aseptic processing at https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Fregulatory-information\u002Fsearch-fda-guidance-documents\u002Fsterile-drug-products-produced-aseptic-processing-current-good-manufacturing-practice.\nCGMP Consultant\nBased upon the nature of the violations we identified at your firm, you should engage a consultant qualified as set forth in 21 CFR 211.34 to evaluate your operations and to assist your firm in meeting CGMP requirements if your firm intends to resume manufacturing drugs for the U.S. market. The qualified consultant should also perform a comprehensive six-system audit of your entire operation for CGMP compliance and evaluate the completion and efficacy of your CAPA before you pursue resolution of your firm’s compliance status with FDA.\nYour use of a consultant does not relieve your firm’s obligation to comply with CGMP. Your firm’s executive management remains responsible for resolving all deficiencies and systemic flaws to ensure ongoing CGMP compliance.\nConclusion\nThe violations cited in this letter are not intended to be an all-inclusive list of violations that exist at your facility. You are responsible for investigating and determining the causes of any violations and for preventing their recurrence or the occurrence of other violations.\nIf you are considering an action that is likely to lead to a disruption in the supply of drugs produced at your facility, FDA requests that you contact CDER’s Drug Shortages Staff immediately, at drugshortages@fda.hhs.gov, so that FDA can work with you on the most effective way to bring your operations into compliance with the law. Contacting the Drug Shortages Staff also allows you to meet any obligations you may have to report discontinuances or interruptions in your drug manufacture under 21 U.S.C. 356C(b). This also allows FDA to consider, as soon as possible, what actions, if any, may be needed to avoid shortages and protect the health of patients who depend on your products.\nFDA placed all drugs and drug products offered for import into the United States from your firm on Import Alert 66-40 on April 27, 2026.\nCorrect any violations promptly. FDA may withhold approval of new applications or supplements listing your firm as a drug manufacturer until any violations are completely addressed and we confirm your compliance with CGMP. We may re-inspect to verify that you have completed corrective actions to any violations.\nFailure to address any violations may also result in the FDA continuing to refuse admission of articles manufactured at 27 Rue de la Lombardiere, 07100 Annonay, Ardeche, France, into the United States under section 801(a)(3) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 381(a)(3). Articles under this authority that appear to be adulterated may be detained or refused admission, in that the methods and controls used in their manufacture do not appear to conform to CGMP within the meaning of section 501(a)(2)(B) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 351(a)(2)(B).\nThis letter notifies you of our findings and provides you an opportunity to address the above deficiencies. After you receive this letter, respond to this office in writing within 15 working days1. Specify what you have done to address any violations and to prevent their recurrence. In response to this letter, you may provide additional information for our consideration as we continue to assess your activities and practices and\u002For submit a request to schedule an FDA inspection. If you cannot complete corrective actions within 15 working days, state your reasons for delay and your schedule for completion.\nSend your electronic reply to CDER-OC-OMQ-Communications@fda.hhs.gov. Identify your response with FEI 3007058211 and ATTN: Russell Riley.\nSincerely,\n\u002FS\u002F\nFrancis Godwin\nDirector\nOffice of Manufacturing Quality\nOffice of Compliance\nCenter for Drug Evaluation and Research\nCC: Mr. Cédric Vandermeiren\nGeneral Manager\nExcelvision\nEmail: cvandermeiren.corporate@fareva.com\n____________________________\n1 Under program enhancements for the Generic Drug User Fee Amendments (GDUFA) reauthorization for fiscal years (FYs) 2023-2027, also known as the GDUFA III Commitment Letter, your facility may be eligible for a Post-Warning Letter Meeting to obtain preliminary feedback from FDA on the adequacy and completeness of your corrective action plans.","Excelvision - Fareva","excelvision-726714-fareva","2026-08-18T06:42:28.498414+00:00",null,"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Fexcelvision-726714-fareva","2026-10-26T08:08:38.091482+00:00","Warning Letter","Issued","2026-06-30","Drugs","Mr. Bernard Fraisse","2026-08-19T04:32:18.468+00:00","Via Email Return Receipt Requested","2026-06-25",{"id":31,"raw":32,"subject":12,"body_html":36,"body_text":37,"firm_name":38,"letter_id":39,"created_at":40,"fei_number":19,"letter_url":41,"updated_at":42,"action_type":22,"case_status":23,"posted_date":43,"marcs_cms_no":44,"product_type":25,"closeout_date":19,"issuing_office":11,"recipient_name":26,"body_fetched_at":45,"delivery_method":46,"recipient_title":19,"reference_number":47,"action_taken_date":48,"medical_device_id":19,"response_letter_date":19},907,[33,34,35,11,12,13,13,13],"\u003Ctime datetime=\"2025-05-13T04:00:00Z\">05\u002F13\u002F2025\u003C\u002Ftime>\n","\u003Ctime datetime=\"2025-05-07T04:00:00Z\">05\u002F07\u002F2025\u003C\u002Ftime>\n","\u003Ca href=\"\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Fexcelvision-fareva-703245-05072025\">Excelvision Fareva\u003C\u002Fa>","\n\n                            \n                            \n                            \n                            \n                                              \n  \n \n\n                 \n\n  \u003Chr>\n \n\n\u003Cdiv>\n  \u003Cdl>\n\n              \u003Cdt>Delivery Method:\u003C\u002Fdt> \n        \u003Cdd>VIA EMAIL WITH READ RECEIPT\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              \u003C\u002Fdd>\n      \n              \u003Cdt>Reference #:\u003C\u002Fdt> \n        \u003Cdd>320-25-70\u003C\u002Fdd>\n      \n              \u003Cdt>Product:\u003C\u002Fdt> \n        \u003Cdd>Drugs                          \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n             \n            \n            \n            \n              \n            \n            \n            \u003C\u002Fdd>\n      \n          \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>            \n\n\n\u003Chr>\n\n\u003Cdiv>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdl>\n\n        \u003Cdt>Recipient:\u003C\u002Fdt>\n\n                      \u003Cdd>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdiv>Recipient Name\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n              \u003Cdiv>Mr. Bernard Fraisse\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n          \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\u003C\u002Fdd>\n                                \u003Cdd>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdiv>Recipient Title\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n              \u003Cdiv>President &amp; CEO \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n          \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\u003C\u002Fdd>\n          \n            \u003Cdd>Excelvision Fareva\u003C\u002Fdd>\n\n          \n                      \u003Cdd>\u003Cp>\u003Cspan>32 Pl. de la Gare, 1616\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cspan>Gare\u003C\u002Fspan> \u003Cspan>Luxembourg\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cspan>France\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n          \n          \n          \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>            \n\n       \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdl>\n          \n          \u003Cdt>Issuing Office:\u003C\u002Fdt>\n        \n         \n          \u003Cdd>Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER)\u003C\u002Fdd>\n        \n         \n          \u003Cdd>\u003Cp>\u003Cspan>United States\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n        \n        \n        \n        \n        \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n    \u003Cdl> \n      \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>  \n      \n\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\n \n\n \n\n\u003Chr>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Warning Letter\u003C\u002Fstrong> 320-25-70\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>May 7, 2025\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Dear Mr. Fraisse:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspected your drug manufacturing facility, Excelvision, FEI 3007058211, at 27 Rue de la Lombardiere, Annonay, Ardeche, France, from November 12 to 19, 2024.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>This warning letter summarizes significant violations of Current Good Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) regulations for finished pharmaceuticals. See Title 21 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), parts 210 and 211 (21 CFR parts 210 and 211).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Because your methods, facilities, or controls for manufacturing, processing, packing, or holding do not conform to CGMP, your drug products are adulterated within the meaning of section 501(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&amp;C Act), 21 U.S.C. 351(a)(2)(B).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>We reviewed your December 10, 2024 response to our Form FDA 483 in detail and acknowledge receipt of your subsequent correspondence.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>During our inspection, our investigators observed specific violations including, but not limited to, the following.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>1. Your firm failed to thoroughly investigate any unexplained discrepancy or failure of a batch or any of its components to meet any of its specifications, whether or not the batch has already been distributed (21 CFR 211.192).\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>You failed to adequately investigate customer complaints for the various sterile \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug products (prescription and over-the-counter) you manufacture. Your investigations were not thorough, did not appropriately expand in scope, and lacked a scientifically supported determination of root cause(s). Additionally, they failed to include an evaluation of customer complaint samples from the affected batches. You did not identify or implement adequate corrective actions and preventive actions (CAPAs).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Specifically, between January 2023 and November 2024, you received multiple complaints related to the presence of mold, black specks, and discoloration on the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, and inside the product container of your \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug products. Without supporting evidence, you attributed the root causes to the inadequate handling by customers who used your products (i.e., complainant leaving product residues in the container closure system) and determined that no further action was necessary.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In August 2024, environmental sampling of Room \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, corridor \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, and \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> revealed the presence of \u003Cem>Penicillium citrinum, Fusarium oxysporum\u003C\u002Fem>, and \u003Cem>Aspergillus\u003C\u002Fem> mold species, respectively. On September 25, 2024, during environmental monitoring, an operator involved in the installation of the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> inside the ISO 5 (Grade A) of the additional \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> filling line tested positive for \u003Cem>Penicillium citrinum\u003C\u002Fem> mold species on their right glove. Your investigation documented that water was found underneath the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> floor in the compounding tank in room \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, which is used to manufacture sterile \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug. You attributed the root cause of the mold excursions in the building \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> to the water leaks discovered. On November 8, 2024, and as a corrective action to mold detection, the floors were replaced with a new \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Notably, you had recovered mold species such as \u003Cem>Aspergillus\u003C\u002Fem> (July 13, 2022, filling room \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>), \u003Cem>Zygomycete\u003C\u002Fem> (March 9, 2022, filling room \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>), and \u003Cem>Penicillin\u003C\u002Fem> (November 2, 2022, filling room \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>) in the building \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. However, as part of the investigations, you failed to consider the presence of mold in the ISO7 (Grade B) manufacturing areas over a 3-year period.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The presence of mold, black specks, and discoloration in \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug products presents serious risks to consumers, especially since these are sterile products intended for \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> application. Furthermore, the documented history of mold recovery in the aseptic filling lines and water leaks in the compounding room suggests a persistent environmental control issue that, if left unaddressed, compromises the sterility and safety of your drug products. It also indicates that your CAPAs have been ineffective to eliminate the present of mold in your manufacturing areas.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In your response, you state that the standard operating procedure has been revised to include a “questionnaire” for customers related to microbial contamination, as well as a new indicator to require microbial determination and sterility test for all returned samples. Additionally, you indicate that you will update your procedure for all returned and retained samples related to potential microbial contamination that will be sent to the microbiology laboratory for further examination. Also, the procedure will include genetic identification (i.e., genus and species) of molds to be performed on return samples and compare with mold identified in filling areas.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Your response is inadequate. It fails to provide a comprehensive investigation into the customer complaints related to mold and black speck samples deviations. Additionally, you did not extend your investigations to other batches to determine the full scope and impact of the deviations on the product. In addition, you have not implemented an effective CAPA plan for the complaint investigations to prevent reoccurrence. You have not indicated whether the mold excursions in the aseptic filling lines have been corrected.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In response to this letter, provide the following:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cul>\u003Cli>A comprehensive, independent assessment of your overall system for investigating deviations, discrepancies, complaints, OOS results, and failures. Provide a detailed action plan to remediate this system. Your action plan should include, but not be limited to, significant improvements in investigation competencies, scope determination, root cause evaluation, CAPA effectiveness, quality assurance unit oversight, and written procedures. Address how your firm will ensure all phases of investigations are appropriately conducted.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>An independent assessment and remediation plan for your CAPA program. Provide a report that evaluates if staff with proper investigation competencies effectively conducts root cause analysis, assures CAPA effectiveness, regularly reviews investigations trends, implements improvements to the CAPA program when needed, ensures appropriate quality assurance unit decision rights, and is fully supported by executive management.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>A management strategy including the interim measures describing the actions you have taken to ensure the safety and quality of your drugs currently in the market, such as notifying customers, recalling potentially affected drug products, conducting additional testing, adding batches to your stability program, and enhancements to your complaint system.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>For your \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> container closure system \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug products, provide your risk assessment for the current container closure system (i.e., \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>) that describes the effectiveness of the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> mechanism. Also, we recommend that you conduct your own testing to determine the effectiveness of your CCS in preserving the sterility of drugs in products.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003C\u002Ful>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>2. Your firm failed to establish and follow appropriate written procedures that are designed to prevent microbiological contamination of drug products purporting to be sterile, and that include validation of all aseptic and sterilization processes (21 CFR 211.113(b)).\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Your air flow visualization studies (i.e., smoke studies) performed for your ISO 5 (Grade A) \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> traditional aseptic filling line, used to fill \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug products for the U.S. market, did not demonstrate unidirectional airflow. For example, airflow was observed to swirl, stagnate, and move sideways and upward toward the air return vent in the ceiling of the room when the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> of the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> filling line was \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> to Room \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> to introduce materials.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Additionally, our investigators observed various instances of poor aseptic techniques during a manual intervention, specifically when connecting the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> in the ISO 5 (Grade A) filling line. Also, operators leaned against or blocked the first air inside the line and extended their non-sanitized forearms near the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, where the product bottles are open.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The ISO 5 (Grade A) area is critical because sterile products are exposed and therefore vulnerable to contamination. Your aseptic manufacturing process should be designed, and operations executed, to prevent contamination hazards to your sterile product. Flaws in the design of cleanrooms and aseptic processing lines, or improper execution of aseptic operations, can promote influx of contamination into the critical processing area.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In your response, you acknowledge the deficiencies on the air flow visualization and concur with the risk associated to drugs with the manual aseptic practices and thus will implement training and update procedures. You commit to perform new air flow visualizations in the filling lines. Also, to implement the use of long gloves (able to sanitize wrists and forearms) before ISO 5 (Grade A) interventions and \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> operator to support interventions.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Your response is inadequate. You do not clearly specify how you will improve your air flow visualization, interventions in your ISO5 area, and how you intend to address potential deficiencies. Without adequate smoke studies, you cannot substantively assess whether your unidirectional airflow in the ISO 5 (Grade A) area protects the sterile drug products. Your response does not sufficiently address the lack of oversight of aseptic behavior of operators. Further, you do not adequately investigate poor aseptic practices to determine the impact on sterile drug products manufactured and aseptic processing areas.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In response to this letter, provide the following:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cul>\u003Cli>Smoke studies under dynamic conditions, with thorough and complete evaluations of aseptic interventions and operator positioning within the critical filling areas. After you remediate your aseptic operation, provide smoke studies that visualize airflow and critically evaluate unidirectional airflow. Include a video of your dynamic smoke studies.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>A comprehensive risk assessment of all contamination hazards with respect to your aseptic processes, equipment, and facilities, including an independent assessment that includes, but is not limited to:\u003Cbr>o All human interactions within the ISO 5 area\u003Cbr>o Equipment placement and ergonomics\u003Cbr>o Air quality in the ISO 5 area and surrounding room\u003Cbr>o Facility layout\u003Cbr>o Personnel flows and material flows throughout all rooms used to conduct and support sterile operations.\u003Cbr>o Building management systems (e.g., address insufficiencies in differential pressure recording frequency)\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>A detailed remediation plan based on review and recommendations by a qualified third party with specific expertise in aseptic processes, with timelines, to address the findings of the contamination hazards risk assessment. Describe how you will significantly improve aseptic processing operation design and control. Include comprehensive improvements in the design of both your aseptic processing lines and cleanrooms. Also describe your plans for qualification and validation of your extensively remediated operations.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003C\u002Ful>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>3. Your firm failed to establish an adequate system for cleaning and disinfecting the room and equipment to produce aseptic conditions and an adequate system for maintaining equipment used to control the aseptic conditions (21 CFR 211.42(c)(10)(v) and 211.42(c)(10)(vi)).\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Your aseptic processing operation is inadequately designed to prevent contamination of your sterile \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> drug products. For example, the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> product ISO 5 (Grade A) filling line \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, is cleaned and sanitized using \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. However, critical equipment components, such as bowls and \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> are not sterilized prior to installation and setup of the filling line. You rely on swab samples taken from equipment surfaces to determine whether the filling line has been properly cleaned and sanitized.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Additionally, during the current inspection, scratch marks were observed on the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> of the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> aseptic filling line. On April 8, 2024, and September 16, 2024, the preventive maintenance (PM) program documented the presence of scratches and cracks on the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> cover and \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> in the equipment checklist. These issues were also observed during the July 2023 inspection. However, CAPAs were not implemented until after the current inspection, when the deficiency was again noted.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Aseptic processes should be designed to minimize exposure of sterile articles to potential contamination hazards, including, but not limited to, an adequate cleaning, disinfection, and sterilization process of movable parts. A suitable facility monitoring system is critical to maintain appropriate environmental conditions throughout all your cleanrooms. All deviations from established limits should be appropriately investigated to rapidly detect atypical changes that can compromise the facility’s environment. Prompt detection of an emerging problem is essential to preventing contamination of your aseptic production operations. Additionally, your clean rooms should be designed as a functional unit and for a specific purpose. For example, an adequate design includes seamless and rounded floor-to-wall junctions, as well as readily accessible corners that are easy to clean.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In your response, you state \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> are used to clean and disinfect the filling line surfaces \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, and that sporicidal decontamination using \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> solution is performed \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. You also indicated that you would conduct a study to evaluate the efficacy of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> against mold species. Additionally, you state that a bio-decontamination process of filling machine surfaces ISO 5 (Grade A) will be implemented using a sporicidal product within defined frequency. You also indicate that the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> aseptic filling \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> doors were changed.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Your response is inadequate. You did not provide a risk assessment to determine if the drug products manufactured by your facility for the U.S. market are not compromised for sterility. Additionally, we are concerned that your preventive maintenance program did not correct the improper equipment conditions (i.e., scratches and cracks on the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>) which were documented but not repaired.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In response to this letter, provide the following:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cul>\u003Cli>A CAPA plan, based on the retrospective assessment of your cleaning and disinfection program, that includes appropriate remediations to your cleaning and disinfection processes and practices, and timelines for completion. Provide a detailed summary of vulnerabilities in your process for lifecycle management of equipment cleaning and disinfection. Describe improvements to your cleaning and disinfection program, including enhancements to cleaning effectiveness; improved ongoing verification of proper cleaning and disinfection execution for all products and equipment; and all other needed remediations.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>Your CAPA plan to implement routine, vigilant operations management oversight of facilities and equipment. This plan should ensure, among other things, prompt detection of equipment\u002Ffacilities performance issues, effective execution of repairs, adherence to appropriate preventive maintenance schedules, timely technological upgrades to the equipment\u002Ffacility infrastructure, and improved systems for ongoing management review.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>A comprehensive assessment of your facility, especially of those areas and rooms where mold species have been identified. This assessment should include a detailed remediation plan describing root causes for the presence of the mold species found and how you intend to reduce or eliminate potential sources to prevent recurrence.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003C\u002Ful>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Drug Production Ceased\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>We acknowledge your commitment to cease production of the traditional \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> fill lines \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> at this facility. In response to this letter, clarify whether you intend to resume manufacturing drugs for the U.S. market at this facility in the future.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>If you plan to resume any manufacturing operations regulated under the FD&amp;C Act, notify this office before resuming your drug manufacturing operations. You are responsible for resolving all deficiencies and systemic flaws to ensure your firm is capable of ongoing CGMP compliance. In your notification to the Agency, provide a summary of your remediations to demonstrate that you have appropriately completed all CAPAs.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Conclusion\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The violations cited in this letter are not intended to be an all-inclusive list of violations that exist at your facility. You are responsible for investigating and determining the causes of any violations and for preventing their recurrence or the occurrence of other violations.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>If you are considering an action that is likely to lead to a disruption in the supply of drugs produced at your facility, FDA requests that you contact CDER’s Drug Shortages Staff immediately, at drugshortages@fda.hhs.gov, so that FDA can work with you on the most effective way to bring your operations into compliance with the law. Contacting the Drug Shortages Staff also allows you to meet any obligations you may have to report discontinuances or interruptions in your drug manufacture under 21 U.S.C. 356C(b). This also allows FDA to consider, as soon as possible, what actions, if any, may be needed to avoid shortages and protect the health of patients who depend on your products.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Correct any violations promptly. FDA may withhold approval of new applications or supplements listing your firm as a drug manufacturer until any violations are completely addressed and we confirm your compliance with CGMP. We may re-inspect to verify that you have completed corrective actions to any violations.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Failure to address any violations may also result in the FDA refusing admission of articles manufactured at Excelvision, located at Rue de la Lombardiere, Annonay, Ardeche, France, into the United States under section 801(a)(3) of the FD&amp;C Act, 21 U.S.C. 381(a)(3). Articles under this authority that appear to be adulterated may be detained or refused admission, in that the methods and controls used in their manufacture do not appear to conform to CGMP within the meaning of section 501(a)(2)(B) of the FD&amp;C Act, 21 U.S.C. 351(a)(2)(B).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>This letter notifies you of our findings and provides you an opportunity to address the above deficiencies. After you receive this letter, respond to this office in writing within 15 working days\u003Cem>\u003Cstrong>\u003Csup>1\u003C\u002Fsup>\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fem>. Specify what you have done to address any violations and to prevent their recurrence. In response to this letter, you may provide additional information for our consideration as we continue to assess your activities and practices. If you cannot complete corrective actions within 15 working days, state your reasons for delay and your schedule for completion.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Send your electronic reply to CDER-OC-OMQ-Communications@fda.hhs.gov. Identify your response with FEI 3007058211and ATTN: Rafael E. Arroyo.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Sincerely,\u003Cbr>\u002FS\u002F\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Francis Godwin\u003Cbr>Director\u003Cbr>Office of Manufacturing Quality\u003Cbr>Office of Compliance\u003Cbr>Center for Drug Evaluation and Research\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>_________________\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cem>\u003Cstrong>1\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fem> Under program enhancements for the Generic Drug User Fee Amendments (GDUFA) reauthorization for fiscal years (FYs) 2023-2027, also known as the GDUFA III Commitment Letter, your facility may be eligible for a Post-Warning Letter Meeting to obtain preliminary feedback from FDA on the adequacy and completeness of your corrective action plans.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n              \n                                            \n              \n            ","Delivery Method:\n\nVIA EMAIL WITH READ RECEIPT\n\nReference #:\n\n320-25-70\n\nProduct:\n\nDrugs\n\nRecipient:\n\nRecipient Name\n\nMr. Bernard Fraisse\n\nRecipient Title\n\nPresident & CEO\n\nExcelvision Fareva\n\n32 Pl. de la Gare, 1616\n\nGare Luxembourg\n\nFrance\n\nIssuing Office:\n\nCenter for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER)\n\nUnited States\n\nWarning Letter 320-25-70\nMay 7, 2025\nDear Mr. Fraisse:\nThe United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspected your drug manufacturing facility, Excelvision, FEI 3007058211, at 27 Rue de la Lombardiere, Annonay, Ardeche, France, from November 12 to 19, 2024.\nThis warning letter summarizes significant violations of Current Good Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) regulations for finished pharmaceuticals. See Title 21 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), parts 210 and 211 (21 CFR parts 210 and 211).\nBecause your methods, facilities, or controls for manufacturing, processing, packing, or holding do not conform to CGMP, your drug products are adulterated within the meaning of section 501(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), 21 U.S.C. 351(a)(2)(B).\nWe reviewed your December 10, 2024 response to our Form FDA 483 in detail and acknowledge receipt of your subsequent correspondence.\nDuring our inspection, our investigators observed specific violations including, but not limited to, the following.\n1. Your firm failed to thoroughly investigate any unexplained discrepancy or failure of a batch or any of its components to meet any of its specifications, whether or not the batch has already been distributed (21 CFR 211.192).\nYou failed to adequately investigate customer complaints for the various sterile (b)(4) drug products (prescription and over-the-counter) you manufacture. Your investigations were not thorough, did not appropriately expand in scope, and lacked a scientifically supported determination of root cause(s). Additionally, they failed to include an evaluation of customer complaint samples from the affected batches. You did not identify or implement adequate corrective actions and preventive actions (CAPAs).\nSpecifically, between January 2023 and November 2024, you received multiple complaints related to the presence of mold, black specks, and discoloration on the (b)(4), and inside the product container of your (b)(4) drug products. Without supporting evidence, you attributed the root causes to the inadequate handling by customers who used your products (i.e., complainant leaving product residues in the container closure system) and determined that no further action was necessary.\nIn August 2024, environmental sampling of Room (b)(4), corridor (b)(4), and (b)(4) revealed the presence of Penicillium citrinum, Fusarium oxysporum, and Aspergillus mold species, respectively. On September 25, 2024, during environmental monitoring, an operator involved in the installation of the (b)(4) inside the ISO 5 (Grade A) of the additional (b)(4) filling line tested positive for Penicillium citrinum mold species on their right glove. Your investigation documented that water was found underneath the (b)(4) floor in the compounding tank in room (b)(4), which is used to manufacture sterile (b)(4) drug. You attributed the root cause of the mold excursions in the building (b)(4) to the water leaks discovered. On November 8, 2024, and as a corrective action to mold detection, the floors were replaced with a new (b)(4).\nNotably, you had recovered mold species such as Aspergillus (July 13, 2022, filling room (b)(4)), Zygomycete (March 9, 2022, filling room (b)(4)), and Penicillin (November 2, 2022, filling room (b)(4)) in the building (b)(4). However, as part of the investigations, you failed to consider the presence of mold in the ISO7 (Grade B) manufacturing areas over a 3-year period.\nThe presence of mold, black specks, and discoloration in (b)(4) drug products presents serious risks to consumers, especially since these are sterile products intended for (b)(4) application. Furthermore, the documented history of mold recovery in the aseptic filling lines and water leaks in the compounding room suggests a persistent environmental control issue that, if left unaddressed, compromises the sterility and safety of your drug products. It also indicates that your CAPAs have been ineffective to eliminate the present of mold in your manufacturing areas.\nIn your response, you state that the standard operating procedure has been revised to include a “questionnaire” for customers related to microbial contamination, as well as a new indicator to require microbial determination and sterility test for all returned samples. Additionally, you indicate that you will update your procedure for all returned and retained samples related to potential microbial contamination that will be sent to the microbiology laboratory for further examination. Also, the procedure will include genetic identification (i.e., genus and species) of molds to be performed on return samples and compare with mold identified in filling areas.\nYour response is inadequate. It fails to provide a comprehensive investigation into the customer complaints related to mold and black speck samples deviations. Additionally, you did not extend your investigations to other batches to determine the full scope and impact of the deviations on the product. In addition, you have not implemented an effective CAPA plan for the complaint investigations to prevent reoccurrence. You have not indicated whether the mold excursions in the aseptic filling lines have been corrected.\nIn response to this letter, provide the following:\nA comprehensive, independent assessment of your overall system for investigating deviations, discrepancies, complaints, OOS results, and failures. Provide a detailed action plan to remediate this system. Your action plan should include, but not be limited to, significant improvements in investigation competencies, scope determination, root cause evaluation, CAPA effectiveness, quality assurance unit oversight, and written procedures. Address how your firm will ensure all phases of investigations are appropriately conducted.\nAn independent assessment and remediation plan for your CAPA program. Provide a report that evaluates if staff with proper investigation competencies effectively conducts root cause analysis, assures CAPA effectiveness, regularly reviews investigations trends, implements improvements to the CAPA program when needed, ensures appropriate quality assurance unit decision rights, and is fully supported by executive management.\nA management strategy including the interim measures describing the actions you have taken to ensure the safety and quality of your drugs currently in the market, such as notifying customers, recalling potentially affected drug products, conducting additional testing, adding batches to your stability program, and enhancements to your complaint system.\nFor your (b)(4) container closure system (b)(4) drug products, provide your risk assessment for the current container closure system (i.e., (b)(4)) that describes the effectiveness of the (b)(4) mechanism. Also, we recommend that you conduct your own testing to determine the effectiveness of your CCS in preserving the sterility of drugs in products.\n2. Your firm failed to establish and follow appropriate written procedures that are designed to prevent microbiological contamination of drug products purporting to be sterile, and that include validation of all aseptic and sterilization processes (21 CFR 211.113(b)).\nYour air flow visualization studies (i.e., smoke studies) performed for your ISO 5 (Grade A) (b)(4) traditional aseptic filling line, used to fill (b)(4) drug products for the U.S. market, did not demonstrate unidirectional airflow. For example, airflow was observed to swirl, stagnate, and move sideways and upward toward the air return vent in the ceiling of the room when the (b)(4) of the (b)(4) filling line was (b)(4) to Room (b)(4) to introduce materials.\nAdditionally, our investigators observed various instances of poor aseptic techniques during a manual intervention, specifically when connecting the (b)(4) in the ISO 5 (Grade A) filling line. Also, operators leaned against or blocked the first air inside the line and extended their non-sanitized forearms near the (b)(4), where the product bottles are open.\nThe ISO 5 (Grade A) area is critical because sterile products are exposed and therefore vulnerable to contamination. Your aseptic manufacturing process should be designed, and operations executed, to prevent contamination hazards to your sterile product. Flaws in the design of cleanrooms and aseptic processing lines, or improper execution of aseptic operations, can promote influx of contamination into the critical processing area.\nIn your response, you acknowledge the deficiencies on the air flow visualization and concur with the risk associated to drugs with the manual aseptic practices and thus will implement training and update procedures. You commit to perform new air flow visualizations in the filling lines. Also, to implement the use of long gloves (able to sanitize wrists and forearms) before ISO 5 (Grade A) interventions and (b)(4) operator to support interventions.\nYour response is inadequate. You do not clearly specify how you will improve your air flow visualization, interventions in your ISO5 area, and how you intend to address potential deficiencies. Without adequate smoke studies, you cannot substantively assess whether your unidirectional airflow in the ISO 5 (Grade A) area protects the sterile drug products. Your response does not sufficiently address the lack of oversight of aseptic behavior of operators. Further, you do not adequately investigate poor aseptic practices to determine the impact on sterile drug products manufactured and aseptic processing areas.\nIn response to this letter, provide the following:\nSmoke studies under dynamic conditions, with thorough and complete evaluations of aseptic interventions and operator positioning within the critical filling areas. After you remediate your aseptic operation, provide smoke studies that visualize airflow and critically evaluate unidirectional airflow. Include a video of your dynamic smoke studies.\nA comprehensive risk assessment of all contamination hazards with respect to your aseptic processes, equipment, and facilities, including an independent assessment that includes, but is not limited to:\no All human interactions within the ISO 5 area\no Equipment placement and ergonomics\no Air quality in the ISO 5 area and surrounding room\no Facility layout\no Personnel flows and material flows throughout all rooms used to conduct and support sterile operations.\no Building management systems (e.g., address insufficiencies in differential pressure recording frequency)\nA detailed remediation plan based on review and recommendations by a qualified third party with specific expertise in aseptic processes, with timelines, to address the findings of the contamination hazards risk assessment. Describe how you will significantly improve aseptic processing operation design and control. Include comprehensive improvements in the design of both your aseptic processing lines and cleanrooms. Also describe your plans for qualification and validation of your extensively remediated operations.\n3. Your firm failed to establish an adequate system for cleaning and disinfecting the room and equipment to produce aseptic conditions and an adequate system for maintaining equipment used to control the aseptic conditions (21 CFR 211.42(c)(10)(v) and 211.42(c)(10)(vi)).\nYour aseptic processing operation is inadequately designed to prevent contamination of your sterile (b)(4) drug products. For example, the (b)(4) product ISO 5 (Grade A) filling line (b)(4), is cleaned and sanitized using (b)(4). However, critical equipment components, such as bowls and (b)(4) are not sterilized prior to installation and setup of the filling line. You rely on swab samples taken from equipment surfaces to determine whether the filling line has been properly cleaned and sanitized.\nAdditionally, during the current inspection, scratch marks were observed on the (b)(4) of the (b)(4) aseptic filling line. On April 8, 2024, and September 16, 2024, the preventive maintenance (PM) program documented the presence of scratches and cracks on the (b)(4) cover and (b)(4) in the equipment checklist. These issues were also observed during the July 2023 inspection. However, CAPAs were not implemented until after the current inspection, when the deficiency was again noted.\nAseptic processes should be designed to minimize exposure of sterile articles to potential contamination hazards, including, but not limited to, an adequate cleaning, disinfection, and sterilization process of movable parts. A suitable facility monitoring system is critical to maintain appropriate environmental conditions throughout all your cleanrooms. All deviations from established limits should be appropriately investigated to rapidly detect atypical changes that can compromise the facility’s environment. Prompt detection of an emerging problem is essential to preventing contamination of your aseptic production operations. Additionally, your clean rooms should be designed as a functional unit and for a specific purpose. For example, an adequate design includes seamless and rounded floor-to-wall junctions, as well as readily accessible corners that are easy to clean.\nIn your response, you state (b)(4) are used to clean and disinfect the filling line surfaces (b)(4), and that sporicidal decontamination using (b)(4) solution is performed (b)(4). You also indicated that you would conduct a study to evaluate the efficacy of (b)(4) against mold species. Additionally, you state that a bio-decontamination process of filling machine surfaces ISO 5 (Grade A) will be implemented using a sporicidal product within defined frequency. You also indicate that the (b)(4) aseptic filling (b)(4) doors were changed.\nYour response is inadequate. You did not provide a risk assessment to determine if the drug products manufactured by your facility for the U.S. market are not compromised for sterility. Additionally, we are concerned that your preventive maintenance program did not correct the improper equipment conditions (i.e., scratches and cracks on the (b)(4)) which were documented but not repaired.\nIn response to this letter, provide the following:\nA CAPA plan, based on the retrospective assessment of your cleaning and disinfection program, that includes appropriate remediations to your cleaning and disinfection processes and practices, and timelines for completion. Provide a detailed summary of vulnerabilities in your process for lifecycle management of equipment cleaning and disinfection. Describe improvements to your cleaning and disinfection program, including enhancements to cleaning effectiveness; improved ongoing verification of proper cleaning and disinfection execution for all products and equipment; and all other needed remediations.\nYour CAPA plan to implement routine, vigilant operations management oversight of facilities and equipment. This plan should ensure, among other things, prompt detection of equipment\u002Ffacilities performance issues, effective execution of repairs, adherence to appropriate preventive maintenance schedules, timely technological upgrades to the equipment\u002Ffacility infrastructure, and improved systems for ongoing management review.\nA comprehensive assessment of your facility, especially of those areas and rooms where mold species have been identified. This assessment should include a detailed remediation plan describing root causes for the presence of the mold species found and how you intend to reduce or eliminate potential sources to prevent recurrence.\nDrug Production Ceased\nWe acknowledge your commitment to cease production of the traditional (b)(4) fill lines (b)(4) at this facility. In response to this letter, clarify whether you intend to resume manufacturing drugs for the U.S. market at this facility in the future.\nIf you plan to resume any manufacturing operations regulated under the FD&C Act, notify this office before resuming your drug manufacturing operations. You are responsible for resolving all deficiencies and systemic flaws to ensure your firm is capable of ongoing CGMP compliance. In your notification to the Agency, provide a summary of your remediations to demonstrate that you have appropriately completed all CAPAs.\nConclusion\nThe violations cited in this letter are not intended to be an all-inclusive list of violations that exist at your facility. You are responsible for investigating and determining the causes of any violations and for preventing their recurrence or the occurrence of other violations.\nIf you are considering an action that is likely to lead to a disruption in the supply of drugs produced at your facility, FDA requests that you contact CDER’s Drug Shortages Staff immediately, at drugshortages@fda.hhs.gov, so that FDA can work with you on the most effective way to bring your operations into compliance with the law. Contacting the Drug Shortages Staff also allows you to meet any obligations you may have to report discontinuances or interruptions in your drug manufacture under 21 U.S.C. 356C(b). This also allows FDA to consider, as soon as possible, what actions, if any, may be needed to avoid shortages and protect the health of patients who depend on your products.\nCorrect any violations promptly. FDA may withhold approval of new applications or supplements listing your firm as a drug manufacturer until any violations are completely addressed and we confirm your compliance with CGMP. We may re-inspect to verify that you have completed corrective actions to any violations.\nFailure to address any violations may also result in the FDA refusing admission of articles manufactured at Excelvision, located at Rue de la Lombardiere, Annonay, Ardeche, France, into the United States under section 801(a)(3) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 381(a)(3). Articles under this authority that appear to be adulterated may be detained or refused admission, in that the methods and controls used in their manufacture do not appear to conform to CGMP within the meaning of section 501(a)(2)(B) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 351(a)(2)(B).\nThis letter notifies you of our findings and provides you an opportunity to address the above deficiencies. After you receive this letter, respond to this office in writing within 15 working days1. Specify what you have done to address any violations and to prevent their recurrence. In response to this letter, you may provide additional information for our consideration as we continue to assess your activities and practices. If you cannot complete corrective actions within 15 working days, state your reasons for delay and your schedule for completion.\nSend your electronic reply to CDER-OC-OMQ-Communications@fda.hhs.gov. Identify your response with FEI 3007058211and ATTN: Rafael E. Arroyo.\nSincerely,\n\u002FS\u002F\nFrancis Godwin\nDirector\nOffice of Manufacturing Quality\nOffice of Compliance\nCenter for Drug Evaluation and Research\n_________________\n1 Under program enhancements for the Generic Drug User Fee Amendments (GDUFA) reauthorization for fiscal years (FYs) 2023-2027, also known as the GDUFA III Commitment Letter, your facility may be eligible for a Post-Warning Letter Meeting to obtain preliminary feedback from FDA on the adequacy and completeness of your corrective action plans.","Excelvision Fareva","excelvision-fareva-703245-05072025","2026-08-18T06:42:28.676509+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Fexcelvision-fareva-703245-05072025","2026-10-26T08:08:38.141662+00:00","2025-05-13","703245","2026-08-19T16:47:59.474+00:00","VIA EMAIL WITH READ RECEIPT","320-25-70","2025-05-07",{"id":50,"raw":51,"subject":56,"body_html":57,"body_text":58,"firm_name":59,"letter_id":60,"created_at":61,"fei_number":19,"letter_url":62,"updated_at":63,"action_type":22,"case_status":23,"posted_date":64,"marcs_cms_no":65,"product_type":66,"closeout_date":19,"issuing_office":55,"recipient_name":67,"body_fetched_at":68,"delivery_method":69,"recipient_title":19,"reference_number":19,"action_taken_date":64,"medical_device_id":19,"response_letter_date":19},2061,[52,53,54,55,56,13,13,13],"\u003Ctime datetime=\"2023-06-08T19:00:00Z\">06\u002F08\u002F2023\u003C\u002Ftime>\n","\u003Ctime datetime=\"2023-06-08T04:00:00Z\">06\u002F08\u002F2023\u003C\u002Ftime>\n","\u003Ca href=\"\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Flb-vision-holdings-inc-dba-vapermate-206-llc-658051-06082023\">LB Vision Holdings, Inc. d\u002Fb\u002Fa VaperMate #206, LLC\u003C\u002Fa>","Center for Tobacco Products","Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act\u002FAdulterated\u002FMisbranded","\n\n                            \n                            \n                            \n                            \n                                              \n  \n \n\n                 \n\n  \u003Chr>\n \n\n\u003Cdiv>\n  \u003Cdl>\n\n              \u003Cdt>Delivery Method:\u003C\u002Fdt> \n        \u003Cdd>VIA UPS and Electronic Mail\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              \u003C\u002Fdd>\n      \n      \n              \u003Cdt>Product:\u003C\u002Fdt> \n        \u003Cdd>Tobacco                          \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n             \n            \n            \n            \n              \n            \n            \n            \u003C\u002Fdd>\n      \n          \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>            \n\n\n\u003Chr>\n\n\u003Cdiv>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdl>\n\n        \u003Cdt>Recipient:\u003C\u002Fdt>\n\n                      \u003Cdd>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdiv>Recipient Name\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n              \u003Cdiv>Linda Botta\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n          \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\u003C\u002Fdd>\n                                \u003Cdd>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdiv>Recipient Title\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n              \u003Cdiv>Owner\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n          \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\u003C\u002Fdd>\n          \n            \u003Cdd>LB Vision Holdings, Inc. d\u002Fb\u002Fa VaperMate #206, LLC\u003C\u002Fdd>\n\n          \n                      \u003Cdd>\u003Cp>\u003Cspan>3833 South Nova Road\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cspan>Port Orange\u003C\u002Fspan>, \u003Cspan>FL\u003C\u002Fspan> \u003Cspan>32127\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cspan>United States\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n          \n          \n            \n            \u003Cdd>\n\n    \u003C\u002Fdd>\u003Cdd>\u003Cspan>\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Ca href=\"mailto:portorange.fl@vapormate.com\"> portorange.fl@vapormate.com\u003C\u002Fa>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n\n          \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>            \n\n       \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdl>\n          \n          \u003Cdt>Issuing Office:\u003C\u002Fdt>\n        \n         \n          \u003Cdd>Center for Tobacco Products\u003C\u002Fdd>\n        \n         \n          \u003Cdd>\u003Cp>\u003Cspan>United States\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n        \n        \n        \n        \n        \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n    \u003Cdl> \n      \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>  \n      \n\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\n \n\n \n\n\u003Chr>\n\n\u003Cp>June 8, 2023\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>WARNING LETTER\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Dear Ms. Botta:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The Center for Tobacco Products of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has reviewed your submissions to the FDA and our inspection records, and determined that LB Vision Holdings, Inc. d\u002Fb\u002Fa VaperMate #206, LLC manufactures and distributes e-liquid products for commercial distribution in the United States, and that the e-liquid products are manufactured and offered for sale or distribution to customers in the United States.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Under section 201(rr) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&amp;C Act) (21 U.S.C. § 321(rr)), these products are tobacco products because they are made or derived from tobacco or contain nicotine from any source, and intended for human consumption. Certain tobacco products, including e-liquid products, are subject to FDA jurisdiction under section 901(b) of the FD&amp;C Act (21 U.S.C. § 387a(b)) and 21 C.F.R. § 1100.1, and are required to be in compliance with the requirements in the FD&amp;C Act.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Please be aware that, on March 15, 2022, the President signed legislation to amend the FD&amp;C Act to extend FDA’s jurisdiction to products “containing nicotine from any source,” not just nicotine derived from tobacco. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, Public Law 117-103, Division P, Title I, Subtitle B. Specifically, this legislation expanded the definition of “tobacco product” under section 201(rr) of the FD&amp;C Act (21 U.S.C. § 321(rr)) to include products containing nicotine from any source. Tobacco products, including e-liquid products, containing nicotine from any source, must be in compliance with the FD&amp;C Act and its implementing regulations. For more information, please see https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Ftobacco-products\u002Fctp-newsroom\u002Frequirements-products-made-non-tobacco-nicotine-take-effect-april-14.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Generally, to be legally marketed in the United States, the FD&amp;C Act requires “new tobacco products” to have a premarket authorization in effect. A “new tobacco product” is any tobacco product that was not commercially marketed in the United States as of February 15, 2007, or any modified tobacco product that was commercially marketed after February 15, 2007 (section 910(a) of the FD&amp;C Act; 21 U.S.C. § 387j(a)). Generally, a marketing authorization order under section 910(c)(1)(A)(i) of the FD&amp;C Act (21 U.S.C. § 387j(c)(1)(A)(i)) is required for a new tobacco product unless (1) the manufacturer of the product submitted a report under section 905(j) of the FD&amp;C Act (21 U.S.C. § 387e(j)) and FDA issues an order finding the product substantially equivalent to a predicate tobacco product (section 910(a)(2)(A) of the FD&amp;C Act) or (2) the manufacturer submitted a report under section 905(j)(1)(A)(ii) of the FD&amp;C Act (21 U.S.C. § 387e(j)(1)(A)(ii)) and all modifications are covered by exemptions from the requirements of substantial equivalence granted by FDA under section 905(j)(3) of the FD&amp;C Act (21 U.S.C. § 387e(j)(3)).\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cstrong>New Tobacco Products Without Required Marketing Authorization Are Adulterated and Misbranded\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>FDA has determined that you manufacture, sell, and\u002For distribute to customers in the United States e-liquid products without a marketing authorization order, including: Green Apple.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The e-liquid products listed above are new tobacco products because they were not commercially marketed in the United States as of February 15, 2007. These products do not have FDA marketing authorization orders in effect under section 910(c)(1)(A)(i) of the FD&amp;C Act and are not otherwise exempt from the marketing authorization requirement. Therefore, these products are adulterated under section 902(6)(A) of the FD&amp;C Act (21 U.S.C. § 387b(6)(A)). In addition, they are misbranded under section 903(a)(6) of the FD&amp;C Act (21 U.S.C. § 387c(a)(6)) because a notice or other information respecting these products was not provided as required by section 905(j) of the FD&amp;C Act. The doing of any act with respect to a tobacco product while such article is held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce which results in such product being adulterated or misbranded is a prohibited act under section 301(k) of the FD&amp;C Act (21 U.S.C. § 331(k)). Additionally, to the extent that a report was required under section 905(j) of the FD&amp;C Act, the failure to provide such report is a prohibited act under section 301(p) of the FD&amp;C Act (21 U.S.C. § 331(p)).\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Conclusion and Requested Actions\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>FDA has not received an application from your firm requesting marketing authorization for the products listed in this Warning Letter. These products and any other new tobacco product on the market without the statutorily required premarket authorization are adulterated and misbranded and are subject to enforcement action at FDA’s discretion.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>It is your responsibility to ensure that all of your tobacco products comply with each applicable provision of the FD&amp;C Act and FDA’s implementing regulations. Failure to address any violations of the FD&amp;C Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., Chapter IX, relating to tobacco products including the tobacco regulations in 21 C.F.R. Parts 1140, 1141, and 1143, may lead to regulatory action, including, but not limited to, civil money penalties, seizure, and\u002For injunction. However, this Warning Letter does not constitute “written notice” for purposes of section 303(f)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the FD&amp;C Act. Please note that tobacco products offered for import into the United States that appear to be adulterated and\u002For misbranded may be detained or refused admission.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The violations discussed in this letter do not necessarily constitute an exhaustive list. You should take prompt action to address any violations that are referenced above, as well as violations that are the same as or similar to the ones stated above, and take any necessary actions to bring your tobacco products into compliance with the FD&amp;C Act.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Please submit a written response to this letter within 15 working days from the date of receipt describing your actions to address any violations and bring your products into compliance, including the dates on which you discontinued the violative sale, and\u002For distribution of these tobacco products and your plan for maintaining compliance with the FD&amp;C Act. If you believe that your products are not in violation of the FD&amp;C Act, include your reasoning and any supporting information for our consideration. This letter notifies you of our findings and provides you with an opportunity to address them. You can find the FD&amp;C Act through links on FDA’s homepage at \u003Ca href=\"http:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov.\u002F\">http:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov.\u003C\u002Fa>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Please note your reference number, ER2300841, in your response and direct your response to the following address:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>DEM-WL Response, Office of Compliance and Enforcement\u003Cbr>\nFDA Center for Tobacco Products\u003Cbr>\nc\u002Fo Document Control Center\u003Cbr>\nBuilding 71, Room G335\u003Cbr>\n10903 New Hampshire Avenue\u003Cbr>\nSilver Spring, MD 20993-0002\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>If you have any questions about the content of this letter, please contact CTPCompliance@fda.hhs.gov.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Sincerely,\u003Cbr>\n\u002FS\u002F\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Ann Simoneau, J.D.\u003Cbr>\nDirector\u003Cbr>\nOffice of Compliance and Enforcement\u003Cbr>\nCenter for Tobacco Products\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>cc: joshv@vapermate.com\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n              \n                                            \n              \n            ","Delivery Method:\n\nVIA UPS and Electronic Mail\n\nProduct:\n\nTobacco\n\nRecipient:\n\nRecipient Name\n\nLinda Botta\n\nRecipient Title\n\nOwner\n\nLB Vision Holdings, Inc. d\u002Fb\u002Fa VaperMate #206, LLC\n\n3833 South Nova Road\n\nPort Orange, FL 32127\n\nUnited States\n\nportorange.fl@vapormate.com\n\nIssuing Office:\n\nCenter for Tobacco Products\n\nUnited States\n\nJune 8, 2023\n\nWARNING LETTER\n\nDear Ms. Botta:\n\nThe Center for Tobacco Products of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has reviewed your submissions to the FDA and our inspection records, and determined that LB Vision Holdings, Inc. d\u002Fb\u002Fa VaperMate #206, LLC manufactures and distributes e-liquid products for commercial distribution in the United States, and that the e-liquid products are manufactured and offered for sale or distribution to customers in the United States.\n\nUnder section 201(rr) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) (21 U.S.C. § 321(rr)), these products are tobacco products because they are made or derived from tobacco or contain nicotine from any source, and intended for human consumption. Certain tobacco products, including e-liquid products, are subject to FDA jurisdiction under section 901(b) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. § 387a(b)) and 21 C.F.R. § 1100.1, and are required to be in compliance with the requirements in the FD&C Act.\n\nPlease be aware that, on March 15, 2022, the President signed legislation to amend the FD&C Act to extend FDA’s jurisdiction to products “containing nicotine from any source,” not just nicotine derived from tobacco. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, Public Law 117-103, Division P, Title I, Subtitle B. Specifically, this legislation expanded the definition of “tobacco product” under section 201(rr) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. § 321(rr)) to include products containing nicotine from any source. Tobacco products, including e-liquid products, containing nicotine from any source, must be in compliance with the FD&C Act and its implementing regulations. For more information, please see https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Ftobacco-products\u002Fctp-newsroom\u002Frequirements-products-made-non-tobacco-nicotine-take-effect-april-14.\n\nGenerally, to be legally marketed in the United States, the FD&C Act requires “new tobacco products” to have a premarket authorization in effect. A “new tobacco product” is any tobacco product that was not commercially marketed in the United States as of February 15, 2007, or any modified tobacco product that was commercially marketed after February 15, 2007 (section 910(a) of the FD&C Act; 21 U.S.C. § 387j(a)). Generally, a marketing authorization order under section 910(c)(1)(A)(i) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. § 387j(c)(1)(A)(i)) is required for a new tobacco product unless (1) the manufacturer of the product submitted a report under section 905(j) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. § 387e(j)) and FDA issues an order finding the product substantially equivalent to a predicate tobacco product (section 910(a)(2)(A) of the FD&C Act) or (2) the manufacturer submitted a report under section 905(j)(1)(A)(ii) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. § 387e(j)(1)(A)(ii)) and all modifications are covered by exemptions from the requirements of substantial equivalence granted by FDA under section 905(j)(3) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. § 387e(j)(3)).\n\nNew Tobacco Products Without Required Marketing Authorization Are Adulterated and Misbranded\n\nFDA has determined that you manufacture, sell, and\u002For distribute to customers in the United States e-liquid products without a marketing authorization order, including: Green Apple.\n\nThe e-liquid products listed above are new tobacco products because they were not commercially marketed in the United States as of February 15, 2007. These products do not have FDA marketing authorization orders in effect under section 910(c)(1)(A)(i) of the FD&C Act and are not otherwise exempt from the marketing authorization requirement. Therefore, these products are adulterated under section 902(6)(A) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. § 387b(6)(A)). In addition, they are misbranded under section 903(a)(6) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. § 387c(a)(6)) because a notice or other information respecting these products was not provided as required by section 905(j) of the FD&C Act. The doing of any act with respect to a tobacco product while such article is held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce which results in such product being adulterated or misbranded is a prohibited act under section 301(k) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. § 331(k)). Additionally, to the extent that a report was required under section 905(j) of the FD&C Act, the failure to provide such report is a prohibited act under section 301(p) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. § 331(p)).\n\nConclusion and Requested Actions\n\nFDA has not received an application from your firm requesting marketing authorization for the products listed in this Warning Letter. These products and any other new tobacco product on the market without the statutorily required premarket authorization are adulterated and misbranded and are subject to enforcement action at FDA’s discretion.\n\nIt is your responsibility to ensure that all of your tobacco products comply with each applicable provision of the FD&C Act and FDA’s implementing regulations. Failure to address any violations of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., Chapter IX, relating to tobacco products including the tobacco regulations in 21 C.F.R. Parts 1140, 1141, and 1143, may lead to regulatory action, including, but not limited to, civil money penalties, seizure, and\u002For injunction. However, this Warning Letter does not constitute “written notice” for purposes of section 303(f)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the FD&C Act. Please note that tobacco products offered for import into the United States that appear to be adulterated and\u002For misbranded may be detained or refused admission.\n\nThe violations discussed in this letter do not necessarily constitute an exhaustive list. You should take prompt action to address any violations that are referenced above, as well as violations that are the same as or similar to the ones stated above, and take any necessary actions to bring your tobacco products into compliance with the FD&C Act.\n\nPlease submit a written response to this letter within 15 working days from the date of receipt describing your actions to address any violations and bring your products into compliance, including the dates on which you discontinued the violative sale, and\u002For distribution of these tobacco products and your plan for maintaining compliance with the FD&C Act. If you believe that your products are not in violation of the FD&C Act, include your reasoning and any supporting information for our consideration. This letter notifies you of our findings and provides you with an opportunity to address them. You can find the FD&C Act through links on FDA’s homepage at http:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov.\n\nPlease note your reference number, ER2300841, in your response and direct your response to the following address:\n\nDEM-WL Response, Office of Compliance and Enforcement\n\nFDA Center for Tobacco Products\n\nc\u002Fo Document Control Center\n\nBuilding 71, Room G335\n\n10903 New Hampshire Avenue\n\nSilver Spring, MD 20993-0002\n\nIf you have any questions about the content of this letter, please contact CTPCompliance@fda.hhs.gov.\n\nSincerely,\n\n\u002FS\u002F\n\nAnn Simoneau, J.D.\n\nDirector\n\nOffice of Compliance and Enforcement\n\nCenter for Tobacco Products\n\ncc: joshv@vapermate.com","LB Vision Holdings, Inc. d\u002Fb\u002Fa VaperMate #206, LLC","lb-vision-holdings-inc-dba-vapermate-206-llc-658051-06082023","2026-08-18T06:42:29.145918+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Flb-vision-holdings-inc-dba-vapermate-206-llc-658051-06082023","2026-10-26T08:09:12.790002+00:00","2023-06-08","658051","Tobacco","Linda Botta","2026-08-20T01:03:41.384+00:00","VIA UPS and Electronic Mail",{"id":71,"raw":72,"subject":79,"body_html":80,"body_text":81,"firm_name":82,"letter_id":83,"created_at":84,"fei_number":19,"letter_url":85,"updated_at":86,"action_type":22,"case_status":87,"posted_date":88,"marcs_cms_no":89,"product_type":90,"closeout_date":91,"issuing_office":76,"recipient_name":92,"body_fetched_at":93,"delivery_method":94,"recipient_title":19,"reference_number":95,"action_taken_date":96,"medical_device_id":19,"response_letter_date":19},1403,[73,74,75,76,77,13,78,13],"\u003Ctime datetime=\"2024-06-25T13:20:00Z\">06\u002F25\u002F2024\u003C\u002Ftime>\n","\u003Ctime datetime=\"2024-06-10T04:00:00Z\">06\u002F10\u002F2024\u003C\u002Ftime>\n","\u003Ca href=\"\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Findiana-lions-eye-bank-inc-dba-visionfirst-indiana-lions-eye-bank-680039-06102024\">Indiana Lions Eye Bank, Inc. dba VisionFirst Indiana Lions Eye Bank\u003C\u002Fa>","Division of Biological Products Operations II","Deviations\u002FCFR\u002FRegulations for Human Cells, Tissues &amp; Cellular Products (HCT\u002FPs)","\u003Ca href=\"\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Findiana-lions-eye-bank-inc-dba-visionfirst-indiana-lions-eye-bank-680039-02092026\">\u003Ctime datetime=\"2026-02-12T05:00:00Z\">02\u002F12\u002F2026\u003C\u002Ftime>\n\u003C\u002Fa>","Deviations\u002FCFR\u002FRegulations for Human Cells, Tissues & Cellular Products (HCT\u002FPs)","\n\n                            \n                            \n                            \n                            \n                                              \n  \n \n\n                 \n\n  \u003Chr>\n \n\n\u003Cdiv>\n  \u003Cdl>\n\n              \u003Cdt>Delivery Method:\u003C\u002Fdt> \n        \u003Cdd>VIA UNITED PARCEL SERVICE SIGNATURE REQUIRED\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              \u003C\u002Fdd>\n      \n              \u003Cdt>Reference #:\u003C\u002Fdt> \n        \u003Cdd>OBPO 24-680039\u003C\u002Fdd>\n      \n              \u003Cdt>Product:\u003C\u002Fdt> \n        \u003Cdd>Biologics                          \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n             \n            \n            \n            \n              \n            \n            \n            \u003C\u002Fdd>\n      \n          \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>            \n\n\n\u003Chr>\n\n\u003Cdiv>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdl>\n\n        \u003Cdt>Recipient:\u003C\u002Fdt>\n\n                      \u003Cdd>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdiv>Recipient Name\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n              \u003Cdiv>Timothy M. Fischer\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n          \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\u003C\u002Fdd>\n                                \u003Cdd>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdiv>Recipient Title\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n              \u003Cdiv>President\u002FChief Executive Officer\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n          \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\u003C\u002Fdd>\n          \n            \u003Cdd>Indiana Lions Eye Bank, Inc. dba VisionFirst Indiana Lions Eye Bank\u003C\u002Fdd>\n\n          \n                      \u003Cdd>\u003Cp>\u003Cspan>4745 Haven Point Blvd.\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cspan>Carmel\u003C\u002Fspan>, \u003Cspan>IN\u003C\u002Fspan> \u003Cspan>46280\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cspan>United States\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n          \n          \n            \n            \u003Cdd>\n\n    \u003C\u002Fdd>\u003Cdd>\u003Cspan>\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Ca href=\"mailto:Tfischer@visionfirst.org\"> Tfischer@visionfirst.org\u003C\u002Fa>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n\n          \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>            \n\n       \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdl>\n          \n          \u003Cdt>Issuing Office:\u003C\u002Fdt>\n        \n         \n          \u003Cdd>Division of Biological Products Operations II\u003C\u002Fdd>\n        \n         \n          \u003Cdd>\u003Cp>\u003Cspan>United States\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n        \n        \n        \n        \n        \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n    \u003Cdl> \n      \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>  \n      \n\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\n \n\n \n\n\u003Chr>\n\n\u003Cp>June 10, 2024\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>Warning Letter OBPO 24-680039\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Dear Mr. Fischer:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>During an inspection of your firm, Indiana Lions Eye Bank, Inc. dba VisionFirst Indiana Lions Eye Bank, located at 4745 Haven Point Blvd., Carmel, IN, conducted between January 22, 2024, and February 1, 2024, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) documented significant deviations from the regulations for human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue-based products (HCTPs) set forth in Title 21 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1271 (21 CFR 1271) and issued under the authority of Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act [42 U.S.C. § 264].\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The deviations documented on the Form FDA-483, List of Inspectional Observations (FDA 483), were presented to and discussed with you at the conclusion of the inspection. These items of concern include, but are not limited to, the following:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>1. Failure to determine as ineligible a donor who is identified as having a risk factor for, or clinical evidence of, any of the relevant communicable disease agents or diseases for which screening is required under 21 CFR 1271.75(a)(1) [21 CFR 1271.75(d)].\u003C\u002Fstrong> Between January 2021 and January 2024, you failed to determine as ineligible five donors of ocular HCT\u002FPs with a documented diagnosis or clinical evidence of sepsis, including two or more systemic responses to infection, documented within their available medical records during the hospital stay immediately preceding death. For example:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>a. Donor \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong> was determined eligible on 1\u002F11\u002F24 and ocular HCT\u002FPs from the donor were distributed on \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The donor was initially hospitalized on \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong> with a hospitalization that spanned \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>&nbsp;across multiple hospitals and was complicated by multiple serious clinical conditions. Given the donor’s age, co-morbidities, deconditioned state, and protracted hospitalization, the donor was at high risk for sepsis. The donor’s health continued to decline, and the donor expired on \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong> with the cause of death attributed to sepsis and septic shock.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>This donor with multiple serious medical conditions had risk factors for and clinical evidence of sepsis, and two or more systemic responses to infection documented in the medical records of the hospital stay immediately preceding death based on, but not limited to, the following:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cul>\n\t\u003Cli>Evidence of urinary tract infection (urine culture on 12\u002F10\u002F23 grew \u003Cem>Klebsiella pneumoniae\u003C\u002Fem>);\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>\u003Cem>Klebsiella pneumoniae\u003C\u002Fem> aspiration pneumonia;\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>\u003Cem>Clostridioides difficile\u003C\u002Fem> colitis\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Respiratory rate &gt;20 breaths\u002Fminute (39 breaths\u002Fminute on 1\u002F5\u002F24); and\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Elevated White Blood Cell (WBC) count &gt;12,000 cells\u002Fmm\u003Csup>3\u003C\u002Fsup> (16,700 cells\u002Fmm\u003Csup>3\u003C\u002Fsup> on 1\u002F7\u002F24);\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Heart rate &gt;90 beats\u002Fminute (144 beats\u002Fminute on 1\u002F7\u002F24); and\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Altered mental status.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Ful>\n\n\u003Cp>b. Donor \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong> was determined eligible on 1\u002F3\u002F24 and ocular HCT\u002FPs from the donor were distributed on \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The donor was taken to the Emergency Department (ED) on \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and was found to have agitation, confusion, hypotension, hypothermia, and multi-organ failure (heart, lungs, liver, kidneys). The donor was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) for shock of mixed etiology (cardiogenic and sepsis, septic shock due to undetermined organism) and possible community acquired versus aspiration pneumonia and was treated with broad spectrum antibiotics. Despite aggressive measures, the donor continued to decline and expired on \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. The donor had a diagnosis of septic shock due to bacterial (\u003Cem>Proteus mirabilis\u003C\u002Fem>) and viral (Respiratory Syncytial Virus) pneumonia and clinical evidence of sepsis at the time of death. Both organisms can cause sepsis and special viral culture media, or a PCR test would be necessary to detect RSV in the blood.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Donor \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong> had risk factors for and clinical evidence of sepsis, and two or more systemic responses to infection documented in the medical records of the hospital stay immediately preceding death based on, but not limited to, the following:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cul>\n\t\u003Cli>Heart rate &gt;90 beats\u002Fminute (97 beats\u002Fminute on 12\u002F27\u002F23)\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Sputum culture positive for \u003Cem>Proteus mirabilis\u003C\u002Fem> and respiratory specimen positive for RSV (12\u002F28\u002F23);\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Elevated procalcitonin level;\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Altered mental status;\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Lactic acidosis;\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Multi-organ failure; and\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Oliguria.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Ful>\n\n\u003Cp>c. Donor \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong> was determined eligible on 12\u002F12\u002F23 and ocular HCT\u002FPs from the donor were distributed on \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The donor was admitted to the ED on \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and was noted to have systemic inflammatory response syndrome (SIRS), profound hyperglycemia, leukocytosis, thrombocytopenia, lactic acidosis, acute renal failure, “shock liver” and passive congestion of liver due to right sided heart failure, pericardial effusion, and urosepsis. The donor was given intravenous fluids and vasopressor support and was treated with Vancomycin and Zosyn for “florid septic shock.” The donor was found in asystole and expired on \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Donor \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong> had a diagnosis of sepsis (urosepsis), risk factors for and clinical evidence of sepsis, and two or more systemic responses to infection documented in the medical records of the hospital stay immediately preceding death based on, but not limited to, the following:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cul>\n\t\u003Cli>Urinary tract infection (urine culture from \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong> grew more than 100,000 cfu\u002FmL of \u003Cem>Klebsiella pneumoniae\u003C\u002Fem>);\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Respiratory rate &gt;20 breaths\u002Fminute (27 breaths\u002Fminute on 12\u002F10\u002F23 and acute hypoxic respiratory failure);\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Elevated WBC count &gt;12,000 cells\u002Fmm\u003Csup>3\u003C\u002Fsup> (15,600 cells\u002Fmm3 on 12\u002F10\u002F23);\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Altered mental status;\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Lactic acidosis; and\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Multi-organ failure.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Ful>\n\n\u003Cp>d. Donor \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong> was determined eligible on 4\u002F3\u002F23 and ocular HCT\u002FPs from the donor were distributed on \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The donor was admitted to the ED from an extended care facility on 3\u002F29\u002F23 with a diagnosis of severe hypoxic respiratory failure, requiring supplemental oxygen, and sepsis due to bilateral pneumonia. The donor expired the same day. The ED record also describes that the donor met SIRS criteria. The discharge summary lists the primary cause of death as respiratory failure with hypoxia, with sepsis listed as a contributing factor.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Donor \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong> had risk factors for and clinical evidence of sepsis, and two or more systemic responses to infection documented in the medical records of the hospital stay immediately preceding death based on, but not limited to, the following:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cul>\n\t\u003Cli>Bilateral pneumonia on chest x-ray (3\u002F29\u002F23);\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Severe hypoxic respiratory failure;\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Heart rate &gt;90 beats\u002Fminute (126 beats\u002Fminute on 3\u002F29\u002F23); and\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Respiratory rate &gt;20 breaths\u002Fminute (31 breaths\u002Fminute on 3\u002F29\u002F23).\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Ful>\n\n\u003Cp>e. Donor \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong> was determined eligible on 4\u002F6\u002F21 and ocular HCT\u002FPs from the donor were distributed on \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The donor presented in the ED on \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and was subsequently admitted to the ICU for “undifferentiated shock” attributed to sepsis and\u002For hypovolemia from dehydration and third spacing of fluid. The donor was treated with multiple renally dosed broad-spectrum antibiotics between \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, had a diagnosis of undifferentiated shock initially attributed to sepsis versus hypovolemia and, on 3\u002F26\u002F2021, the medical record clearly states that the shock was partly due to sepsis.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>While the donor also had colitis and \u003Cem>Brevibacterium sp\u003C\u002Fem>. bacteremia on admission, it is unclear whether the presence of this microorganism in one blood culture was a contaminant or a true pathogen. We note that \u003Cem>Brevibacterium sp\u003C\u002Fem>. has been reported as a cause of sepsis in cancer and immunocompromised patients.\u003Csup>\u003Cem>\u003Cstrong>1-2\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fem>\u003C\u002Fsup> Although follow-up blood cultures on 3\u002F30\u002F21 showed no growth, the specimens were obtained while the donor was still on antibiotics and the donor clinically decompensated when the antibiotics were discontinued upon withdrawal of care due to the cancer prognosis. On the day of death (\u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong>), the donor showed additional, more severe signs of sepsis.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Donor \u003Cstrong>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)\u003C\u002Fstrong> had risk factors for and clinical evidence of sepsis, and two or more systemic responses to infection documented in the medical records of the hospital stay immediately preceding death based on, but not limited to, the following:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cul>\n\t\u003Cli>Heart rate &gt;90 beats\u002Fminute (114 beats\u002Fminute on 3\u002F27\u002F21)\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Diagnosis of a urinary tract infection on 3\u002F29\u002F21;\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Respiratory rate &gt;20 breaths\u002Fminute (24 breaths\u002Fminute on 3\u002F29\u002F21);\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Elevated WBC count &gt;12,000 cells\u002Fmm3 (24,400 cells\u002Fmm3 on 3\u002F30\u002F21);\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Elevated lactate (lactic acidosis);\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Altered mental status;\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Hypoxia with high FiO2 requirements;\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Oliguria; and\u003C\u002Fli>\n\t\u003Cli>Multi-organ system failure.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Ful>\n\n\u003Cp>The events described above are HCT\u002FP deviations related to core Current Good Tissue Practice (CGTP) requirements and must be investigated and documented. Because these situations represent an HCT\u002FP deviation relating to a core CGTP and to the prevention of communicable disease transmission or HCT\u002FP contamination; and HCT\u002FPs were distributed, deviation reports must be submitted to FDA in accordance with 21 CFR 1271.350(b).\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>2. Failure to ensure procedures are in compliance with the donor eligibility requirements within Subpart C – Donor Eligibility of 21 CFR 1271 [21 CFR 1271.47(a)].\u003C\u002Fstrong> For example, your procedure, “SOP-DC-1, Transplant Tissue Exclusionary Criteria” (Revision 15, Implementation Date 11\u002F29\u002F22), used to determine donor eligibility and “Form F-DC-25 Sepsis Consult Flowchart” (Revision 1, Implementation Date 03\u002F14\u002F19), used to determine if an infectious disease consult is required, fail to include all clinical evidence and systemic responses to infection, if unexplained, of sepsis during the donor’s hospital stay immediately preceding death to appropriately evaluate a donor’s sepsis risk. Additionally, your “Form F-DC-25 Sepsis Consult Flowchart” includes just two systemic responses to infection (fever &gt;100.4 F and WBC &gt;12,000 cells\u002Fmm\u003Csup>3\u003C\u002Fsup> or &lt;4,000 or bands &gt;10%) that accompany clinical evidence of infection. The flowchart fails to include a heart rate &gt;90 beats\u002Fminute and respiratory rate &gt;20 breaths\u002Fminute or partial pressure of carbon dioxide (PaCO\u003Csub>2\u003C\u002Fsub>) ˂32.\u003Csup>3\u003C\u002Fsup> Finally, your procedure and flowchart fail to include more severe signs of sepsis, such as unexplained hypoxemia, elevated lactate, oliguria, altered mentation, and hypotension.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>All five donors referenced above were evaluated for a risk of sepsis using the “Form F-DC-25 Sepsis Consult Flowchart.” Documentation in all the donor records included the following standard statement that failed to take into account all the clinical evidence of sepsis and systemic responses to infection as documented in the medical records during the hospital stay immediately preceding death:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>“As long as these were all the clinical ID tests drawn (blood, sputum, urine, peritoneal fluid, CSF, AFB Cxs; viral tests; Quantiferon, etc) there was no definitive empirical evidence of sepsis or bacteremia at TOD.”\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The deviations identified above are not intended to be an all-inclusive list of deficiencies at your facility. It is your responsibility to ensure that your establishment complies with all applicable federal regulations. You are responsible for reviewing your firm’s operations as a whole to ensure that you are in compliance with the law.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>We acknowledge receipt of your letter, dated February 23, 2024, providing a response and corrective actions to the FDA’s inspectional observations. We have reviewed your response and we have determined that the response is inadequate to address our concerns. We have the following comments regarding your FDA 483 response and your firm’s corrective actions.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>1. In response to Observation 1, your disagreement that the donors were septic at the time of death does not account for the donors’ medical records with documented diagnoses and clinical evidence of sepsis, including systemic responses to infection, during their hospital stay immediately preceding death. Your response states, “there is still only one gold standard for the diagnosis of sepsis, and that is a positive blood culture” and that the blood cultures were negative, and sepsis was thus ruled out for all donors cited on the FDA 483.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Sepsis is defined as life-threatening organ dysfunction caused by a dysregulated host response to infection.\u003Csup>\u003Cem>\u003Cstrong>3-4\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fem>\u003C\u002Fsup> A diagnosis of sepsis can be made in the emergency room and positive blood cultures are not required for the diagnosis of sepsis.\u003Csup>\u003Cem>\u003Cstrong>3-4\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fem>\u003C\u002Fsup> Positive pre-mortem blood cultures \u003Cu>\u003Cstrong>may\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fu> be associated with clinical evidence of sepsis. However, negative blood cultures do not exclude a diagnosis of bacteremia or sepsis. Routine blood cultures do not identify all microbial agents that can cause sepsis and additional incubation time, or special media is sometimes needed. Previous administration of antibiotics is frequently a reason for negative blood cultures (i.e., culture negative sepsis).\u003Csup>\u003Cem>\u003Cstrong>5\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fem>\u003C\u002Fsup> There are a myriad of reasons why blood cultures may be negative in cases of sepsis and the absence of a positive blood culture does not exclude sepsis as a cause of death.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Additionally, in FDA’s \u003Cem>Guidance for Industry: Eligibility Determination of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products (HCT\u002FPs) \u003C\u002Fem>(August 2007), the Agency describes our current thinking on the risks of sepsis in deceased donors to include a review of medical records during a hospital stay immediately preceding death for diagnosis of sepsis, clinical evidence of infection, and systemic responses to infection. These risk factors for sepsis and septic shock are supported in recent medical literature.\u003Csup>\u003Cem>\u003Cstrong>3-4\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fem>\u003C\u002Fsup>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>2. In response to Observation 3, we acknowledge that you have revised your procedure, “SOP-DC-1 Transplant Tissue Exclusionary Criteria,” to include reference to “Form F-DC-25 Sepsis Assessment Flowchart” and have revised section 6.4.11 as “Persons who have a documented medical diagnosis of sepsis immediately preceding death, or have documented clinical evidence consistent with a diagnosis of sepsis, which is not explained by other clinical conditions at the time of death.” However, your revised procedure does not account for the diagnosis or clinical evidence of sepsis, including systemic responses to infection, during a hospital stay immediately preceding death.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>We also acknowledge that you have revised “Form F-DC-25 Sepsis Assessment Flowchart” to include additional systemic responses to infection such as elevated heart rate and respiratory rate. However, it fails to include additional severe signs of sepsis described above that were also missing from your revised procedure. In addition, the flowchart states, “Complete for donors, with transplant intent, that were diagnosed or had a suspicion of sepsis, or positive blood cultures noted in the donor’s available records within five (5) days of death.” We note that a donor must be determined ineligible if there is documented diagnosis and clinical evidence of sepsis, including systemic responses to infection, documented in their medical records during a hospital stay immediately preceding death regardless of whether that information is documented within five days of death.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>You should take prompt action to correct the violations addressed in this letter and prevent their recurrence. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in regulatory action being initiated by the FDA without further notice.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>We request that you respond in writing within fifteen (15) working days from your receipt of this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken or plan to take to correct the noted violations, including an explanation of how you plan to prevent these violations, or similar violations, from occurring again. If you believe that your products are not in violation of the law, include your reasoning and any supporting information for our consideration. Additionally, include any documentation necessary to show that correction has been achieved. If you cannot complete all corrective actions within fifteen (15) working days, please explain the reason for your delay and the timeframe within which the remaining corrections will be completed.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Your response should be sent to the following address: Young Mi Yoon, Compliance Officer, U.S. Food &amp; Drug Administration, Office of Biological Products Operations – Division 2, 222 W. 7th Avenue, #25, Room 122, Anchorage, AK 99513 or emailed to YoungMi.Yoon@fda.hhs.gov. If you should have any questions, please contact Young Mi Yoon, Compliance Officer at (907) 248-8146 x 104 or via e-mail.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Sincerely,\u003Cbr>\n\u002FS\u002F\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Karlton T. Watson\u003Cbr>\nProgram Division Director\u003Cbr>\nOffice of Biological Products Operations – Division 2\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>_________________________\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cem>\u003Cstrong>1\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fem> Castagnola, E. et al. Broviac catheter-related bacteraemias due to unusual pathogens in children with cancer: case reports with literature review. J Infect. 1997 May; 34(3): 215-8.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cem>\u003Cstrong>2\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fem> Lina, B. Persistent bacteremia due to Brevibacterium species in an immunocompromised patient. Clin Infect Dis. 1994 Mar;18(3): 487-8.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cem>\u003Cstrong>3\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fem> Singer M, Deutschman CS, Seymour CW, et al: The third international consensus definitions for sepsis and septic shock (Sepsis-3). JAMA 2016; 315:801–810.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cem>\u003Cstrong>4\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fem> Evans, L. et al. Surviving Sepsis Campaign: International Guidelines for Management of Sepsis and Septic Shock 2021. Crit Care Med. 2021 Nov 1;49(11): e1063-e1143\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>5\u003C\u002Fstrong> Scheer, CS. Impact of antibiotic administration on blood culture positivity at the beginning of sepsis: a prospective clinical cohort study. Clin Microbiol Infect. 2019 Mar; 25(3):326-331.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n              \n                                            \n              \n            ","Delivery Method:\n\nVIA UNITED PARCEL SERVICE SIGNATURE REQUIRED\n\nReference #:\n\nOBPO 24-680039\n\nProduct:\n\nBiologics\n\nRecipient:\n\nRecipient Name\n\nTimothy M. Fischer\n\nRecipient Title\n\nPresident\u002FChief Executive Officer\n\nIndiana Lions Eye Bank, Inc. dba VisionFirst Indiana Lions Eye Bank\n\n4745 Haven Point Blvd.\n\nCarmel, IN 46280\n\nUnited States\n\nTfischer@visionfirst.org\n\nIssuing Office:\n\nDivision of Biological Products Operations II\n\nUnited States\n\nJune 10, 2024\n\nWarning Letter OBPO 24-680039\n\nDear Mr. Fischer:\n\nDuring an inspection of your firm, Indiana Lions Eye Bank, Inc. dba VisionFirst Indiana Lions Eye Bank, located at 4745 Haven Point Blvd., Carmel, IN, conducted between January 22, 2024, and February 1, 2024, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) documented significant deviations from the regulations for human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue-based products (HCTPs) set forth in Title 21 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1271 (21 CFR 1271) and issued under the authority of Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act [42 U.S.C. § 264].\n\nThe deviations documented on the Form FDA-483, List of Inspectional Observations (FDA 483), were presented to and discussed with you at the conclusion of the inspection. These items of concern include, but are not limited to, the following:\n\n1. Failure to determine as ineligible a donor who is identified as having a risk factor for, or clinical evidence of, any of the relevant communicable disease agents or diseases for which screening is required under 21 CFR 1271.75(a)(1) [21 CFR 1271.75(d)]. Between January 2021 and January 2024, you failed to determine as ineligible five donors of ocular HCT\u002FPs with a documented diagnosis or clinical evidence of sepsis, including two or more systemic responses to infection, documented within their available medical records during the hospital stay immediately preceding death. For example:\n\na. Donor (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was determined eligible on 1\u002F11\u002F24 and ocular HCT\u002FPs from the donor were distributed on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).\n\nThe donor was initially hospitalized on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) with a hospitalization that spanned (b)(4) across multiple hospitals and was complicated by multiple serious clinical conditions. Given the donor’s age, co-morbidities, deconditioned state, and protracted hospitalization, the donor was at high risk for sepsis. The donor’s health continued to decline, and the donor expired on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) with the cause of death attributed to sepsis and septic shock.\n\nThis donor with multiple serious medical conditions had risk factors for and clinical evidence of sepsis, and two or more systemic responses to infection documented in the medical records of the hospital stay immediately preceding death based on, but not limited to, the following:\n\nEvidence of urinary tract infection (urine culture on 12\u002F10\u002F23 grew Klebsiella pneumoniae);\n\nKlebsiella pneumoniae aspiration pneumonia;\n\nClostridioides difficile colitis\n\nRespiratory rate >20 breaths\u002Fminute (39 breaths\u002Fminute on 1\u002F5\u002F24); and\n\nElevated White Blood Cell (WBC) count >12,000 cells\u002Fmm3 (16,700 cells\u002Fmm3 on 1\u002F7\u002F24);\n\nHeart rate >90 beats\u002Fminute (144 beats\u002Fminute on 1\u002F7\u002F24); and\n\nAltered mental status.\n\nb. Donor (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was determined eligible on 1\u002F3\u002F24 and ocular HCT\u002FPs from the donor were distributed on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).\n\nThe donor was taken to the Emergency Department (ED) on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and was found to have agitation, confusion, hypotension, hypothermia, and multi-organ failure (heart, lungs, liver, kidneys). The donor was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) for shock of mixed etiology (cardiogenic and sepsis, septic shock due to undetermined organism) and possible community acquired versus aspiration pneumonia and was treated with broad spectrum antibiotics. Despite aggressive measures, the donor continued to decline and expired on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). The donor had a diagnosis of septic shock due to bacterial (Proteus mirabilis) and viral (Respiratory Syncytial Virus) pneumonia and clinical evidence of sepsis at the time of death. Both organisms can cause sepsis and special viral culture media, or a PCR test would be necessary to detect RSV in the blood.\n\nDonor (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had risk factors for and clinical evidence of sepsis, and two or more systemic responses to infection documented in the medical records of the hospital stay immediately preceding death based on, but not limited to, the following:\n\nHeart rate >90 beats\u002Fminute (97 beats\u002Fminute on 12\u002F27\u002F23)\n\nSputum culture positive for Proteus mirabilis and respiratory specimen positive for RSV (12\u002F28\u002F23);\n\nElevated procalcitonin level;\n\nAltered mental status;\n\nLactic acidosis;\n\nMulti-organ failure; and\n\nOliguria.\n\nc. Donor (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was determined eligible on 12\u002F12\u002F23 and ocular HCT\u002FPs from the donor were distributed on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).\n\nThe donor was admitted to the ED on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and was noted to have systemic inflammatory response syndrome (SIRS), profound hyperglycemia, leukocytosis, thrombocytopenia, lactic acidosis, acute renal failure, “shock liver” and passive congestion of liver due to right sided heart failure, pericardial effusion, and urosepsis. The donor was given intravenous fluids and vasopressor support and was treated with Vancomycin and Zosyn for “florid septic shock.” The donor was found in asystole and expired on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).\n\nDonor (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had a diagnosis of sepsis (urosepsis), risk factors for and clinical evidence of sepsis, and two or more systemic responses to infection documented in the medical records of the hospital stay immediately preceding death based on, but not limited to, the following:\n\nUrinary tract infection (urine culture from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) grew more than 100,000 cfu\u002FmL of Klebsiella pneumoniae);\n\nRespiratory rate >20 breaths\u002Fminute (27 breaths\u002Fminute on 12\u002F10\u002F23 and acute hypoxic respiratory failure);\n\nElevated WBC count >12,000 cells\u002Fmm3 (15,600 cells\u002Fmm3 on 12\u002F10\u002F23);\n\nAltered mental status;\n\nLactic acidosis; and\n\nMulti-organ failure.\n\nd. Donor (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was determined eligible on 4\u002F3\u002F23 and ocular HCT\u002FPs from the donor were distributed on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).\n\nThe donor was admitted to the ED from an extended care facility on 3\u002F29\u002F23 with a diagnosis of severe hypoxic respiratory failure, requiring supplemental oxygen, and sepsis due to bilateral pneumonia. The donor expired the same day. The ED record also describes that the donor met SIRS criteria. The discharge summary lists the primary cause of death as respiratory failure with hypoxia, with sepsis listed as a contributing factor.\n\nDonor (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had risk factors for and clinical evidence of sepsis, and two or more systemic responses to infection documented in the medical records of the hospital stay immediately preceding death based on, but not limited to, the following:\n\nBilateral pneumonia on chest x-ray (3\u002F29\u002F23);\n\nSevere hypoxic respiratory failure;\n\nHeart rate >90 beats\u002Fminute (126 beats\u002Fminute on 3\u002F29\u002F23); and\n\nRespiratory rate >20 breaths\u002Fminute (31 breaths\u002Fminute on 3\u002F29\u002F23).\n\ne. Donor (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was determined eligible on 4\u002F6\u002F21 and ocular HCT\u002FPs from the donor were distributed on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C).\n\nThe donor presented in the ED on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and was subsequently admitted to the ICU for “undifferentiated shock” attributed to sepsis and\u002For hypovolemia from dehydration and third spacing of fluid. The donor was treated with multiple renally dosed broad-spectrum antibiotics between (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), had a diagnosis of undifferentiated shock initially attributed to sepsis versus hypovolemia and, on 3\u002F26\u002F2021, the medical record clearly states that the shock was partly due to sepsis.\n\nWhile the donor also had colitis and Brevibacterium sp. bacteremia on admission, it is unclear whether the presence of this microorganism in one blood culture was a contaminant or a true pathogen. We note that Brevibacterium sp. has been reported as a cause of sepsis in cancer and immunocompromised patients.1-2 Although follow-up blood cultures on 3\u002F30\u002F21 showed no growth, the specimens were obtained while the donor was still on antibiotics and the donor clinically decompensated when the antibiotics were discontinued upon withdrawal of care due to the cancer prognosis. On the day of death ((b)(6), (b)(7)(C)), the donor showed additional, more severe signs of sepsis.\n\nDonor (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had risk factors for and clinical evidence of sepsis, and two or more systemic responses to infection documented in the medical records of the hospital stay immediately preceding death based on, but not limited to, the following:\n\nHeart rate >90 beats\u002Fminute (114 beats\u002Fminute on 3\u002F27\u002F21)\n\nDiagnosis of a urinary tract infection on 3\u002F29\u002F21;\n\nRespiratory rate >20 breaths\u002Fminute (24 breaths\u002Fminute on 3\u002F29\u002F21);\n\nElevated WBC count >12,000 cells\u002Fmm3 (24,400 cells\u002Fmm3 on 3\u002F30\u002F21);\n\nElevated lactate (lactic acidosis);\n\nAltered mental status;\n\nHypoxia with high FiO2 requirements;\n\nOliguria; and\n\nMulti-organ system failure.\n\nThe events described above are HCT\u002FP deviations related to core Current Good Tissue Practice (CGTP) requirements and must be investigated and documented. Because these situations represent an HCT\u002FP deviation relating to a core CGTP and to the prevention of communicable disease transmission or HCT\u002FP contamination; and HCT\u002FPs were distributed, deviation reports must be submitted to FDA in accordance with 21 CFR 1271.350(b).\n\n2. Failure to ensure procedures are in compliance with the donor eligibility requirements within Subpart C – Donor Eligibility of 21 CFR 1271 [21 CFR 1271.47(a)]. For example, your procedure, “SOP-DC-1, Transplant Tissue Exclusionary Criteria” (Revision 15, Implementation Date 11\u002F29\u002F22), used to determine donor eligibility and “Form F-DC-25 Sepsis Consult Flowchart” (Revision 1, Implementation Date 03\u002F14\u002F19), used to determine if an infectious disease consult is required, fail to include all clinical evidence and systemic responses to infection, if unexplained, of sepsis during the donor’s hospital stay immediately preceding death to appropriately evaluate a donor’s sepsis risk. Additionally, your “Form F-DC-25 Sepsis Consult Flowchart” includes just two systemic responses to infection (fever >100.4 F and WBC >12,000 cells\u002Fmm3 or \u003C4,000 or bands >10%) that accompany clinical evidence of infection. The flowchart fails to include a heart rate >90 beats\u002Fminute and respiratory rate >20 breaths\u002Fminute or partial pressure of carbon dioxide (PaCO2) ˂32.3 Finally, your procedure and flowchart fail to include more severe signs of sepsis, such as unexplained hypoxemia, elevated lactate, oliguria, altered mentation, and hypotension.\n\nAll five donors referenced above were evaluated for a risk of sepsis using the “Form F-DC-25 Sepsis Consult Flowchart.” Documentation in all the donor records included the following standard statement that failed to take into account all the clinical evidence of sepsis and systemic responses to infection as documented in the medical records during the hospital stay immediately preceding death:\n\n“As long as these were all the clinical ID tests drawn (blood, sputum, urine, peritoneal fluid, CSF, AFB Cxs; viral tests; Quantiferon, etc) there was no definitive empirical evidence of sepsis or bacteremia at TOD.”\n\nThe deviations identified above are not intended to be an all-inclusive list of deficiencies at your facility. It is your responsibility to ensure that your establishment complies with all applicable federal regulations. You are responsible for reviewing your firm’s operations as a whole to ensure that you are in compliance with the law.\n\nWe acknowledge receipt of your letter, dated February 23, 2024, providing a response and corrective actions to the FDA’s inspectional observations. We have reviewed your response and we have determined that the response is inadequate to address our concerns. We have the following comments regarding your FDA 483 response and your firm’s corrective actions.\n\n1. In response to Observation 1, your disagreement that the donors were septic at the time of death does not account for the donors’ medical records with documented diagnoses and clinical evidence of sepsis, including systemic responses to infection, during their hospital stay immediately preceding death. Your response states, “there is still only one gold standard for the diagnosis of sepsis, and that is a positive blood culture” and that the blood cultures were negative, and sepsis was thus ruled out for all donors cited on the FDA 483.\n\nSepsis is defined as life-threatening organ dysfunction caused by a dysregulated host response to infection.3-4 A diagnosis of sepsis can be made in the emergency room and positive blood cultures are not required for the diagnosis of sepsis.3-4 Positive pre-mortem blood cultures may be associated with clinical evidence of sepsis. However, negative blood cultures do not exclude a diagnosis of bacteremia or sepsis. Routine blood cultures do not identify all microbial agents that can cause sepsis and additional incubation time, or special media is sometimes needed. Previous administration of antibiotics is frequently a reason for negative blood cultures (i.e., culture negative sepsis).5 There are a myriad of reasons why blood cultures may be negative in cases of sepsis and the absence of a positive blood culture does not exclude sepsis as a cause of death.\n\nAdditionally, in FDA’s Guidance for Industry: Eligibility Determination of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products (HCT\u002FPs) (August 2007), the Agency describes our current thinking on the risks of sepsis in deceased donors to include a review of medical records during a hospital stay immediately preceding death for diagnosis of sepsis, clinical evidence of infection, and systemic responses to infection. These risk factors for sepsis and septic shock are supported in recent medical literature.3-4\n\n2. In response to Observation 3, we acknowledge that you have revised your procedure, “SOP-DC-1 Transplant Tissue Exclusionary Criteria,” to include reference to “Form F-DC-25 Sepsis Assessment Flowchart” and have revised section 6.4.11 as “Persons who have a documented medical diagnosis of sepsis immediately preceding death, or have documented clinical evidence consistent with a diagnosis of sepsis, which is not explained by other clinical conditions at the time of death.” However, your revised procedure does not account for the diagnosis or clinical evidence of sepsis, including systemic responses to infection, during a hospital stay immediately preceding death.\n\nWe also acknowledge that you have revised “Form F-DC-25 Sepsis Assessment Flowchart” to include additional systemic responses to infection such as elevated heart rate and respiratory rate. However, it fails to include additional severe signs of sepsis described above that were also missing from your revised procedure. In addition, the flowchart states, “Complete for donors, with transplant intent, that were diagnosed or had a suspicion of sepsis, or positive blood cultures noted in the donor’s available records within five (5) days of death.” We note that a donor must be determined ineligible if there is documented diagnosis and clinical evidence of sepsis, including systemic responses to infection, documented in their medical records during a hospital stay immediately preceding death regardless of whether that information is documented within five days of death.\n\nYou should take prompt action to correct the violations addressed in this letter and prevent their recurrence. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in regulatory action being initiated by the FDA without further notice.\n\nWe request that you respond in writing within fifteen (15) working days from your receipt of this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken or plan to take to correct the noted violations, including an explanation of how you plan to prevent these violations, or similar violations, from occurring again. If you believe that your products are not in violation of the law, include your reasoning and any supporting information for our consideration. Additionally, include any documentation necessary to show that correction has been achieved. If you cannot complete all corrective actions within fifteen (15) working days, please explain the reason for your delay and the timeframe within which the remaining corrections will be completed.\n\nYour response should be sent to the following address: Young Mi Yoon, Compliance Officer, U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Office of Biological Products Operations – Division 2, 222 W. 7th Avenue, #25, Room 122, Anchorage, AK 99513 or emailed to YoungMi.Yoon@fda.hhs.gov. If you should have any questions, please contact Young Mi Yoon, Compliance Officer at (907) 248-8146 x 104 or via e-mail.\n\nSincerely,\n\n\u002FS\u002F\n\nKarlton T. Watson\n\nProgram Division Director\n\nOffice of Biological Products Operations – Division 2\n\n_________________________\n\n1 Castagnola, E. et al. Broviac catheter-related bacteraemias due to unusual pathogens in children with cancer: case reports with literature review. J Infect. 1997 May; 34(3): 215-8.\n\n2 Lina, B. Persistent bacteremia due to Brevibacterium species in an immunocompromised patient. Clin Infect Dis. 1994 Mar;18(3): 487-8.\n\n3 Singer M, Deutschman CS, Seymour CW, et al: The third international consensus definitions for sepsis and septic shock (Sepsis-3). JAMA 2016; 315:801–810.\n\n4 Evans, L. et al. Surviving Sepsis Campaign: International Guidelines for Management of Sepsis and Septic Shock 2021. Crit Care Med. 2021 Nov 1;49(11): e1063-e1143\n\n5 Scheer, CS. Impact of antibiotic administration on blood culture positivity at the beginning of sepsis: a prospective clinical cohort study. Clin Microbiol Infect. 2019 Mar; 25(3):326-331.","Indiana Lions Eye Bank, Inc. dba VisionFirst Indiana Lions Eye Bank","indiana-lions-eye-bank-inc-dba-visionfirst-indiana-lions-eye-bank-680039-06102024","2026-08-18T06:42:28.856152+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Findiana-lions-eye-bank-inc-dba-visionfirst-indiana-lions-eye-bank-680039-06102024","2026-10-26T08:08:58.473015+00:00","Closed Out","2024-06-25","680039","Biologics","2026-02-12","Timothy M. Fischer","2026-08-20T00:00:39.048+00:00","VIA UNITED PARCEL SERVICE SIGNATURE REQUIRED","OBPO 24-680039","2024-06-10",4,{"510k":99,"classification":100,"enforcement":101,"event":102,"event_backfill":103,"pma":104,"warning_letter":105},"2026-11-16T02:00:55.89+00:00","2026-11-16T02:00:41.999+00:00","2026-11-16T02:00:49.415+00:00","2026-11-18T04:00:44.748+00:00","2026-09-07T05:17:28.839+00:00","2026-11-16T02:01:03.155+00:00","2026-11-17T01:02:55.859+00:00"]