[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"fda-warning-letters-search:[\"Medtronic MiniMed\",\"\",\"\",\"\",\"\",1]":3,"fda-latest-sync-dates":53},{"warningLetters":4,"total":52},[5,33],{"id":6,"raw":7,"subject":12,"body_html":15,"body_text":16,"firm_name":17,"letter_id":18,"created_at":19,"fei_number":20,"letter_url":21,"updated_at":22,"action_type":23,"case_status":24,"posted_date":25,"marcs_cms_no":26,"product_type":27,"closeout_date":28,"issuing_office":11,"recipient_name":29,"body_fetched_at":30,"delivery_method":31,"recipient_title":20,"reference_number":20,"action_taken_date":32,"medical_device_id":20,"response_letter_date":20},2944,[8,9,10,11,12,13,14,13],"\u003Ctime datetime=\"2021-12-28T14:20:00Z\">12\u002F28\u002F2021\u003C\u002Ftime>\n","\u003Ctime datetime=\"2021-12-09T05:00:00Z\">12\u002F09\u002F2021\u003C\u002Ftime>\n","\u003Ca href=\"\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Fmedtronic-inc-617539-12092021\">Medtronic, Inc.\u003C\u002Fa>","Center for Devices and Radiological Health","CGMP\u002FQSR\u002FMedical Devices\u002FAdulterated","","\u003Ca href=\"\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Fmedtronic-minimed-inc-617539-04252023\">\u003Ctime datetime=\"2023-04-28T04:00:00Z\">04\u002F28\u002F2023\u003C\u002Ftime>\n\u003C\u002Fa>","\n\n                            \n                            \n                            \n                            \n                                              \n  \n \n\n                 \n\n  \u003Chr>\n \n\n\u003Cdiv>\n  \u003Cdl>\n\n              \u003Cdt>Delivery Method:\u003C\u002Fdt> \n        \u003Cdd>VIA Electronic Mail\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              \u003C\u002Fdd>\n      \n      \n              \u003Cdt>Product:\u003C\u002Fdt> \n        \u003Cdd>Medical Devices                          \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n             \n            \n            \n            \n              \n            \n            \n            \u003C\u002Fdd>\n      \n          \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>            \n\n\n\u003Chr>\n\n\u003Cdiv>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdl>\n\n        \u003Cdt>Recipient:\u003C\u002Fdt>\n\n                      \u003Cdd>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdiv>Recipient Name\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n              \u003Cdiv>Geoff S. Martha\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n          \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\u003C\u002Fdd>\n                                \u003Cdd>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdiv>Recipient Title\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n              \u003Cdiv>Chief Executive Officer\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n          \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\u003C\u002Fdd>\n          \n            \u003Cdd>Medtronic, Inc.\u003C\u002Fdd>\n\n          \n                      \u003Cdd>\u003Cp>\u003Cspan>710 Medtronic Parkway\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cspan>Minneapolis\u003C\u002Fspan>, \u003Cspan>MN\u003C\u002Fspan> \u003Cspan>55432\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cspan>United States\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n          \n          \n            \n            \u003Cdd>\n\n    \u003C\u002Fdd>\u003Cdd>\u003Cspan>\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Ca href=\"mailto:Geoff.martha@medtronic.com\"> Geoff.martha@medtronic.com\u003C\u002Fa>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n\n          \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>            \n\n       \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdl>\n          \n          \u003Cdt>Issuing Office:\u003C\u002Fdt>\n        \n         \n          \u003Cdd>Center for Devices and Radiological Health\u003C\u002Fdd>\n        \n         \n          \u003Cdd>\u003Cp>\u003Cspan>United States\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n        \n        \n        \n        \n        \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n    \u003Cdl> \n      \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>  \n      \n\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\n \n\n \n\n\u003Chr>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>WARNING LETTER \u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>CMS 617539\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>December 9, 2021\u003Cbr>\n&nbsp;\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Dear Mr. Martha:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>During an inspection of your firm located in Northridge, California, on June 7, 2021 through July&nbsp;7, 2021, an investigator from the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determined that&nbsp;your firm manufactures the MiniMed 600 series insulin infusion pumps, and software and remote&nbsp;controllers used in conjunction with the Paradigm and MiniMed series insulin infusion pumps. &nbsp;Under&nbsp;section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act) [21 U.S.C. § 321(h)], these&nbsp;products are devices because they are intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other&nbsp;conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or to affect the&nbsp;structure or any function of the body.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>This inspection revealed the devices are adulterated within the meaning of section 501(h) of the&nbsp;Act [21 U.S.C. § 351(h)] in that the methods used in, or the facilities or controls used for, the&nbsp;manufacture, packing, storage, or installation are not in conformity with the current good&nbsp;manufacturing practice requirements of the Quality System regulation found at Title 21, Code of&nbsp;Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 820. &nbsp;You may find the Act and FDA’s regulations through links in the FDA’s home page \u003Ca>www.fda.gov.\u003C\u002Fa> &nbsp;We received your responses from Sean Salmon, Executive Vice President and President Diabetes Operating Unit, and Chirag Tilara, Vice President,&nbsp;Quality Management Representative, dated July 28, September 3, October 8, November 5, and December&nbsp;3, 2021, concerning our investigator’s observations noted on the Form FDA 483, Inspectional&nbsp;Observations, that was issued to your firm on July 7, 2021. &nbsp;We have considered these responses in&nbsp;relation to our observations noted during the inspection, which include, but are not limited to,&nbsp;the following:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>1. &nbsp;You failed to adequately establish procedures for corrective and preventive action, as required&nbsp;by 21 CFR 820.100(a).\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>a. &nbsp;Specifically, in June 2016, your firm initiated CAPA&nbsp;\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677 to address anincrease in complaints of damaged retainer rings (clear retainer rings) in the MiniMed 600 Series&nbsp;Insulin Infusion Pumps. &nbsp;Your investigation determined the device failures were caused by the&nbsp;\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> retainer ring, which in turn caused a \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. &nbsp;A damaged&nbsp;retainer ring may result in the over or under-delivery of insulin, which may lead to hypoglycemia&nbsp;or hyperglycemia.Beginning August 2019, your firm began releasing the re-designed pumps (which were manufactured&nbsp;with a black retainer ring) for distribution. &nbsp;You began notifying customers of retainer ring&nbsp;failures in November 2019. &nbsp;FDA determined that there was a reasonable probability that the use of,&nbsp;or exposure to, the pumps manufactured with the clear retainer ring would cause serious adverse&nbsp;health consequences, including severe hypoglycemia which can result in loss of consciousness,&nbsp;seizure; severe hyperglycemia which can result in diabetic ketoacidosis or hyperosmolar&nbsp;hyperglycemic state, metabolic abnormalities; or death and classified the recall (RES84430) as&nbsp;class 1. &nbsp;However, your firm failed to adequately implement procedures for corrective and&nbsp;preventive action (CAPA) in that you failed to adequately analyze all sources of quality data,&nbsp;failed to identify actions needed to correct nonconforming product, and you did not appropriately&nbsp;verify or validate the change to your device to ensure corrective and preventive actions taken were&nbsp;effective and did not adversely affect the finished device. &nbsp;While you implemented your procedure,&nbsp;we disagree with your characterization of the risk threshold which led to a conclusion of a lower&nbsp;risk than was appropriate. &nbsp;For example:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>i. &nbsp; Your CAPA \u003Cem>System\u003C\u002Fem> procedure (SOP114-01DOC, Effective Date 5\u002F19\u002F2015, Version L) requires your&nbsp;firm to determine whether distributed product is potentially affected by a nonconformance and to&nbsp;conduct additional risk assessment activities per the \u003Cem>Product Risk Management Process\u003C\u002Fem> (SOP104- 08,&nbsp;Version W). &nbsp;In June 2016, your firm conducted a \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>16-1051, Version A) which, per your Product Risk Management Process, outlines affected product&nbsp;in the field, and is a risk assessment and health hazard evaluation for informing field corrective&nbsp;action (“FCA”) decisions. &nbsp;Based on FDA’s own evaluation of risk, your outcomes of risk assessment&nbsp;do not appear to be appropriate. &nbsp;In conducting your \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> you did not accurately calculate the risk&nbsp;associated with the failed retainer rings in the MiniMed 600 Series Insulin Infusion Pumps because&nbsp;your risk calculation formula underestimated the probability of occurrence of harm, resulting in&nbsp;your firm classifying the risk as “\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>” (zone \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>)&nbsp;\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>” (zone \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>). &nbsp;Consequently, your firm did not&nbsp;initiate a correction or removal to address the defective devices from the field because per your&nbsp;\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, the risk of serious adverse health consequences was “improbable.”\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>ii. &nbsp; In March 2021, your firm revised your \u003Cem>Product Risk Management Process\u003C\u002Fem> (SOP104-08, Version&nbsp;AL), which updated the formula for risk calculation; however, this also did not result in accurate&nbsp;risk calculation. &nbsp;The updated formula uses the “total shipment of affected product” which again&nbsp;underestimates the probability of occurrence because the number of products shipped includes&nbsp;devices not in use by patients (e.g., devices shipped to distributors that have not yet been&nbsp;distributed to customers). Further, the update also changed the parameters on the risk evaluation&nbsp;matrix, increasing the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> parameters (zones \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>) and \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> parameters (zone \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>), thus requiring a higher occurrence for a harm to be classified as “\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>”&nbsp;(zone \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>). &nbsp;In June 2021 your firm again repeated the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, but due to the changes made in your risk&nbsp;evaluation formula and matrix, your firm again classified the risk as “\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>” (zone \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>&nbsp;(zone \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>).\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>iii. &nbsp; Your firm did not identify the actions needed to control devices already in distribution. As previously discussed, your firm’s justification in June 2016 for not initiating a recall was&nbsp;based on your firm’s underestimated risk calculation. &nbsp;Per your Product Review Board Decision Form,&nbsp;dated September 2, 2016 and signed by your VP\u002FPresident IIM Diabetes on October 3, 2016, while your&nbsp;firm initially planned to develop a customer communication regarding the reservoir retainer ring&nbsp;issue, the decision to not initiate a customer communication was based on “\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.” &nbsp;Your firm then \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, each time using&nbsp;the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and each time \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>; your firm consequently did not initiate a recall until November 20, 2019. &nbsp;From initiation of&nbsp;CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677 in June 2016 to November 20, 2019, the date you initiated the recall, you received&nbsp;over 74,000 retainer ring complaints, with over 57,000 of those reported to FDA as MDRs.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>iv. &nbsp; After you initiated the recall of the MiniMed 600 Series Insulin Infusion Pumps on November&nbsp;20, 2019, your firm further failed to implement changes in your methods and procedures needed to&nbsp;correct and prevent the recurrence of quality problems. &nbsp;Your recall consisted of a customer&nbsp;notification informing customers with affected insulin pumps to examine their devices for retainer&nbsp;ring damage and to contact Medtronic for a replacement pump if damage was noted; if no damage was&nbsp;noted by the customer, your&nbsp;notification instructed customers to continue using the device and to examine the retainer ring if&nbsp;the device was dropped or bumped. &nbsp;Thus, after redesigning the retainer ring to prevent further&nbsp;risk, you failed to adequately remove the pumps containing the older, less robust ring from the&nbsp;market.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>v. &nbsp; Your firm failed to verify and\u002For validate the corrective and preventive actions to ensure the&nbsp;action taken was effective to prevent recurrence of the nonconformance and did not adversely affect&nbsp;the finished device. &nbsp;Your firm began releasing the re-designed pump with the black retainer ring&nbsp;beginning August 2019 and closed CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677 as effective on October 2, 2020. Per your CAPA&nbsp;effectiveness plan, your firm compared the complaint rate of the newly released pumps \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> to the complaint rate of the previous pump design with the clear retainer ring \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>…” &nbsp;You concluded the&nbsp;effectiveness criteria were met because the complaint rate for the re-designed pumps was \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)&nbsp;\u003C\u002Fstrong>while the complaint rate for the previous design was \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. &nbsp;However, you received 322 complaints&nbsp;during the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> effectiveness check period (\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> to \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>), and as of May 25, 2021, you had&nbsp;received a total of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> complaints of defective black retainer rings. &nbsp;You did not re-evaluate the&nbsp;effectiveness of your corrective and preventive actions to determine whether CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677 should&nbsp;be re-evaluated.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>b. &nbsp;Specifically, your firm initiated CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#401464 on June 29, 2018, to address a cybersecurity&nbsp;vulnerability with the remote controllers used with your Medtronic MiniMed 508 Insulin Infusion&nbsp;Pump and your MiniMed Paradigm Insulin Infusion Pumps. &nbsp;The identified cybersecurity vulnerability&nbsp;revealed unauthorized individuals could \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.” &nbsp;The root cause&nbsp;investigation in CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#401464 indicated the “\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.” &nbsp;In evaluating the risk of patient harm, your firm&nbsp;determined the lack of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> that could lead to delivery of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> could result in&nbsp;catastrophic harm to patients. &nbsp;Per your CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#401464, to address the root cause of the lack of&nbsp;cyber security requirements in the design, all current and future Medtronic Diabetes software&nbsp;products would be evaluated for encryption security requirements. &nbsp;Your firm also discontinued the&nbsp;manufacture and distribution of the&nbsp;Paradigm Pump products and scrapped remaining inventory of the remote controllers; however, these&nbsp;corrective actions did not address the devices in the field. &nbsp;While your firm initiated a recall of&nbsp;15,787 remote controllers shipped to customers in the previous four years, you have distributed&nbsp;over \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> remote controllers since its release in 1999, and you did not notify all customers of&nbsp;this safety issue.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>We have reviewed your responses and conclude that they are not adequate because you have not yet&nbsp;provided evidence of implementation for all corrections and corrective actions. We acknowledge your&nbsp;firm has committed to replacing MiniMed 600 Series Insulin Infusion Pumps with the clear retainer&nbsp;ring for all US customers, regardless of warranty status, and will retrieve all Medtronic MiniMed&nbsp;remote controllers from active users, and opened CAPA 539888 in order to track completion of your&nbsp;proposed corrective actions.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>You stated you have updated relevant procedures, including but not limited to the risk management&nbsp;procedures, including \u003Cem>Product Risk Management Process\u003C\u002Fem> (SOP104- 08DOC), \u003Cem>Risk Management Post&nbsp;Production Procedure\u003C\u002Fem> (DOP104-068DOC), your recall procedure, \u003Cem>Diabetes FCA Program Governance&nbsp;\u003C\u002Fem>(10578148DOC), to address observation 1 on the FDA 483. You also state you will no longer use a&nbsp;device’s warranty status as a factor in determining the scope of recalls associated with the risk&nbsp;patient harm.&nbsp;Additionally, you state you have updated the \u003Cem>Medtronic Internal Message Guide\u003C\u002Fem> to characterize the&nbsp;field action as a recall to US customers, and opened CAPA 539942 to investigate reports of black&nbsp;retainer ring damage “in light of complaints that have been received.”\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>We acknowledge that you provided a copy of Engineering Report; \u003Cem>NGP 6015265-020 Retainer Ring Damage&nbsp;Investigation\u003C\u002Fem>, Version B in which you conclude that no manufacturing or design non-conformance was&nbsp;identified. However, you also stated that you have opened CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#539942 to further investigate&nbsp;damaged retainer rings and that activity is still ongoing.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>You have also provided DOP104-068DOC, \u003Cem>Risk Management Post Production Procedure\u003C\u002Fem>, Revision U. This&nbsp;procedure is not adequate. &nbsp;You have \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> for the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> “Medtronic MiniMed believes the&nbsp;\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> is common&nbsp;practice in the industry”, however you have not provided adequate justification to demonstrate that&nbsp;it is appropriate for your risk calculation. &nbsp;For example, on pg. 200 of “Appendix B_1 of 2”&nbsp;provided in your response dated July 28, 2021 you provided the number of MiniMed 600 Series pumps&nbsp;with clear&nbsp;retainer rings shipped to the field as of February 28, 2021. &nbsp;There is a large difference between&nbsp;the number of products shipped (\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>) and number of products actually in use in the field&nbsp;(\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>% of product shipped). &nbsp;It is unclear to us if the difference was due to the&nbsp;number of devices currently with distributors. &nbsp;If that is not the case, using the number of&nbsp;products shipped (including devices that are not in use by patients) could under- estimate the&nbsp;probability of occurrence of hazardous situations, even after subtracting products currently with&nbsp;distributors.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>In addition, you started \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> in \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> but did not&nbsp;\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> (SOP104-08DOC, Revision AP), stating that the one-year&nbsp;delay was “\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>”, however you should not have delayed implementing the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>&nbsp;method. &nbsp;You further attempted to justify your interpretation of the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> in your July 2021&nbsp;response as follows: “\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, etc.) \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>”. &nbsp;However, you have not explained how your \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>&nbsp;i.e., that for \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>” as the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, especially when the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Following change in the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> situations, you&nbsp;have also re-evaluated your risk zone classification matrix in March 2021 (Change Order&nbsp;QCH00047208, SOP104-08 DOC, Revision AL), stating that “t\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>”, which resulted in changes in classification of risk zones. \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>: specifically, “\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>&nbsp;from \u003Cstrong>(b)(4).\u003C\u002Fstrong>&nbsp; In Attachment 1.6 of your response&nbsp;provided on July 28, 2021 you stated that your assessment of suitability of the risk acceptability&nbsp;criteria was conducted based on mortality rates associated with type 1 diabetes, however death is&nbsp;not the only serious consequence for population for which insulin pump therapy is indicated. &nbsp;Other&nbsp;adverse events such as severe hypoglycemia (SH) and diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA) can also present&nbsp;serious harms to users and should be considered in your hazard analysis. &nbsp;Similarly, your&nbsp;justification for the reassignment of risk zones for \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> events relies heavily on the above&nbsp;calculation of mortality rates only. Furthermore, you argued that, with the removal of the factor&nbsp;of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> from your \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.” &nbsp;However, the risk calculation for \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and severity of the&nbsp;risk zones are separate issues and should be assessed separately; addressing the risk calculation&nbsp;does not justify changing the risk zone classification to maintain the overall risk levels. &nbsp;You&nbsp;have not provided adequate information to support that your revised risk zones are clinically&nbsp;acceptable because they appear to be based only on mortality rates, and not all the adverse events&nbsp;that can occur in the intended use population.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>In your response, you should explain how your mortality-based risk calculation is appropriate to&nbsp;address all health risks especially as it led to a down-classification of the risk severity, and&nbsp;update your risk zone classifications if necessary. Finally, in your November 5, 2021 update you&nbsp;stated that you evaluated the Issue Impact Assessments (IIAs) initiated in the last \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and&nbsp;identified 20 IIAs that require remediation to reflect the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> per&nbsp;DOP104-068DOC, \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> that is planned to be complete by \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. However, as it is&nbsp;unclear if your revised procedure is adequate and because this corrective action is not yet&nbsp;complete, we cannot evaluate the adequacy at this time.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>In summary, your corrective actions are still in process, and you have not yet conducted&nbsp;effectiveness checks to ensure the updated procedures and required employee training &nbsp;will prevent&nbsp;reoccurrence of the identified deficiencies. &nbsp;In your November 5, 2021 update you stated that you&nbsp;completed a retrospective review of CAPA effectiveness criteria and of CAPA effectiveness&nbsp;monitoring thresholds but 38 CAPAs were identified as requiring remediation and\u002For clarification&nbsp;and 14 CAPAs were identified as requiring a new complaint monitoring plan. &nbsp;You should remediate&nbsp;those CAPAs using an adequate risk analysis and provide a summary of your review and remediation&nbsp;efforts.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>2. &nbsp;You failed to review, evaluate, and investigate complaints involving the possible failure of a&nbsp;device to meet any of its specifications, as required by 21 CFR 820.198(c).\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>a. &nbsp;Your firm failed to investigate over 800 complaints of defective black retainer rings. In June&nbsp;2016, your firm initiated CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677 to address an increase in complaints of damaged retainer&nbsp;rings in the MiniMed 600 Series Insulin Infusion Pumps; as part of the CAPA investigation, your&nbsp;firm determined the retainer ring required re-design, and you changed the retainer ring from a&nbsp;clear \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> ring to a black \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> ring. &nbsp;You began&nbsp;releasing the re-designed pump with black retainer ring in August 2019, and you closed CAPA&nbsp;\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677 as effective October 2020. &nbsp;From December 2019 to May 2021, you received 887 complaints&nbsp;of defective black retainer rings; in 772 of the 887 complaints your firm referenced CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677&nbsp;as the “Formal Investigation\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Reference Number” even though this CAPA was an investigation of the previous clear retainer ring&nbsp;design. &nbsp;For example:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>i.&nbsp; On January 21, 2020, you received a complaint (CASE-2020-00056605) from a customer&nbsp;reporting a crack on their insulin pump reservoir compartment, and damage to the retainer ring. &nbsp;Your product analysis on the returned device confirmed the device had a “partially broken retainer,&nbsp;cracked reservoir tube lip, missing reservoir tube lip O-ring, and broken reservoir tube lip.” &nbsp;On&nbsp;April 24, 2020, you determined no formal investigation was necessary due to existing\u002Fprevious&nbsp;formal investigation and referenced CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677. &nbsp;You closed this complaint on April 24, 2020.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>ii.&nbsp; On February 20, 2020, you received a complaint (CASE-2020-00139368) from a customer&nbsp;reporting they experience hyperglycemia, with blood glucose levels of 450 mg\u002FdL. &nbsp;The customer&nbsp;stated that the lip ring was missing. &nbsp;Your product analysis on the returned device confirmed the&nbsp;device was missing the reservoir retainer ring and the reservoir tube lip O-ring, and the reservoir&nbsp;would not stay locked in place due to the missing retainer. &nbsp;On May 8, 2020, you determined no&nbsp;formal investigation was necessary due to existing\u002Fprevious formal investigation and referenced&nbsp;CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677. You closed this complaint on May 8, 2020.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>iii.&nbsp; On April 7, 2020, you received a complaint (CASE-2020-00260639) from a customer&nbsp;experiencing a high blood glucose level of 434 mg\u002FdL. &nbsp;The customer reported that the retainer ring&nbsp;was loose, and the reservoir did not lock into place when inserted into the pump. &nbsp;Your product&nbsp;analysis on the returned device confirmed a broken retainer and missing reservoir tube O- ring, and&nbsp;the reservoir did not lock into place. &nbsp;On June 5, 2020, you determined no formal investigation was&nbsp;necessary due to existing\u002Fprevious formal investigation and referenced CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677. &nbsp;You closed&nbsp;this complaint on June 6, 2020.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>b. &nbsp;Your firm failed to adequately investigate a complaint in which the customer reported \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> of insulin that were not programmed by the customer. You received a complaint on December&nbsp;25, 2019 (CASE-2019-00921665) where the customer alleged that their low blood glucose was the&nbsp;result of over-delivery of insulin by their Paradigm Insulin Infusion Pump (Model MMT-715WWS),&nbsp;which per the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, reflected \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> that were not programmed by the customer. The&nbsp;device was returned to your firm for analysis and the complaint was escalated to your cybersecurity&nbsp;Incident Response Management Team. Your investigation included a review of the downloaded CareLink data, in which the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> reported by&nbsp;the customer were not reflected. However, your firm’s investigation did not include reviewing the&nbsp;actual pump history to verify the presence of the additional \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. This complaint was closed&nbsp;June 26, 2021 as “the cause of the event cannot be determined, as product analysis found no failure&nbsp;or anomaly in the device.”\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>c. &nbsp; Your firm failed to adequately investigate complaints of Enlite3 MMT-7020A glucose sensor&nbsp;failures. &nbsp;You received two complaints of sensor failures, both of which were closed as “analysis&nbsp;is not required as this complaint is not reportable, and the sensor lot number is unknown.” &nbsp;However, there is no evidence in either complaint record that technical support attempted to&nbsp;determine the lot numbers when communicating with the complainants, even though your \u003Cem>Guides,&nbsp;Troubleshooting, Glucose Sensor\u003C\u002Fem> procedure (DOP114-691DOC, Revisions AL and AM) requires all service&nbsp;notifications to include a lot or batch number for the product. &nbsp;Furthermore, while your \u003Cem>Failure&nbsp;Analysis-Glucose Sensor Products\u003C\u002Fem> procedure (DOP830DOC, Version V) indicates expired sensors are not&nbsp;required to be analyzed, it is not clear how your firm determined the sensors were expired when&nbsp;neither complaint record lists an expiration date, and you failed to determine the lot or batch&nbsp;number of the returned sensors. &nbsp;Last, your \u003Cem>Failure Analysis-Glucose Sensor Products\u003C\u002Fem> procedure does&nbsp;not include MDR reportability as a requirement for sensor analysis.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>d. &nbsp;Your firm failed to adequately investigate reported issues with your CareLink software that&nbsp;your firm manufactures; this software uses information transmitted from insulin infusion pumps and&nbsp;glucose meters to create reports intended to assist users with diabetes management. &nbsp;Of the 25&nbsp;complaints reviewed during our inspection, your firm documented “software error unknown” in 20 of&nbsp;the complaints; however, there is no evidence in your complaint records that technical support&nbsp;attempted to determine the version of software used by the device in order to conduct an&nbsp;investigation. &nbsp;During the inspection, your VP of Quality Assurance explained to our investigator&nbsp;that all versions of the software are maintained and could be analyzed to investigate the reported&nbsp;software errors.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>We have reviewed your responses and acknowledge you have opened CAPA 539889 to track completion of&nbsp;your proposed corrective actions, including updating complaint investigation and post market&nbsp;trending, as well as implementation of an enhanced training program for complaint handling,&nbsp;technical support, and failure analysis personnel. &nbsp;You have also committed to performing a&nbsp;retrospective review of complaint files for the issues identified on the FDA 483, Inspectional&nbsp;Observations.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>In your initial response, you acknowledge CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677 should not have been used to justify not&nbsp;investigating complaints of the re-designed insulin infusion pumps, and you recognize complaints of&nbsp;damaged black retainer rings should have been escalated to a new formal investigation; you have&nbsp;opened CAPA 539942 to conduct this formal investigation. &nbsp;However, your response does not address&nbsp;why your firm deemed the original CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677 as adequate justification for not investigating&nbsp;over 800 complaints in the re-designed pump, nor does it address changes made to prevent recurrence&nbsp;of similar events.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Your response indicates you conducted further analysis of complaint CASE-2019-00921665, in which&nbsp;the customer received \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> not programmed into the device; in your supplementary&nbsp;investigation, your firm reviewed the downloaded pump history file and found \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> of similar&nbsp;size to those recorded in the complaint. &nbsp;Your supplementary investigation concluded the extra&nbsp;\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> were not received over \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, which “rules out the possibility of a cyber security incident.” &nbsp;We acknowledge your firm has updated your \u003Cem>Failure Analysis\u003C\u002Fem>, \u003Cem>Paradigm\u003C\u002Fem> (DOP114-858DOC) and \u003Cem>Failure&nbsp;Analysis\u003C\u002Fem>, NGP (DOP114- 888DOC) procedures, and will update failure analyses as warranted; however,&nbsp;your response does not address your firm’s initial limited investigation, nor does it address&nbsp;changes made to prevent recurrence of similar events.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Your response also describes further investigations of the two complaints of Enlite3 MMT- 7020A&nbsp;glucose sensor failures. &nbsp;Per your response, your firm was able to narrow down and\u002For determine lot&nbsp;numbers of the sensors via patient history and reassessment of complaint files. In your&nbsp;reassessment you conducted a Lot History Review (LHR) and determined for both complaints “there&nbsp;were no process deviations or out of specification test results observed that would have&nbsp;contributed to a sensor performance issues.” &nbsp;We acknowledge you opened CAPA 541992 to investigate&nbsp;methods to reliably investigate and analyze sensors; however, as this corrective action is not yet&nbsp;complete, we cannot evaluate the adequacy at this time.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>We also acknowledge your firm committed to implementing a new failure analysis process specific to&nbsp;software complaints, and opened CAPA 541994 to investigate and identify actions needed, and&nbsp;complaints with “software error unknown” will be investigated as part of that CAPA. &nbsp; However, as&nbsp;part of your corrective actions are not yet complete, including your, retrospective complaint&nbsp;review and systemic complaint investigation processes and training, we cannot evaluate the adequacy&nbsp;of your response at this time.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Our inspection also revealed that your insulin infusion pump devices are misbranded under section&nbsp;502(t)(2) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(t)(2), in that your firm failed or refused to furnish&nbsp;material or information respecting the device that is required by or under section 519 of the Act,&nbsp;21 U.S.C. § 360i, and 21 CFR Part 803 – Medical Device Reporting. &nbsp;Significant deficiencies&nbsp;include, but are not limited to, the following:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>3. &nbsp;Your firm failed to submit a report to FDA no later than 30 calendar days of receiving or&nbsp;otherwise becoming aware of information that reasonably suggests that a marketed device may have&nbsp;caused or contributed to a death or serious injury, as required by 21 CFR 803.50(a)(1).\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>For example, the information included for complaint #CASE-2020-00236012 describes an event in which&nbsp;your firm’s MiniMed Insulin Pump malfunctioned; after using the device the patient exhibited low&nbsp;glucose reading of 36 mg\u002FdL and was treated with food. &nbsp;We believe that the treatment received by&nbsp;the patient was necessitated to preclude permanent impairment of a body function or permanent&nbsp;damage to a body structure. &nbsp;There is no information included in the firm’s complaint file that&nbsp;rules out the device may not have caused or contributed to the referenced serious injury. &nbsp;As such,&nbsp;the referenced complaint meets the definition of a reportable serious injury, as defined in 21 CFR&nbsp;803.3. The firm became aware of the event on March 27, 2020. However, your firm did not submit an&nbsp;MDR to the FDA.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The adequacy of your firm’s response dated July 28, 2021 cannot be determined at this time. &nbsp;The&nbsp;response noted that your firm is implementing systemic corrective actions, including updates to its&nbsp;reportability criteria, a retrospective review of the complaints and staff training. &nbsp;However, your&nbsp;firm did not provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions,&nbsp;including submission of the referenced serious injury MDR, have been implemented and completed as&nbsp;they are still in progress.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The adequacy of your firm’s response dated September 3, 2021 also cannot be determined at this&nbsp;time. &nbsp;Your response provided an update to its planned or newly added corrective actions, including&nbsp;identification and submission of reportable events associated with retainer ring damage complaints,&nbsp;and implementation of late regulatory review process. &nbsp;However, your firm did not provide&nbsp;documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including submission of&nbsp;the referenced serious injury MDR and planned re-evaluation of its reportability criteria, have&nbsp;been implemented and completed as they are still in progress.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The adequacy of your firm’s responses dated October 8, November 5, and December 2, 2021 also cannot&nbsp;be determined at this time. &nbsp;Your responses provided an update to the planned corrective actions. &nbsp;You provided your new MDR Training Program. &nbsp;However, you also report that training of personnel&nbsp;will not be completed until \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. You also provided \u003Cem>D00603958 MDR Decision Alignment with Risk Management Remediation Plan for&nbsp;Diabetes\u003C\u002Fem>. &nbsp;It is unclear if this plan incorporates an adequate risk analysis (see review under item&nbsp;#1) and you state that your planned actions will not be completed until \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. You did not&nbsp;provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including&nbsp;submission of the referenced serious injury MDR and planned re-evaluation of its reportability&nbsp;criteria, have been implemented and completed as they are still in progress.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>4. &nbsp;Your firm failed to submit a report to FDA no later than 30 calendar days after the day that&nbsp;the firm received or otherwise became aware of information, from any source, that reasonably&nbsp;suggests that a device that the firm markets has malfunctioned and this device or a similar device&nbsp;that it markets would be likely to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury, if the&nbsp;malfunction were to recur, as required by 21 CFR 803.50(a)(2).\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>For example, the information included for Complaints #CASE-2018-00270399 and #CASE-2018-00437534&nbsp;reasonably suggests that your firm’s insulin pump malfunctioned (e.g. broken or missing retainer&nbsp;ring) while in use. &nbsp;The same malfunction is the subject of the recall Z-0956-2020 for the same&nbsp;device. &nbsp;Per the 1995 Preamble, a malfunction is reportable if the manufacturer takes, or would be&nbsp;required to take, an action under section 518 or 519(g) of the FD&amp;C as a result of the malfunction&nbsp;of the device or other similar devices {60 FR 63578, 63585 (Dec. 11, 1995)}. Please note that the&nbsp;preamble reference is section 519(f), but the appropriate designation for the section is now&nbsp;section 519(g) due to amendments to the FD&amp;C Act. &nbsp;There is no information included for the&nbsp;complaint files that justifies that the malfunction would not be likely to cause or contribute to a&nbsp;death or serious injury, if it were to recur. &nbsp;As such, your firm should have submitted within the&nbsp;required timeframes, an MDR for each MDR reportable event subject of the referenced complaints. &nbsp;The corresponding MDRs 2032227-2021-157630 and 2032227-2021-157620 were received by FDA beyond the&nbsp;required 30 calendar days timeframe.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The adequacy of your firm’s response dated July 28, 2021 cannot be determined at this time. &nbsp;The&nbsp;response noted that your firm is implementing systemic corrective actions, including updates to its&nbsp;reportability criteria, a retrospective review of the complaints and staff training. However, your&nbsp;firm did not provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions,&nbsp;including the planned assessment of its reportability criteria, have been implemented and completed&nbsp;as they are still in progress.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The adequacy of your firm’s response dated September 3, 2021 also cannot be determined at this&nbsp;time. &nbsp;Your response provided an update to its planned or newly added corrective actions, including&nbsp;identification and submission of reportable events associated with retainer ring damage complaints,&nbsp;and implementation of late regulatory review process. &nbsp;However, your firm did not provide&nbsp;documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including the planned&nbsp;re-evaluation of its reportability criteria, have been implemented and completed as they are still&nbsp;in progress.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The adequacy of your firm’s responses dated October 8, November 5, and December 2, 2021 also cannot&nbsp;be determined at this time. &nbsp;Your response provided an update to the planned corrective actions. &nbsp;You provided your new MDR Training Program. &nbsp;However, you also report that training of personnel&nbsp;will not be completed until \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.&nbsp; You also provided \u003Cem>D00603958 MDR Decision Alignment with Risk Management Remediation Plan for&nbsp;Diabetes\u003C\u002Fem>. &nbsp;It is unclear if this plan incorporates an adequate risk analysis (see review under item&nbsp;#1) and you state that your planned actions will not be completed until \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.&nbsp; You did not&nbsp;provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including&nbsp;submission of the referenced serious injury MDR and planned re-evaluation of its reportability&nbsp;criteria, have been implemented and completed as they are still in progress.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>This letter notifies you of our findings and provides you an opportunity to address the above&nbsp;deficiencies. &nbsp;Your firm should investigate and determine the causes of any deficiencies, and take&nbsp;prompt actions to correct the deficiencies and bring the products into compliance. Failure to&nbsp;promptly correct these deficiencies may result in regulatory action being initiated by the FDA&nbsp;without further notice. &nbsp;These actions include, but are not limited to, seizure, injunction, and&nbsp;civil money penalties. &nbsp;Additionally, premarket approval applications for Class III devices to&nbsp;which the Quality System regulation deficiencies are reasonably related will not be approved until&nbsp;the deficiencies have been corrected. &nbsp;Also, should FDA determine that your devices do not meet&nbsp;requirements of the Act, requests for Certificates to Foreign Governments (CFG) may not be granted.&nbsp;More information on processes for persons denied a CFG can be found at:&nbsp;\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Fregulatory-information\u002Fsearch-fda-guidance-documents\u002Fprocess-request-review-fdas-decision-not-issue-certain-export-certificates-devices\">https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Fregulatory-information\u002Fsearch-fda-guidance-documents\u002Fprocess-request-review-fdas-decision-not-issue-certain-export-certificates-devices\u003C\u002Fa>. If you believe that your&nbsp;products are not in violation of the FD&amp;C Act and FDA regulations, please provide us with your&nbsp;reasoning and any supporting information for our consideration within fifteen business days.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>You should schedule a teleconference with FDA to further discuss your response to this Warning&nbsp;Letter, particularly in response to your revised risk assessment (please see item 1 above) in more&nbsp;detail. Please notify FDA in writing within fifteen business days from the date you receive this&nbsp;letter of the specific steps your firm has taken to correct the noted Quality System and MDR&nbsp;reporting deficiencies, as well as an explanation of how your firm plans to prevent these deficiencies, or similar deficiencies, from occurring again. &nbsp;Include documentation of the&nbsp;corrections and\u002For corrective actions (which must address systemic problems) that your firm has&nbsp;taken. &nbsp;If your firm’s planned corrections and\u002For corrective actions will occur over time, please&nbsp;include a timetable for implementation of those activities. &nbsp;If corrections and\u002For corrective&nbsp;actions cannot be completed within fifteen business days, state the reason for the delay and the&nbsp;time within which these activities will be completed. &nbsp;Your firm’s response should be comprehensive&nbsp;and address all deficiencies included in this Warning Letter.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Your response should be sent to: US Food and Drug Administration, Division 3\u002FWest, Office of&nbsp;Medical Device and Radiological Health Operations at oradevices3firmresponse@fda.hhs.gov. Please&nbsp;identify your response with CMS Case #617539. &nbsp;If you have questions about the contents of this&nbsp;letter, please contact Compliance Officer Jamie M. Bumpas at 214-253-5336 or via email at Jamie.bumpas@fda.hhs.gov.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Finally, you should know that this letter is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of the&nbsp;deficiencies at your firm’s facility. &nbsp;It is your firm’s responsibility to ensure compliance with&nbsp;applicable laws and regulations administered by FDA. &nbsp;The specific deficiencies noted in this&nbsp;letter and in the Inspectional Observations, FDA 483, issued at the close of the inspection may be&nbsp;symptomatic of serious problems in your firm’s manufacturing and quality management systems. &nbsp;Your&nbsp;firm should investigate and determine the causes of the deficiencies, and take prompt actions to&nbsp;correct the deficiencies and bring the products into compliance.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cbr>\nSincerely,\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u002FS\u002F\u003Cbr>\nShari J. Shambaugh\u003Cbr>\nProgram Division Director\u003Cbr>\nOffice of Medical Device &amp; Radiological Health\u003Cbr>\nWest\u002FDivision 3\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u002FS\u002F\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Timothy T. Stenzel, M.D., Ph.D.\u003Cbr>\nDirector\u003Cbr>\nOHT 7: Office of In Vitro Diagnostics and\u003Cbr>\nRadiological Health\u003Cbr>\nOffice of Product Evaluation and Quality\u003Cbr>\nCenter for Devices and Radiological Health\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cbr>\nCc:\u003Cbr>\nSean Salmon, Executive Vice President &amp; President\u003Cbr>\nDiabetes Operating Unit\u003Cbr>\nMedtronic, Inc.\u003Cbr>\nSean.salmon@medtronic.com\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Chirag Tilara, Vice President, Quality\u003Cbr>\nMedtronic, Inc.\u003Cbr>\nChirag.m.tilara@medtronic.com\u003Cbr>\n&nbsp;\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n              \n                                            \n              \n            ","Delivery Method:\n\nVIA Electronic Mail\n\nProduct:\n\nMedical Devices\n\nRecipient:\n\nRecipient Name\n\nGeoff S. Martha\n\nRecipient Title\n\nChief Executive Officer\n\nMedtronic, Inc.\n\n710 Medtronic Parkway\n\nMinneapolis, MN 55432\n\nUnited States\n\nGeoff.martha@medtronic.com\n\nIssuing Office:\n\nCenter for Devices and Radiological Health\n\nUnited States\n\nWARNING LETTER\n\nCMS 617539\n\nDecember 9, 2021\n\nDear Mr. Martha:\n\nDuring an inspection of your firm located in Northridge, California, on June 7, 2021 through July 7, 2021, an investigator from the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determined that your firm manufactures the MiniMed 600 series insulin infusion pumps, and software and remote controllers used in conjunction with the Paradigm and MiniMed series insulin infusion pumps. Under section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act) [21 U.S.C. § 321(h)], these products are devices because they are intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or to affect the structure or any function of the body.\n\nThis inspection revealed the devices are adulterated within the meaning of section 501(h) of the Act [21 U.S.C. § 351(h)] in that the methods used in, or the facilities or controls used for, the manufacture, packing, storage, or installation are not in conformity with the current good manufacturing practice requirements of the Quality System regulation found at Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 820. You may find the Act and FDA’s regulations through links in the FDA’s home page www.fda.gov. We received your responses from Sean Salmon, Executive Vice President and President Diabetes Operating Unit, and Chirag Tilara, Vice President, Quality Management Representative, dated July 28, September 3, October 8, November 5, and December 3, 2021, concerning our investigator’s observations noted on the Form FDA 483, Inspectional Observations, that was issued to your firm on July 7, 2021. We have considered these responses in relation to our observations noted during the inspection, which include, but are not limited to, the following:\n\n1. You failed to adequately establish procedures for corrective and preventive action, as required by 21 CFR 820.100(a).\n\na. Specifically, in June 2016, your firm initiated CAPA (b)(4)#299677 to address anincrease in complaints of damaged retainer rings (clear retainer rings) in the MiniMed 600 Series Insulin Infusion Pumps. Your investigation determined the device failures were caused by the (b)(4) retainer ring, which in turn caused a (b)(4). A damaged retainer ring may result in the over or under-delivery of insulin, which may lead to hypoglycemia or hyperglycemia.Beginning August 2019, your firm began releasing the re-designed pumps (which were manufactured with a black retainer ring) for distribution. You began notifying customers of retainer ring failures in November 2019. FDA determined that there was a reasonable probability that the use of, or exposure to, the pumps manufactured with the clear retainer ring would cause serious adverse health consequences, including severe hypoglycemia which can result in loss of consciousness, seizure; severe hyperglycemia which can result in diabetic ketoacidosis or hyperosmolar hyperglycemic state, metabolic abnormalities; or death and classified the recall (RES84430) as class 1. However, your firm failed to adequately implement procedures for corrective and preventive action (CAPA) in that you failed to adequately analyze all sources of quality data, failed to identify actions needed to correct nonconforming product, and you did not appropriately verify or validate the change to your device to ensure corrective and preventive actions taken were effective and did not adversely affect the finished device. While you implemented your procedure, we disagree with your characterization of the risk threshold which led to a conclusion of a lower risk than was appropriate. For example:\n\ni. Your CAPA System procedure (SOP114-01DOC, Effective Date 5\u002F19\u002F2015, Version L) requires your firm to determine whether distributed product is potentially affected by a nonconformance and to conduct additional risk assessment activities per the Product Risk Management Process (SOP104- 08, Version W). In June 2016, your firm conducted a (b)(4)16-1051, Version A) which, per your Product Risk Management Process, outlines affected product in the field, and is a risk assessment and health hazard evaluation for informing field corrective action (“FCA”) decisions. Based on FDA’s own evaluation of risk, your outcomes of risk assessment do not appear to be appropriate. In conducting your (b)(4) you did not accurately calculate the risk associated with the failed retainer rings in the MiniMed 600 Series Insulin Infusion Pumps because your risk calculation formula underestimated the probability of occurrence of harm, resulting in your firm classifying the risk as “(b)(4)” (zone (b)(4)) (b)(4)” (zone (b)(4)). Consequently, your firm did not initiate a correction or removal to address the defective devices from the field because per your (b)(4), the risk of serious adverse health consequences was “improbable.”\n\nii. In March 2021, your firm revised your Product Risk Management Process (SOP104-08, Version AL), which updated the formula for risk calculation; however, this also did not result in accurate risk calculation. The updated formula uses the “total shipment of affected product” which again underestimates the probability of occurrence because the number of products shipped includes devices not in use by patients (e.g., devices shipped to distributors that have not yet been distributed to customers). Further, the update also changed the parameters on the risk evaluation matrix, increasing the (b)(4) parameters (zones (b)(4)) and (b)(4) parameters (zone (b)(4)), thus requiring a higher occurrence for a harm to be classified as “(b)(4)” (zone (b)(4)). In June 2021 your firm again repeated the (b)(4), but due to the changes made in your risk evaluation formula and matrix, your firm again classified the risk as “(b)(4)” (zone (b)(4) (zone (b)(4)).\n\niii. Your firm did not identify the actions needed to control devices already in distribution. As previously discussed, your firm’s justification in June 2016 for not initiating a recall was based on your firm’s underestimated risk calculation. Per your Product Review Board Decision Form, dated September 2, 2016 and signed by your VP\u002FPresident IIM Diabetes on October 3, 2016, while your firm initially planned to develop a customer communication regarding the reservoir retainer ring issue, the decision to not initiate a customer communication was based on “(b)(4).” Your firm then (b)(4) and (b)(4), each time using the (b)(4) and each time (b)(4); your firm consequently did not initiate a recall until November 20, 2019. From initiation of CAPA (b)(4)#299677 in June 2016 to November 20, 2019, the date you initiated the recall, you received over 74,000 retainer ring complaints, with over 57,000 of those reported to FDA as MDRs.\n\niv. After you initiated the recall of the MiniMed 600 Series Insulin Infusion Pumps on November 20, 2019, your firm further failed to implement changes in your methods and procedures needed to correct and prevent the recurrence of quality problems. Your recall consisted of a customer notification informing customers with affected insulin pumps to examine their devices for retainer ring damage and to contact Medtronic for a replacement pump if damage was noted; if no damage was noted by the customer, your notification instructed customers to continue using the device and to examine the retainer ring if the device was dropped or bumped. Thus, after redesigning the retainer ring to prevent further risk, you failed to adequately remove the pumps containing the older, less robust ring from the market.\n\nv. Your firm failed to verify and\u002For validate the corrective and preventive actions to ensure the action taken was effective to prevent recurrence of the nonconformance and did not adversely affect the finished device. Your firm began releasing the re-designed pump with the black retainer ring beginning August 2019 and closed CAPA (b)(4)#299677 as effective on October 2, 2020. Per your CAPA effectiveness plan, your firm compared the complaint rate of the newly released pumps (b)(4) to the complaint rate of the previous pump design with the clear retainer ring (b)(4)…” You concluded the effectiveness criteria were met because the complaint rate for the re-designed pumps was (b)(4) while the complaint rate for the previous design was (b)(4). However, you received 322 complaints during the (b)(4) effectiveness check period ((b)(4) to (b)(4)), and as of May 25, 2021, you had received a total of (b)(4) complaints of defective black retainer rings. You did not re-evaluate the effectiveness of your corrective and preventive actions to determine whether CAPA (b)(4)#299677 should be re-evaluated.\n\nb. Specifically, your firm initiated CAPA (b)(4)#401464 on June 29, 2018, to address a cybersecurity vulnerability with the remote controllers used with your Medtronic MiniMed 508 Insulin Infusion Pump and your MiniMed Paradigm Insulin Infusion Pumps. The identified cybersecurity vulnerability revealed unauthorized individuals could (b)(4).” The root cause investigation in CAPA (b)(4)#401464 indicated the “(b)(4).” In evaluating the risk of patient harm, your firm determined the lack of (b)(4) that could lead to delivery of (b)(4) could result in catastrophic harm to patients. Per your CAPA (b)(4)#401464, to address the root cause of the lack of cyber security requirements in the design, all current and future Medtronic Diabetes software products would be evaluated for encryption security requirements. Your firm also discontinued the manufacture and distribution of the Paradigm Pump products and scrapped remaining inventory of the remote controllers; however, these corrective actions did not address the devices in the field. While your firm initiated a recall of 15,787 remote controllers shipped to customers in the previous four years, you have distributed over (b)(4) remote controllers since its release in 1999, and you did not notify all customers of this safety issue.\n\nWe have reviewed your responses and conclude that they are not adequate because you have not yet provided evidence of implementation for all corrections and corrective actions. We acknowledge your firm has committed to replacing MiniMed 600 Series Insulin Infusion Pumps with the clear retainer ring for all US customers, regardless of warranty status, and will retrieve all Medtronic MiniMed remote controllers from active users, and opened CAPA 539888 in order to track completion of your proposed corrective actions.\n\nYou stated you have updated relevant procedures, including but not limited to the risk management procedures, including Product Risk Management Process (SOP104- 08DOC), Risk Management Post Production Procedure (DOP104-068DOC), your recall procedure, Diabetes FCA Program Governance (10578148DOC), to address observation 1 on the FDA 483. You also state you will no longer use a device’s warranty status as a factor in determining the scope of recalls associated with the risk patient harm. Additionally, you state you have updated the Medtronic Internal Message Guide to characterize the field action as a recall to US customers, and opened CAPA 539942 to investigate reports of black retainer ring damage “in light of complaints that have been received.”\n\nWe acknowledge that you provided a copy of Engineering Report; NGP 6015265-020 Retainer Ring Damage Investigation, Version B in which you conclude that no manufacturing or design non-conformance was identified. However, you also stated that you have opened CAPA (b)(4)#539942 to further investigate damaged retainer rings and that activity is still ongoing.\n\nYou have also provided DOP104-068DOC, Risk Management Post Production Procedure, Revision U. This procedure is not adequate. You have (b)(4) for the (b)(4) “Medtronic MiniMed believes the (b)(4) is common practice in the industry”, however you have not provided adequate justification to demonstrate that it is appropriate for your risk calculation. For example, on pg. 200 of “Appendix B_1 of 2” provided in your response dated July 28, 2021 you provided the number of MiniMed 600 Series pumps with clear retainer rings shipped to the field as of February 28, 2021. There is a large difference between the number of products shipped ((b)(4)) and number of products actually in use in the field ((b)(4)% of product shipped). It is unclear to us if the difference was due to the number of devices currently with distributors. If that is not the case, using the number of products shipped (including devices that are not in use by patients) could under- estimate the probability of occurrence of hazardous situations, even after subtracting products currently with distributors.\n\nIn addition, you started (b)(4) in (b)(4) but did not (b)(4) (SOP104-08DOC, Revision AP), stating that the one-year delay was “(b)(4)”, however you should not have delayed implementing the (b)(4) method. You further attempted to justify your interpretation of the (b)(4) in your July 2021 response as follows: “(b)(4), etc.) (b)(4)”. However, you have not explained how your (b)(4) i.e., that for (b)(4)” as the (b)(4), especially when the (b)(4).\n\nFollowing change in the (b)(4) situations, you have also re-evaluated your risk zone classification matrix in March 2021 (Change Order QCH00047208, SOP104-08 DOC, Revision AL), stating that “t(b)(4)”, which resulted in changes in classification of risk zones. (b)(4): specifically, “(b)(4) from (b)(4). In Attachment 1.6 of your response provided on July 28, 2021 you stated that your assessment of suitability of the risk acceptability criteria was conducted based on mortality rates associated with type 1 diabetes, however death is not the only serious consequence for population for which insulin pump therapy is indicated. Other adverse events such as severe hypoglycemia (SH) and diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA) can also present serious harms to users and should be considered in your hazard analysis. Similarly, your justification for the reassignment of risk zones for (b)(4) events relies heavily on the above calculation of mortality rates only. Furthermore, you argued that, with the removal of the factor of (b)(4) from your (b)(4) of (b)(4).” However, the risk calculation for (b)(4) and severity of the risk zones are separate issues and should be assessed separately; addressing the risk calculation does not justify changing the risk zone classification to maintain the overall risk levels. You have not provided adequate information to support that your revised risk zones are clinically acceptable because they appear to be based only on mortality rates, and not all the adverse events that can occur in the intended use population.\n\nIn your response, you should explain how your mortality-based risk calculation is appropriate to address all health risks especially as it led to a down-classification of the risk severity, and update your risk zone classifications if necessary. Finally, in your November 5, 2021 update you stated that you evaluated the Issue Impact Assessments (IIAs) initiated in the last (b)(4) and identified 20 IIAs that require remediation to reflect the (b)(4) per DOP104-068DOC, (b)(4) that is planned to be complete by (b)(4). However, as it is unclear if your revised procedure is adequate and because this corrective action is not yet complete, we cannot evaluate the adequacy at this time.\n\nIn summary, your corrective actions are still in process, and you have not yet conducted effectiveness checks to ensure the updated procedures and required employee training will prevent reoccurrence of the identified deficiencies. In your November 5, 2021 update you stated that you completed a retrospective review of CAPA effectiveness criteria and of CAPA effectiveness monitoring thresholds but 38 CAPAs were identified as requiring remediation and\u002For clarification and 14 CAPAs were identified as requiring a new complaint monitoring plan. You should remediate those CAPAs using an adequate risk analysis and provide a summary of your review and remediation efforts.\n\n2. You failed to review, evaluate, and investigate complaints involving the possible failure of a device to meet any of its specifications, as required by 21 CFR 820.198(c).\n\na. Your firm failed to investigate over 800 complaints of defective black retainer rings. In June 2016, your firm initiated CAPA (b)(4)#299677 to address an increase in complaints of damaged retainer rings in the MiniMed 600 Series Insulin Infusion Pumps; as part of the CAPA investigation, your firm determined the retainer ring required re-design, and you changed the retainer ring from a clear (b)(4) ring to a black (b)(4) ring. You began releasing the re-designed pump with black retainer ring in August 2019, and you closed CAPA (b)(4)#299677 as effective October 2020. From December 2019 to May 2021, you received 887 complaints of defective black retainer rings; in 772 of the 887 complaints your firm referenced CAPA (b)(4)#299677 as the “Formal Investigation\n\nReference Number” even though this CAPA was an investigation of the previous clear retainer ring design. For example:\n\ni. On January 21, 2020, you received a complaint (CASE-2020-00056605) from a customer reporting a crack on their insulin pump reservoir compartment, and damage to the retainer ring. Your product analysis on the returned device confirmed the device had a “partially broken retainer, cracked reservoir tube lip, missing reservoir tube lip O-ring, and broken reservoir tube lip.” On April 24, 2020, you determined no formal investigation was necessary due to existing\u002Fprevious formal investigation and referenced CAPA (b)(4)#299677. You closed this complaint on April 24, 2020.\n\nii. On February 20, 2020, you received a complaint (CASE-2020-00139368) from a customer reporting they experience hyperglycemia, with blood glucose levels of 450 mg\u002FdL. The customer stated that the lip ring was missing. Your product analysis on the returned device confirmed the device was missing the reservoir retainer ring and the reservoir tube lip O-ring, and the reservoir would not stay locked in place due to the missing retainer. On May 8, 2020, you determined no formal investigation was necessary due to existing\u002Fprevious formal investigation and referenced CAPA (b)(4)#299677. You closed this complaint on May 8, 2020.\n\niii. On April 7, 2020, you received a complaint (CASE-2020-00260639) from a customer experiencing a high blood glucose level of 434 mg\u002FdL. The customer reported that the retainer ring was loose, and the reservoir did not lock into place when inserted into the pump. Your product analysis on the returned device confirmed a broken retainer and missing reservoir tube O- ring, and the reservoir did not lock into place. On June 5, 2020, you determined no formal investigation was necessary due to existing\u002Fprevious formal investigation and referenced CAPA (b)(4)#299677. You closed this complaint on June 6, 2020.\n\nb. Your firm failed to adequately investigate a complaint in which the customer reported (b)(4) of insulin that were not programmed by the customer. You received a complaint on December 25, 2019 (CASE-2019-00921665) where the customer alleged that their low blood glucose was the result of over-delivery of insulin by their Paradigm Insulin Infusion Pump (Model MMT-715WWS), which per the (b)(4), reflected (b)(4) that were not programmed by the customer. The device was returned to your firm for analysis and the complaint was escalated to your cybersecurity Incident Response Management Team. Your investigation included a review of the downloaded CareLink data, in which the (b)(4) reported by the customer were not reflected. However, your firm’s investigation did not include reviewing the actual pump history to verify the presence of the additional (b)(4). This complaint was closed June 26, 2021 as “the cause of the event cannot be determined, as product analysis found no failure or anomaly in the device.”\n\nc. Your firm failed to adequately investigate complaints of Enlite3 MMT-7020A glucose sensor failures. You received two complaints of sensor failures, both of which were closed as “analysis is not required as this complaint is not reportable, and the sensor lot number is unknown.” However, there is no evidence in either complaint record that technical support attempted to determine the lot numbers when communicating with the complainants, even though your Guides, Troubleshooting, Glucose Sensor procedure (DOP114-691DOC, Revisions AL and AM) requires all service notifications to include a lot or batch number for the product. Furthermore, while your Failure Analysis-Glucose Sensor Products procedure (DOP830DOC, Version V) indicates expired sensors are not required to be analyzed, it is not clear how your firm determined the sensors were expired when neither complaint record lists an expiration date, and you failed to determine the lot or batch number of the returned sensors. Last, your Failure Analysis-Glucose Sensor Products procedure does not include MDR reportability as a requirement for sensor analysis.\n\nd. Your firm failed to adequately investigate reported issues with your CareLink software that your firm manufactures; this software uses information transmitted from insulin infusion pumps and glucose meters to create reports intended to assist users with diabetes management. Of the 25 complaints reviewed during our inspection, your firm documented “software error unknown” in 20 of the complaints; however, there is no evidence in your complaint records that technical support attempted to determine the version of software used by the device in order to conduct an investigation. During the inspection, your VP of Quality Assurance explained to our investigator that all versions of the software are maintained and could be analyzed to investigate the reported software errors.\n\nWe have reviewed your responses and acknowledge you have opened CAPA 539889 to track completion of your proposed corrective actions, including updating complaint investigation and post market trending, as well as implementation of an enhanced training program for complaint handling, technical support, and failure analysis personnel. You have also committed to performing a retrospective review of complaint files for the issues identified on the FDA 483, Inspectional Observations.\n\nIn your initial response, you acknowledge CAPA (b)(4)#299677 should not have been used to justify not investigating complaints of the re-designed insulin infusion pumps, and you recognize complaints of damaged black retainer rings should have been escalated to a new formal investigation; you have opened CAPA 539942 to conduct this formal investigation. However, your response does not address why your firm deemed the original CAPA (b)(4)#299677 as adequate justification for not investigating over 800 complaints in the re-designed pump, nor does it address changes made to prevent recurrence of similar events.\n\nYour response indicates you conducted further analysis of complaint CASE-2019-00921665, in which the customer received (b)(4) not programmed into the device; in your supplementary investigation, your firm reviewed the downloaded pump history file and found (b)(4) of similar size to those recorded in the complaint. Your supplementary investigation concluded the extra (b)(4) were not received over (b)(4), which “rules out the possibility of a cyber security incident.” We acknowledge your firm has updated your Failure Analysis, Paradigm (DOP114-858DOC) and Failure Analysis, NGP (DOP114- 888DOC) procedures, and will update failure analyses as warranted; however, your response does not address your firm’s initial limited investigation, nor does it address changes made to prevent recurrence of similar events.\n\nYour response also describes further investigations of the two complaints of Enlite3 MMT- 7020A glucose sensor failures. Per your response, your firm was able to narrow down and\u002For determine lot numbers of the sensors via patient history and reassessment of complaint files. In your reassessment you conducted a Lot History Review (LHR) and determined for both complaints “there were no process deviations or out of specification test results observed that would have contributed to a sensor performance issues.” We acknowledge you opened CAPA 541992 to investigate methods to reliably investigate and analyze sensors; however, as this corrective action is not yet complete, we cannot evaluate the adequacy at this time.\n\nWe also acknowledge your firm committed to implementing a new failure analysis process specific to software complaints, and opened CAPA 541994 to investigate and identify actions needed, and complaints with “software error unknown” will be investigated as part of that CAPA. However, as part of your corrective actions are not yet complete, including your, retrospective complaint review and systemic complaint investigation processes and training, we cannot evaluate the adequacy of your response at this time.\n\nOur inspection also revealed that your insulin infusion pump devices are misbranded under section 502(t)(2) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(t)(2), in that your firm failed or refused to furnish material or information respecting the device that is required by or under section 519 of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360i, and 21 CFR Part 803 – Medical Device Reporting. Significant deficiencies include, but are not limited to, the following:\n\n3. Your firm failed to submit a report to FDA no later than 30 calendar days of receiving or otherwise becoming aware of information that reasonably suggests that a marketed device may have caused or contributed to a death or serious injury, as required by 21 CFR 803.50(a)(1).\n\nFor example, the information included for complaint #CASE-2020-00236012 describes an event in which your firm’s MiniMed Insulin Pump malfunctioned; after using the device the patient exhibited low glucose reading of 36 mg\u002FdL and was treated with food. We believe that the treatment received by the patient was necessitated to preclude permanent impairment of a body function or permanent damage to a body structure. There is no information included in the firm’s complaint file that rules out the device may not have caused or contributed to the referenced serious injury. As such, the referenced complaint meets the definition of a reportable serious injury, as defined in 21 CFR 803.3. The firm became aware of the event on March 27, 2020. However, your firm did not submit an MDR to the FDA.\n\nThe adequacy of your firm’s response dated July 28, 2021 cannot be determined at this time. The response noted that your firm is implementing systemic corrective actions, including updates to its reportability criteria, a retrospective review of the complaints and staff training. However, your firm did not provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including submission of the referenced serious injury MDR, have been implemented and completed as they are still in progress.\n\nThe adequacy of your firm’s response dated September 3, 2021 also cannot be determined at this time. Your response provided an update to its planned or newly added corrective actions, including identification and submission of reportable events associated with retainer ring damage complaints, and implementation of late regulatory review process. However, your firm did not provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including submission of the referenced serious injury MDR and planned re-evaluation of its reportability criteria, have been implemented and completed as they are still in progress.\n\nThe adequacy of your firm’s responses dated October 8, November 5, and December 2, 2021 also cannot be determined at this time. Your responses provided an update to the planned corrective actions. You provided your new MDR Training Program. However, you also report that training of personnel will not be completed until (b)(4). You also provided D00603958 MDR Decision Alignment with Risk Management Remediation Plan for Diabetes. It is unclear if this plan incorporates an adequate risk analysis (see review under item #1) and you state that your planned actions will not be completed until (b)(4). You did not provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including submission of the referenced serious injury MDR and planned re-evaluation of its reportability criteria, have been implemented and completed as they are still in progress.\n\n4. Your firm failed to submit a report to FDA no later than 30 calendar days after the day that the firm received or otherwise became aware of information, from any source, that reasonably suggests that a device that the firm markets has malfunctioned and this device or a similar device that it markets would be likely to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury, if the malfunction were to recur, as required by 21 CFR 803.50(a)(2).\n\nFor example, the information included for Complaints #CASE-2018-00270399 and #CASE-2018-00437534 reasonably suggests that your firm’s insulin pump malfunctioned (e.g. broken or missing retainer ring) while in use. The same malfunction is the subject of the recall Z-0956-2020 for the same device. Per the 1995 Preamble, a malfunction is reportable if the manufacturer takes, or would be required to take, an action under section 518 or 519(g) of the FD&C as a result of the malfunction of the device or other similar devices {60 FR 63578, 63585 (Dec. 11, 1995)}. Please note that the preamble reference is section 519(f), but the appropriate designation for the section is now section 519(g) due to amendments to the FD&C Act. There is no information included for the complaint files that justifies that the malfunction would not be likely to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury, if it were to recur. As such, your firm should have submitted within the required timeframes, an MDR for each MDR reportable event subject of the referenced complaints. The corresponding MDRs 2032227-2021-157630 and 2032227-2021-157620 were received by FDA beyond the required 30 calendar days timeframe.\n\nThe adequacy of your firm’s response dated July 28, 2021 cannot be determined at this time. The response noted that your firm is implementing systemic corrective actions, including updates to its reportability criteria, a retrospective review of the complaints and staff training. However, your firm did not provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including the planned assessment of its reportability criteria, have been implemented and completed as they are still in progress.\n\nThe adequacy of your firm’s response dated September 3, 2021 also cannot be determined at this time. Your response provided an update to its planned or newly added corrective actions, including identification and submission of reportable events associated with retainer ring damage complaints, and implementation of late regulatory review process. However, your firm did not provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including the planned re-evaluation of its reportability criteria, have been implemented and completed as they are still in progress.\n\nThe adequacy of your firm’s responses dated October 8, November 5, and December 2, 2021 also cannot be determined at this time. Your response provided an update to the planned corrective actions. You provided your new MDR Training Program. However, you also report that training of personnel will not be completed until (b)(4). You also provided D00603958 MDR Decision Alignment with Risk Management Remediation Plan for Diabetes. It is unclear if this plan incorporates an adequate risk analysis (see review under item #1) and you state that your planned actions will not be completed until (b)(4). You did not provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including submission of the referenced serious injury MDR and planned re-evaluation of its reportability criteria, have been implemented and completed as they are still in progress.\n\nThis letter notifies you of our findings and provides you an opportunity to address the above deficiencies. Your firm should investigate and determine the causes of any deficiencies, and take prompt actions to correct the deficiencies and bring the products into compliance. Failure to promptly correct these deficiencies may result in regulatory action being initiated by the FDA without further notice. These actions include, but are not limited to, seizure, injunction, and civil money penalties. Additionally, premarket approval applications for Class III devices to which the Quality System regulation deficiencies are reasonably related will not be approved until the deficiencies have been corrected. Also, should FDA determine that your devices do not meet requirements of the Act, requests for Certificates to Foreign Governments (CFG) may not be granted. More information on processes for persons denied a CFG can be found at: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Fregulatory-information\u002Fsearch-fda-guidance-documents\u002Fprocess-request-review-fdas-decision-not-issue-certain-export-certificates-devices. If you believe that your products are not in violation of the FD&C Act and FDA regulations, please provide us with your reasoning and any supporting information for our consideration within fifteen business days.\n\nYou should schedule a teleconference with FDA to further discuss your response to this Warning Letter, particularly in response to your revised risk assessment (please see item 1 above) in more detail. Please notify FDA in writing within fifteen business days from the date you receive this letter of the specific steps your firm has taken to correct the noted Quality System and MDR reporting deficiencies, as well as an explanation of how your firm plans to prevent these deficiencies, or similar deficiencies, from occurring again. Include documentation of the corrections and\u002For corrective actions (which must address systemic problems) that your firm has taken. If your firm’s planned corrections and\u002For corrective actions will occur over time, please include a timetable for implementation of those activities. If corrections and\u002For corrective actions cannot be completed within fifteen business days, state the reason for the delay and the time within which these activities will be completed. Your firm’s response should be comprehensive and address all deficiencies included in this Warning Letter.\n\nYour response should be sent to: US Food and Drug Administration, Division 3\u002FWest, Office of Medical Device and Radiological Health Operations at oradevices3firmresponse@fda.hhs.gov. Please identify your response with CMS Case #617539. If you have questions about the contents of this letter, please contact Compliance Officer Jamie M. Bumpas at 214-253-5336 or via email at Jamie.bumpas@fda.hhs.gov.\n\nFinally, you should know that this letter is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of the deficiencies at your firm’s facility. It is your firm’s responsibility to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations administered by FDA. The specific deficiencies noted in this letter and in the Inspectional Observations, FDA 483, issued at the close of the inspection may be symptomatic of serious problems in your firm’s manufacturing and quality management systems. Your firm should investigate and determine the causes of the deficiencies, and take prompt actions to correct the deficiencies and bring the products into compliance.\n\nSincerely,\n\n\u002FS\u002F\n\nShari J. Shambaugh\n\nProgram Division Director\n\nOffice of Medical Device & Radiological Health\n\nWest\u002FDivision 3\n\n\u002FS\u002F\n\nTimothy T. Stenzel, M.D., Ph.D.\n\nDirector\n\nOHT 7: Office of In Vitro Diagnostics and\n\nRadiological Health\n\nOffice of Product Evaluation and Quality\n\nCenter for Devices and Radiological Health\n\nCc:\n\nSean Salmon, Executive Vice President & President\n\nDiabetes Operating Unit\n\nMedtronic, Inc.\n\nSean.salmon@medtronic.com\n\nChirag Tilara, Vice President, Quality\n\nMedtronic, Inc.\n\nChirag.m.tilara@medtronic.com","Medtronic, Inc.","medtronic-inc-617539-12092021","2026-08-18T06:42:29.262718+00:00",null,"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Fmedtronic-inc-617539-12092021","2026-10-26T08:09:23.659714+00:00","Warning Letter","Closed Out","2021-12-28","617539","Medical Devices","2023-04-28","Geoff S. Martha","2026-08-20T02:18:05.754+00:00","VIA Electronic Mail","2021-12-09",{"id":34,"raw":35,"subject":12,"body_html":39,"body_text":40,"firm_name":41,"letter_id":42,"created_at":43,"fei_number":20,"letter_url":44,"updated_at":45,"action_type":23,"case_status":46,"posted_date":47,"marcs_cms_no":48,"product_type":27,"closeout_date":20,"issuing_office":11,"recipient_name":49,"body_fetched_at":50,"delivery_method":20,"recipient_title":20,"reference_number":20,"action_taken_date":51,"medical_device_id":20,"response_letter_date":20},734,[36,37,38,11,12,13,13,13],"\u003Ctime datetime=\"2025-08-05T04:00:00Z\">08\u002F05\u002F2025\u003C\u002Ftime>\n","\u003Ctime datetime=\"2025-06-27T04:00:00Z\">06\u002F27\u002F2025\u003C\u002Ftime>\n","\u003Ca href=\"\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Fmectronic-medicale-srl-707997-06272025\">Mectronic Medicale S.R.L. \u003C\u002Fa>","\n\n                            \n                            \n                            \n                            \n                                              \n  \n \n\n                 \n\n \n\n\u003Cdiv>\n  \u003Cdl>\n\n      \n      \n              \u003Cdt>Product:\u003C\u002Fdt> \n        \u003Cdd>Medical Devices                          \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n             \n            \n            \n            \n              \n            \n            \n            \u003C\u002Fdd>\n      \n          \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>            \n\n\n\u003Chr>\n\n\u003Cdiv>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdl>\n\n        \u003Cdt>Recipient:\u003C\u002Fdt>\n\n                      \u003Cdd>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdiv>Recipient Name\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n              \u003Cdiv>Ennio Aloisini\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n          \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\u003C\u002Fdd>\n                                \u003Cdd>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdiv>Recipient Title\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n              \u003Cdiv>Chief Executive Officer\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n          \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\u003C\u002Fdd>\n          \n            \u003Cdd>Mectronic Medicale S.R.L. \u003C\u002Fdd>\n\n          \n                      \u003Cdd>\u003Cp>\u003Cspan>Via Orio Al Serio 15\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cspan>24050\u003C\u002Fspan> \u003Cspan>BG\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cspan>Italy\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n          \n          \n            \n            \u003Cdd>\n\n    \u003C\u002Fdd>\u003Cdd>\u003Cspan>\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Ca href=\"mailto:(b)(4)@mecmedix.com\"> (b)(4)@mecmedix.com \u003C\u002Fa>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n\n          \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>            \n\n       \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdl>\n          \n          \u003Cdt>Issuing Office:\u003C\u002Fdt>\n        \n         \n          \u003Cdd>Center for Devices and Radiological Health\u003C\u002Fdd>\n        \n         \n          \u003Cdd>\u003Cp>\u003Cspan>United States\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n        \n        \n        \n        \n        \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n    \u003Cdl> \n      \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>  \n      \n\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\n \n\n \n\n\u003Chr>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>WARNING LETTER\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003Cbr>CMS # 707997\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>June 27, 2025\u003Cbr>\u003Cbr>Dear Mr. Aloisini:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>During an inspection of your firm located in Bergamo, Italy from February 24, 2025, through February 27, 2025, an investigator from the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA, we, or the agency) determined that your firm manufactures CHELT, Ixyon XP, iLux Smart, iLux Plus, Doctor Tecar, Doctor Tecar Smart, and Doctor Tecar Plus devices. Under section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act), 21 U.S.C. § 321(h), these products are devices because they are intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or to affect the structure or function of the body. In addition, under section 531(2) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360hh(2), each of these products is an electronic product because it is (A) a manufactured or assembled product which, when in operation, (i) contains or acts as part of an electronic circuit and (ii) emits (or in the absence of effective shielding or other controls would emit) electronic product radiation, or (B) a manufactured or assembled article which is intended for use as a component, part, or accessory of a product described in clause (A) and which when in operation emits (or in the absence of effective shielding or other controls would emit) such radiation.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>\u003Cu>Quality System Regulation Violation(s)\u003C\u002Fu>\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003Cbr>This inspection revealed that these devices are adulterated within the meaning of section 501(h) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 351(h), in that the methods used in, or the facilities or controls used for, their manufacture, packing, storage, or installation are not in conformity with the current good manufacturing practice requirements of the Quality System regulation found at Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 820. These violations include, but are not limited to, the following:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>1. Failure to establish and maintain a DHF for each type of device, as required by 21 CFR 820.30(j).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>For example: Your firm’s design control procedures, PO_7.3_Design and Development, state the design elements requirements of the quality system regulation (i.e., Design and Development Planning, Design Input, Design Output, Design Verification, Design Validation, Design Transfer, and Design Changes) and that these design elements should be documented. However, a review of your firm’s therapeutic RF, laser, and laser\u002Fcryotherapy family Design History Files (DHF) demonstrated that your firm did not adequately document any of these design elements required per 21 CFR 820.30 Design Controls. For example, the three reviewed DHFs documented short statements or phrases of what occurred during each phase, but your firm failed to document any objective evidence of the activities conducted during all design phases for the three product families.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>2. Failure to ensure that where the results of a process cannot be fully verified by subsequent inspection and test, the process shall be validated with a high degree of assurance and approved according to established procedures, as required by 21 CFR 820.75(a).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>For example: Your firm has stated that it has not established process validation where the results of a process cannot be fully verified by subsequent inspection and test. For example, your firm has not validated your output calibration system based on an established procedure. Your firm stated that you have not established process validation and\u002For test method validation procedures for your output calibration system, consisting of an \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, used in the production of your therapeutic RF emitting device. Additionally, your firm did not have any records of performing validation of the system\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>3. Failure to establish and maintain procedures to control product that does not conform to specified requirements, as required by 21 CFR 820.90.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>For example: Your firm did not properly identify and segregate nonconforming products. Your firm’s procedure, PO_8.3_Nonconformity Management, states that defective parts should be identified by means of red sticker, NCM identification code, and product is to be segregated in the area designated for nonconformities. However, during the inspection component was found outside of designated quarantine areas and nonconforming product was found lacking a red sticker and identification code.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Additionally, a production record for a Doctor Tecar RF therapeutic device, serial number DT07222, was reviewed during the inspection. The record indicated that the product was nonconforming as it failed to meet the peak-to-peak voltage (Vpp) output specification for one of the frequency\u002Fpower combinations during device acceptance. However, your firm failed to identify this device as nonconforming and the product was released without justification or assessment.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>4. Failure to establish and maintain procedures acceptance activities, as required by 21 CFR 820.80.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>For example: During the inspection your firm was unable to provide procedures for receiving inspection and stated that receiving inspection procedures have not been established. For example, your firm stated that they performed a 100% verification of laser diode power output and identified these as critical components used in your firm’s therapeutic devices. However, the laser diode acceptance activities were recorded on an uncontrolled document without identifying the test equipment used (e.g., laser power meter), nor its operator performing the test. These were not recorded in your firm’s Device History Record.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>5. Failure to establish and maintain procedures for receiving, reviewing, and evaluating complaints by a formally designated unit, as required by 21 CFR 820.198(a).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>For example: During the inspection, your firm’s management stated that they could not provide any specific complaint records because none had been documented to date. Your firm’s procedure, PO_8.2.1_Return Information section 8.2, requires complaints to be documented on the form, MOD_8.3a_NC and AC\u002FAP. The form is also used in the assessment of the complaints to determine the need to open and manage a corrective action. Your firm provided a complaint log which listed 22 complaints that your firm received. However, your firm was not able to provide evidence that these complaints were reviewed and evaluated by a formally designated unit.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>6. Failure to establish and maintain instructions and procedures for performing and verifying that the servicing meets the specified requirements, as required by 21 CFR 820.200.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>For example: Your firm’s servicing procedures, PO_7.5a_Production and delivery of services, section 6.7, generally describe your firm’s service products and generates a corresponding service record for all of your firm’s products. However, the procedures do not contain any specific information about how to perform routine servicing activities, acceptance testing following servicing, nor documentation requirements. Additionally, your firm provided a service record for a Doctor Tecar Plus device, serial# DTP07522, and it did not document the UDI of the service device. Furthermore, \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> quantitative acceptance points were only recorded as two check marks on a separate uncontrolled document.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>7. Failure to establish procedures for identifying training needs and ensure that all personal are trained to adequately perform their assigned responsibilities, as required by 21 CFR 820.25(b).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>For example: Your firm’s procedure, PO_6.2_Training, requires management to define the training needs of employees on Form 6.2.3a Training Planning and for the identified internal training to be documented. However, your firm could not provide your training plan and training records for your production employees.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>8. Failure to maintain device history records as required by 21 CFR 820.184.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>For example: Your firm failed to document a copy of the primary product labeling for the Doctor Tecar device in each instance based on the inspection for 10 DHRs. This includes the handpiece label with a corresponding serial number and unit\u002Fconsole label with a corresponding serial number and UDI.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>9. Failure to establish procedures for quality audits and conduct such audits to assure that the quality system is in compliance with the established quality system requirements and to determine the effectiveness of the quality system, as required by 21 CFR 820.22.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>For example: Your firm’s procedures, for internal audits, P O _8.2.4_Inspection Visits, require that internal auditors to not have direct responsibility in the areas they audit to ensure that the auditors are independent. However, your firm’s Administrative, Financial, &amp; Quality Manager audited the quality system areas that they have direct responsibility over. For example, the Administrative, Financial &amp; Quality Manager audited:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cul>\u003Cli>CY2025 Internal audit plan – Coverage of monitoring of products and processes (i.e. final device acceptance), CAPA and Non-conformances.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>CY2024 Internal audit plan and completed internal audit record – Coverage of monitoring of products and processes (i.e. final device acceptance), CAPA and Non-conformances.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>CY2023 Internal audit plan and completed internal audit record – Coverage of your firm’s entire quality management system.\u003C\u002Fli>\u003C\u002Ful>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>\u003Cu>Medical Device Reporting (MDR) Violation(s)\u003C\u002Fu>\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003Cbr>Our inspection revealed that your firm has failed to develop, maintain, and implement written Medical Device Reporting (MDR) procedures, as required by 21 CFR 803.17. Specifically, your firm has stated that it has not established any procedures for MDRs. These would include establishing procedures for timely and effective identification, communication, and evaluation of reportable events, a standardized review process for determining when an event meets reportability criteria, timely submission of MDRs to the FDA, and compliance with the applicable documentation and recordkeeping requirements.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>A device is deemed to be misbranded under section 502(t)(2) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(t)(2), if there was a failure or refusal to furnish any material or information required by or under section 519 of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360i, which includes adverse event reports required under 21 CFR Part 803, respecting the device.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In response to this letter, please provide any completed actions taken by your firm to address this item or your planned actions and the timeframe for when these actions will be completed.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>\u003Cu>Unapproved Device Violation(s)\u003C\u002Fu>\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003Cbr>Our inspection also revealed that the devices are adulterated under section 501(f)(1)(B) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 351(f)(1)(B), because your firm does not have an approved application for premarket approval (PMA) in effect pursuant to section 515(a) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360e(a), or an approved application for an investigational device exemption (IDE) under section 520(g) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g) for the device as described and marketed. These devices are also misbranded under section 502(o) the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(o), because your firm did not notify the agency of its intent to introduce the device into commercial distribution, intended for a use different from the intended use of a legally marketed device, without submitting a premarket notification to FDA as required by section 510(k) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>1. Your Doctor Tecar, Doctor Tecar Smart, and Doctor Tecar Plus devices have been cleared for the following indications:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>K221043 – Doctor Tecar Plus and Doctor Tecar Smart devices are intended to provide topical heating for the purpose of elevating tissue temperature for treatment of selected medical conditions such as: relief of pain, muscle spasms, increase in local circulation.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>K183693 – The Doctor Tecar device is intended to provide topical heating for the purpose of elevating tissue temperature for treatment of selected medical conditions such as relief of pain, muscle spasms, and increase in local circulation.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>However, you are marketing these devices without clearance for the following uses in your marketing materials, including but not limited to:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cul>\u003Cli>“Doctor Tecar Therapy is an innovative, high-performance therapy in the treatment of Carpal Tunnel Syndrome.”\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>“Doctor Tecar Therapy not only provides rapid pain relief, but also accelerates the healing process, significantly reducing recovery time and improving the effectiveness of treatments.”\u003C\u002Fli>\u003Cli>“Accelerated Healing: Boosts cellular metabolism for faster and more effective rehabilitation.”\u003C\u002Fli>\u003C\u002Ful>\u003Cp>These statements were not reviewed as part of your premarket notification materials submitted to FDA and are outside of the scope of the clearances issued under K221043 and K183693. FDA is currently unaware of any evidence that could support the above intended uses. These statements appear to constitute changes in the intended use of the products that require submission of a new 510(k), as provided by 21 CFR 807.81(a)(3)(ii). These new intended uses raise effectiveness concerns that are different from those normally associated with the cleared uses of the device. These topical heating devices use energy to generate heat within layers of the skin and require performance testing for specific indications for use that presume a specific clinical outcome. The above-mentioned new treatment claims have not been evaluated in the 510(k) submissions and substantiated by supporting data for the new treatment claims such as any clinical data demonstrating the treatment of Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, reduced recovery time and boosting of cellular metabolism. Patients who use this device may forego other known therapies and delay addressing their health concerns that may result in serious injury or lengthen recovery times.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>2. The FDA has reviewed the user manuals for the CHELT, iLux Plus, iLux Smart, and Ixyon XP devices, which your firm introduced or delivered for introduction these devices into interstate commerce for commercial distribution, and which you have listed in FDA’s registration and listing database as intended for use in the generic type of device described at 21 CFR 890.5500 (infrared lamp) and product code ILY (lamp, infrared, therapeutic heating). Devices regulated under 21 CFR 890.5500 and ILY are exempt from premarket notification unless they exceed the limitations of exemption described in 21 CFR 890.9(a). However, there is evidence that the CHELT, Ixyon XP, iLux Smart, and iLux Plus are intended for uses that are different from those of legally marketed devices regulated under 21 CFR 890.5500 and ILY.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Generic devices of this type emit energy at infrared frequencies (approximately 700 to 50,000 nanometers) to provide topical heating and are intended for medical purposes including, but not limited to, temporary increase in local blood circulation and temporary relief of: muscle spasms, minor joint pain and stiffness, minor muscle pain and stiffness, and minor arthritis pain. However, your firm is marketing the CHELT, Ixyon XP, iLux Smart, and iLux Plus for different specific intended uses, namely “f\u003Cem>or the treatment of pathologies of the musculoskeletal system such as lumbago, cervicalgia, epicondylitis, medial epicondylitis, . . . as well as contractures . . .\u003C\u002Fem>” FDA is currently unaware of any clinical evidence that could support these intended uses. These uses increase the risk of injury because of deeper tissue penetration, and potentially higher energy and temperature delivery to target structures not addressed in legally marketed ILY devices. The specific conditions including lumbago, cervicalgia, epicondylitis, medial epicondylitis, and contractures, involve anatomical sites that are more sensitive than superficial muscle groups. Treating these conditions with infrared heating or high-intensity laser therapy can result in overheating of deeper tissues, burns, nerve injury, or damage to underlying structures. Additionally, these new indications introduce uncertainty about safety and efficacy because there is no validated clinical evidence to support the benefits outweighing the risks for these specific treatment indications. These risks are not present in currently cleared or exempted ILY indications, which are limited to superficial, non-specific pain relief through mild, topical heating. The devices are therefore not exempt from the 510(k) requirement as described in 21 CFR 807.81(a)(3)(ii).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In addition, the CHELT, Ixyon XP, iLux Smart, and iLux Plus devices include a maximum threshold for a skin surface temperature of 50°C. A safe and effective therapeutic skin surface temperature range for infrared lamps is 40 - 45°C because skin surface temperatures greater than 45°C present a risk of skin burns in generic devices of this type. The 50°C maximum skin surface temperature threshold is a different technological characteristic for this generic device type. Because there is evidence that the CHELT, Ixyon XP, iLux Smart, and iLux Plus have different intended uses and technology compared with that of legally marketed devices classified under 21 CFR 890.5500, the devices exceed the limitations described in 21 CFR 890.9(b) and are not exempt from premarket notification requirements. They are also therefore subject to the requirement under 21 CFR 807.81(3)(a)(i).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>For a device requiring premarket approval, the notification required by section 510(k) is deemed satisfied when a PMA is pending before the agency. [21 CFR 807.81(b)] The kind of information that your firm needs to submit in order to obtain approval or clearance for the device is described on the Internet at http:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002FMedicalDevices\u002FDeviceRegulationandGuidance\u002FHowtoMarketYourDevice\u002Fdefault.htm. The FDA will evaluate the information that your firm submits and decide whether the product may be legally marketed.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>\u003Cu>Electronic Product Radiation Control Device Violation(s)\u003C\u002Fu>\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003Cbr>Our inspection also revealed that your firm failed to comply with reporting requirements applicable to electronic products under 21 CFR Chapter I, Subchapter J – Radiological Health. Section 538(a) of the Act (21 U.S.C. 360oo(a)) prohibits, in part, any person to fail or refuse to make any report, or furnish or preserve any information required by section 537 of the Act (21 U.S.C. 360nn).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>In addition to being a \"device,\" Ixyon therapeutic laser family of devices are \"electronic products\" subject to compliance with Chapter V, Subchapter C of the Act, Electronic Product Radiation Control (21 U.S.C. 360hh et seq.) and the general requirements at 21 CFR Parts 1000-1005, including reporting requirements at 21 CFR Part 1002, which are prescribed pursuant to section 537 of the Act.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Significant violations include, but are not limited to, failure to submit a radiation safety product report followed by annual reports as required by 21 CFR 1002.10 and 1002.13, respectively. For example, during the inspection, Ms. Chiara (NMI) Borgonovo, Export Area Manager, clarified that Mectronic Medicale S.R.L. has shipped eight (8) laser devices to the US for sales purposes. A review of our records indicates that the required radiation safety report (21 CFR 1002.10) for your company’s Ixyon therapeutic laser family of devices has not been received by FDA. In addition, FDA has not received the required annual reports for the CHELT model of products (21 CFR 1002.13).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Manufacturers of laser products are responsible for assuring their products comply with all applicable mandatory federal radiation safety performance standards prior to entry of those products into US commerce. For medical lasers, the applicable performance standards are 21 CFR Part 1010, 1040.10, and 1040.11(a). Additionally, manufacturers of these products are subject to all applicable requirements of Title 21 CFR Parts 1000 – 1005, which includes the reporting and record keeping requirements found in Title 21 CFR Part 1002.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>We also note that, while FDA has stated the agency does not intend to enforce the requirements of 21 CFR 1040.10 and 1040.11(a) if the laser products have incorporated the comparable clause of IEC 60825-1 Ed. 3 (see FDA’s Laser Notice 56 available here: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Fmedia\u002F110120\u002Fdownload), the applicable “DANGER” phrase (see IEC 60825-1 Ed. 3, clause 7.7) is missing from the warning logotype label as depicted in the user manuals of the Ixyon, iLux, and CHELT therapeutic laser family of devices.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Please revise your warning logotype labels for compliance with the applicable requirements outlined in 21 CFR 1040.10(g)(3), which FDA considers to be comparable to conformance with IEC 60825-1 Ed. 3, clause 7.7. Please submit the revised labels as part of your response to this correspondence.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>For therapeutic laser devices that do not currently have a radiation safety report on file, please ensure that copies of compliant warning logotype labels are included in all future submissions.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Additionally, you should update your company’s quality control procedures to ensure that all future production units intended to enter the U.S. commerce bear the required warning logotype label. Copies of the labels must also be included in relevant promotional materials, such as the device user manual as required per 21 CFR 1040.10(h)(1)(iii).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Please also provide the following information: (a) list all models of laser products your firm manufactured and imported to the US, and (b) whether Mectronic Medicale S.R.L. certified each laser product which entered commerce as required by Title 21 CFR 1010.2. Please note that medical laser product certification according to 21 CFR 1010.2 and ISO 13485 certification are not the same. The FDA regulation (21 CFR 1010.2) specifically addresses laser product safety and performance standards in the U.S., while ISO 13485 is an international standard for quality management systems in medical device manufacturing. The FDA certification focuses on the product itself, whereas ISO 13485 covers broader organizational processes and quality management. While both are relevant for medical laser manufacturers, they serve distinct purposes in regulatory compliance and quality assurance.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Copies of the Federal Performance Standards, compliance guides, radiation safety product report guides, and other documents related to laser products are available on FDA’s web site at: http:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002FRadiation-EmittingProducts\u002Fdefault.htm, and https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Fradiation-emitting-products\u002Fsurgical-and-therapeutic-products\u002Fmedical-lasers.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Please submit the missing radiation safety reports for all models that are already imported into the US, or that you plan to enter the US market. Please use Form FDA 3632 to prepare your radiation safety product reports, and form FDA 3636 for the annual report. All Radiation Safety reports and supporting materials can be submitted to the FDA by email at: RadHealthCustomerService@fda.hhs.gov.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Other federal agencies may take your compliance with the FD&amp;C Act and its implementation regulations into account when considering the award of federal contracts. Additionally, should FDA determine that you have Quality System regulation violations that are reasonably related to premarket approval applications for Class III devices, such devices will not be approved until the violations have been addressed.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>This letter notifies you of our findings and provides you an opportunity to correct the above deficiencies. Please notify this office in writing within fifteen business days from the date you receive this letter of the specific steps your firm has taken to address the noted violations, including an explanation of how your firm plans to prevent these violations, or similar violations, from occurring again. Include documentation of the corrections and\u002For corrective action (which must address systemic problems) that your firm has taken. If your firm’s planned corrections and\u002For corrective actions will occur over time, please include a timetable for implementation of those activities. If corrections and\u002For corrective actions cannot be completed within fifteen business days, state the reason for the delay and the time within which these activities will be completed.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Please provide a translation of documentation not in English to facilitate our review. We will notify you regarding the adequacy of your firm’s response and the need to re-inspect your firm’s facility to verify that the appropriate corrections and\u002For corrective actions have been made. If you believe that your products are not in violation of the FD&amp;C Act, include your reasoning and any supporting information for our consideration as part of your response.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Your firm’s response should be sent via email to James Jang at CDRHEnforcement@fda.hhs.gov. Please include in the subject line, “CMS Case 707997” when replying. If you have any questions about the contents of this letter, please contact: Andrew Keys at Andrew.Keys@FDA.HHS.Gov\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Finally, you should know that this letter is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of the violations at your firm’s facility or associated with your firm’s devices and electronic products. It is your firm’s responsibility to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations administered by FDA. The specific violations noted in this letter and in the Inspectional Observations, FDA 483, issued at the close of the inspection may be symptomatic of serious problems in your firm’s manufacturing and quality management systems. Your firm should investigate and determine the causes of any violations and take prompt actions to address any violations and bring the products into compliance.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Sincerely,\u003Cbr>\u002FS\u002F\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Bleta Vuniqi Houtkamp\u003Cbr>Deputy Office Director\u003Cbr>OHT4: Office of Surgical and Infection Control Devices\u003Cbr>Office of Product Evaluation and Quality\u003Cbr>Center for Devices and Radiological Health\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>CC:\u003Cbr>Jerry Doane\u003Cbr>Pragmatic Compliance dba FDAbasics&nbsp;&nbsp;\u003Cbr>15815 SW 11th Court Rd\u003Cbr>Ocala, FL US 34473\u003Cbr>Usagent@fdabasics.com\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n              \n                                            \n              \n            ","Product:\n\nMedical Devices\n\nRecipient:\n\nRecipient Name\n\nEnnio Aloisini\n\nRecipient Title\n\nChief Executive Officer\n\nMectronic Medicale S.R.L.\n\nVia Orio Al Serio 15\n\n24050 BG\n\nItaly\n\n(b)(4)@mecmedix.com\n\nIssuing Office:\n\nCenter for Devices and Radiological Health\n\nUnited States\n\nWARNING LETTER\nCMS # 707997\nJune 27, 2025\n\nDear Mr. Aloisini:\nDuring an inspection of your firm located in Bergamo, Italy from February 24, 2025, through February 27, 2025, an investigator from the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA, we, or the agency) determined that your firm manufactures CHELT, Ixyon XP, iLux Smart, iLux Plus, Doctor Tecar, Doctor Tecar Smart, and Doctor Tecar Plus devices. Under section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act), 21 U.S.C. § 321(h), these products are devices because they are intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or to affect the structure or function of the body. In addition, under section 531(2) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360hh(2), each of these products is an electronic product because it is (A) a manufactured or assembled product which, when in operation, (i) contains or acts as part of an electronic circuit and (ii) emits (or in the absence of effective shielding or other controls would emit) electronic product radiation, or (B) a manufactured or assembled article which is intended for use as a component, part, or accessory of a product described in clause (A) and which when in operation emits (or in the absence of effective shielding or other controls would emit) such radiation.\nQuality System Regulation Violation(s)\nThis inspection revealed that these devices are adulterated within the meaning of section 501(h) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 351(h), in that the methods used in, or the facilities or controls used for, their manufacture, packing, storage, or installation are not in conformity with the current good manufacturing practice requirements of the Quality System regulation found at Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 820. These violations include, but are not limited to, the following:\n1. Failure to establish and maintain a DHF for each type of device, as required by 21 CFR 820.30(j).\nFor example: Your firm’s design control procedures, PO_7.3_Design and Development, state the design elements requirements of the quality system regulation (i.e., Design and Development Planning, Design Input, Design Output, Design Verification, Design Validation, Design Transfer, and Design Changes) and that these design elements should be documented. However, a review of your firm’s therapeutic RF, laser, and laser\u002Fcryotherapy family Design History Files (DHF) demonstrated that your firm did not adequately document any of these design elements required per 21 CFR 820.30 Design Controls. For example, the three reviewed DHFs documented short statements or phrases of what occurred during each phase, but your firm failed to document any objective evidence of the activities conducted during all design phases for the three product families.\n2. Failure to ensure that where the results of a process cannot be fully verified by subsequent inspection and test, the process shall be validated with a high degree of assurance and approved according to established procedures, as required by 21 CFR 820.75(a).\nFor example: Your firm has stated that it has not established process validation where the results of a process cannot be fully verified by subsequent inspection and test. For example, your firm has not validated your output calibration system based on an established procedure. Your firm stated that you have not established process validation and\u002For test method validation procedures for your output calibration system, consisting of an (b)(4) and (b)(4), used in the production of your therapeutic RF emitting device. Additionally, your firm did not have any records of performing validation of the system\n3. Failure to establish and maintain procedures to control product that does not conform to specified requirements, as required by 21 CFR 820.90.\nFor example: Your firm did not properly identify and segregate nonconforming products. Your firm’s procedure, PO_8.3_Nonconformity Management, states that defective parts should be identified by means of red sticker, NCM identification code, and product is to be segregated in the area designated for nonconformities. However, during the inspection component was found outside of designated quarantine areas and nonconforming product was found lacking a red sticker and identification code.\nAdditionally, a production record for a Doctor Tecar RF therapeutic device, serial number DT07222, was reviewed during the inspection. The record indicated that the product was nonconforming as it failed to meet the peak-to-peak voltage (Vpp) output specification for one of the frequency\u002Fpower combinations during device acceptance. However, your firm failed to identify this device as nonconforming and the product was released without justification or assessment.\n4. Failure to establish and maintain procedures acceptance activities, as required by 21 CFR 820.80.\nFor example: During the inspection your firm was unable to provide procedures for receiving inspection and stated that receiving inspection procedures have not been established. For example, your firm stated that they performed a 100% verification of laser diode power output and identified these as critical components used in your firm’s therapeutic devices. However, the laser diode acceptance activities were recorded on an uncontrolled document without identifying the test equipment used (e.g., laser power meter), nor its operator performing the test. These were not recorded in your firm’s Device History Record.\n5. Failure to establish and maintain procedures for receiving, reviewing, and evaluating complaints by a formally designated unit, as required by 21 CFR 820.198(a).\nFor example: During the inspection, your firm’s management stated that they could not provide any specific complaint records because none had been documented to date. Your firm’s procedure, PO_8.2.1_Return Information section 8.2, requires complaints to be documented on the form, MOD_8.3a_NC and AC\u002FAP. The form is also used in the assessment of the complaints to determine the need to open and manage a corrective action. Your firm provided a complaint log which listed 22 complaints that your firm received. However, your firm was not able to provide evidence that these complaints were reviewed and evaluated by a formally designated unit.\n6. Failure to establish and maintain instructions and procedures for performing and verifying that the servicing meets the specified requirements, as required by 21 CFR 820.200.\nFor example: Your firm’s servicing procedures, PO_7.5a_Production and delivery of services, section 6.7, generally describe your firm’s service products and generates a corresponding service record for all of your firm’s products. However, the procedures do not contain any specific information about how to perform routine servicing activities, acceptance testing following servicing, nor documentation requirements. Additionally, your firm provided a service record for a Doctor Tecar Plus device, serial# DTP07522, and it did not document the UDI of the service device. Furthermore, (b)(4) quantitative acceptance points were only recorded as two check marks on a separate uncontrolled document.\n7. Failure to establish procedures for identifying training needs and ensure that all personal are trained to adequately perform their assigned responsibilities, as required by 21 CFR 820.25(b).\nFor example: Your firm’s procedure, PO_6.2_Training, requires management to define the training needs of employees on Form 6.2.3a Training Planning and for the identified internal training to be documented. However, your firm could not provide your training plan and training records for your production employees.\n8. Failure to maintain device history records as required by 21 CFR 820.184.\nFor example: Your firm failed to document a copy of the primary product labeling for the Doctor Tecar device in each instance based on the inspection for 10 DHRs. This includes the handpiece label with a corresponding serial number and unit\u002Fconsole label with a corresponding serial number and UDI.\n9. Failure to establish procedures for quality audits and conduct such audits to assure that the quality system is in compliance with the established quality system requirements and to determine the effectiveness of the quality system, as required by 21 CFR 820.22.\nFor example: Your firm’s procedures, for internal audits, P O _8.2.4_Inspection Visits, require that internal auditors to not have direct responsibility in the areas they audit to ensure that the auditors are independent. However, your firm’s Administrative, Financial, & Quality Manager audited the quality system areas that they have direct responsibility over. For example, the Administrative, Financial & Quality Manager audited:\nCY2025 Internal audit plan – Coverage of monitoring of products and processes (i.e. final device acceptance), CAPA and Non-conformances.\nCY2024 Internal audit plan and completed internal audit record – Coverage of monitoring of products and processes (i.e. final device acceptance), CAPA and Non-conformances.\nCY2023 Internal audit plan and completed internal audit record – Coverage of your firm’s entire quality management system.\nMedical Device Reporting (MDR) Violation(s)\nOur inspection revealed that your firm has failed to develop, maintain, and implement written Medical Device Reporting (MDR) procedures, as required by 21 CFR 803.17. Specifically, your firm has stated that it has not established any procedures for MDRs. These would include establishing procedures for timely and effective identification, communication, and evaluation of reportable events, a standardized review process for determining when an event meets reportability criteria, timely submission of MDRs to the FDA, and compliance with the applicable documentation and recordkeeping requirements.\nA device is deemed to be misbranded under section 502(t)(2) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(t)(2), if there was a failure or refusal to furnish any material or information required by or under section 519 of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360i, which includes adverse event reports required under 21 CFR Part 803, respecting the device.\nIn response to this letter, please provide any completed actions taken by your firm to address this item or your planned actions and the timeframe for when these actions will be completed.\nUnapproved Device Violation(s)\nOur inspection also revealed that the devices are adulterated under section 501(f)(1)(B) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 351(f)(1)(B), because your firm does not have an approved application for premarket approval (PMA) in effect pursuant to section 515(a) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360e(a), or an approved application for an investigational device exemption (IDE) under section 520(g) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g) for the device as described and marketed. These devices are also misbranded under section 502(o) the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(o), because your firm did not notify the agency of its intent to introduce the device into commercial distribution, intended for a use different from the intended use of a legally marketed device, without submitting a premarket notification to FDA as required by section 510(k) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k).\n1. Your Doctor Tecar, Doctor Tecar Smart, and Doctor Tecar Plus devices have been cleared for the following indications:\nK221043 – Doctor Tecar Plus and Doctor Tecar Smart devices are intended to provide topical heating for the purpose of elevating tissue temperature for treatment of selected medical conditions such as: relief of pain, muscle spasms, increase in local circulation.\nK183693 – The Doctor Tecar device is intended to provide topical heating for the purpose of elevating tissue temperature for treatment of selected medical conditions such as relief of pain, muscle spasms, and increase in local circulation.\nHowever, you are marketing these devices without clearance for the following uses in your marketing materials, including but not limited to:\n“Doctor Tecar Therapy is an innovative, high-performance therapy in the treatment of Carpal Tunnel Syndrome.”\n“Doctor Tecar Therapy not only provides rapid pain relief, but also accelerates the healing process, significantly reducing recovery time and improving the effectiveness of treatments.”\n“Accelerated Healing: Boosts cellular metabolism for faster and more effective rehabilitation.”\nThese statements were not reviewed as part of your premarket notification materials submitted to FDA and are outside of the scope of the clearances issued under K221043 and K183693. FDA is currently unaware of any evidence that could support the above intended uses. These statements appear to constitute changes in the intended use of the products that require submission of a new 510(k), as provided by 21 CFR 807.81(a)(3)(ii). These new intended uses raise effectiveness concerns that are different from those normally associated with the cleared uses of the device. These topical heating devices use energy to generate heat within layers of the skin and require performance testing for specific indications for use that presume a specific clinical outcome. The above-mentioned new treatment claims have not been evaluated in the 510(k) submissions and substantiated by supporting data for the new treatment claims such as any clinical data demonstrating the treatment of Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, reduced recovery time and boosting of cellular metabolism. Patients who use this device may forego other known therapies and delay addressing their health concerns that may result in serious injury or lengthen recovery times.\n2. The FDA has reviewed the user manuals for the CHELT, iLux Plus, iLux Smart, and Ixyon XP devices, which your firm introduced or delivered for introduction these devices into interstate commerce for commercial distribution, and which you have listed in FDA’s registration and listing database as intended for use in the generic type of device described at 21 CFR 890.5500 (infrared lamp) and product code ILY (lamp, infrared, therapeutic heating). Devices regulated under 21 CFR 890.5500 and ILY are exempt from premarket notification unless they exceed the limitations of exemption described in 21 CFR 890.9(a). However, there is evidence that the CHELT, Ixyon XP, iLux Smart, and iLux Plus are intended for uses that are different from those of legally marketed devices regulated under 21 CFR 890.5500 and ILY.\nGeneric devices of this type emit energy at infrared frequencies (approximately 700 to 50,000 nanometers) to provide topical heating and are intended for medical purposes including, but not limited to, temporary increase in local blood circulation and temporary relief of: muscle spasms, minor joint pain and stiffness, minor muscle pain and stiffness, and minor arthritis pain. However, your firm is marketing the CHELT, Ixyon XP, iLux Smart, and iLux Plus for different specific intended uses, namely “for the treatment of pathologies of the musculoskeletal system such as lumbago, cervicalgia, epicondylitis, medial epicondylitis, . . . as well as contractures . . .” FDA is currently unaware of any clinical evidence that could support these intended uses. These uses increase the risk of injury because of deeper tissue penetration, and potentially higher energy and temperature delivery to target structures not addressed in legally marketed ILY devices. The specific conditions including lumbago, cervicalgia, epicondylitis, medial epicondylitis, and contractures, involve anatomical sites that are more sensitive than superficial muscle groups. Treating these conditions with infrared heating or high-intensity laser therapy can result in overheating of deeper tissues, burns, nerve injury, or damage to underlying structures. Additionally, these new indications introduce uncertainty about safety and efficacy because there is no validated clinical evidence to support the benefits outweighing the risks for these specific treatment indications. These risks are not present in currently cleared or exempted ILY indications, which are limited to superficial, non-specific pain relief through mild, topical heating. The devices are therefore not exempt from the 510(k) requirement as described in 21 CFR 807.81(a)(3)(ii).\nIn addition, the CHELT, Ixyon XP, iLux Smart, and iLux Plus devices include a maximum threshold for a skin surface temperature of 50°C. A safe and effective therapeutic skin surface temperature range for infrared lamps is 40 - 45°C because skin surface temperatures greater than 45°C present a risk of skin burns in generic devices of this type. The 50°C maximum skin surface temperature threshold is a different technological characteristic for this generic device type. Because there is evidence that the CHELT, Ixyon XP, iLux Smart, and iLux Plus have different intended uses and technology compared with that of legally marketed devices classified under 21 CFR 890.5500, the devices exceed the limitations described in 21 CFR 890.9(b) and are not exempt from premarket notification requirements. They are also therefore subject to the requirement under 21 CFR 807.81(3)(a)(i).\nFor a device requiring premarket approval, the notification required by section 510(k) is deemed satisfied when a PMA is pending before the agency. [21 CFR 807.81(b)] The kind of information that your firm needs to submit in order to obtain approval or clearance for the device is described on the Internet at http:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002FMedicalDevices\u002FDeviceRegulationandGuidance\u002FHowtoMarketYourDevice\u002Fdefault.htm. The FDA will evaluate the information that your firm submits and decide whether the product may be legally marketed.\nElectronic Product Radiation Control Device Violation(s)\nOur inspection also revealed that your firm failed to comply with reporting requirements applicable to electronic products under 21 CFR Chapter I, Subchapter J – Radiological Health. Section 538(a) of the Act (21 U.S.C. 360oo(a)) prohibits, in part, any person to fail or refuse to make any report, or furnish or preserve any information required by section 537 of the Act (21 U.S.C. 360nn).\nIn addition to being a \"device,\" Ixyon therapeutic laser family of devices are \"electronic products\" subject to compliance with Chapter V, Subchapter C of the Act, Electronic Product Radiation Control (21 U.S.C. 360hh et seq.) and the general requirements at 21 CFR Parts 1000-1005, including reporting requirements at 21 CFR Part 1002, which are prescribed pursuant to section 537 of the Act.\nSignificant violations include, but are not limited to, failure to submit a radiation safety product report followed by annual reports as required by 21 CFR 1002.10 and 1002.13, respectively. For example, during the inspection, Ms. Chiara (NMI) Borgonovo, Export Area Manager, clarified that Mectronic Medicale S.R.L. has shipped eight (8) laser devices to the US for sales purposes. A review of our records indicates that the required radiation safety report (21 CFR 1002.10) for your company’s Ixyon therapeutic laser family of devices has not been received by FDA. In addition, FDA has not received the required annual reports for the CHELT model of products (21 CFR 1002.13).\nManufacturers of laser products are responsible for assuring their products comply with all applicable mandatory federal radiation safety performance standards prior to entry of those products into US commerce. For medical lasers, the applicable performance standards are 21 CFR Part 1010, 1040.10, and 1040.11(a). Additionally, manufacturers of these products are subject to all applicable requirements of Title 21 CFR Parts 1000 – 1005, which includes the reporting and record keeping requirements found in Title 21 CFR Part 1002.\nWe also note that, while FDA has stated the agency does not intend to enforce the requirements of 21 CFR 1040.10 and 1040.11(a) if the laser products have incorporated the comparable clause of IEC 60825-1 Ed. 3 (see FDA’s Laser Notice 56 available here: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Fmedia\u002F110120\u002Fdownload), the applicable “DANGER” phrase (see IEC 60825-1 Ed. 3, clause 7.7) is missing from the warning logotype label as depicted in the user manuals of the Ixyon, iLux, and CHELT therapeutic laser family of devices.\nPlease revise your warning logotype labels for compliance with the applicable requirements outlined in 21 CFR 1040.10(g)(3), which FDA considers to be comparable to conformance with IEC 60825-1 Ed. 3, clause 7.7. Please submit the revised labels as part of your response to this correspondence.\nFor therapeutic laser devices that do not currently have a radiation safety report on file, please ensure that copies of compliant warning logotype labels are included in all future submissions.\nAdditionally, you should update your company’s quality control procedures to ensure that all future production units intended to enter the U.S. commerce bear the required warning logotype label. Copies of the labels must also be included in relevant promotional materials, such as the device user manual as required per 21 CFR 1040.10(h)(1)(iii).\nPlease also provide the following information: (a) list all models of laser products your firm manufactured and imported to the US, and (b) whether Mectronic Medicale S.R.L. certified each laser product which entered commerce as required by Title 21 CFR 1010.2. Please note that medical laser product certification according to 21 CFR 1010.2 and ISO 13485 certification are not the same. The FDA regulation (21 CFR 1010.2) specifically addresses laser product safety and performance standards in the U.S., while ISO 13485 is an international standard for quality management systems in medical device manufacturing. The FDA certification focuses on the product itself, whereas ISO 13485 covers broader organizational processes and quality management. While both are relevant for medical laser manufacturers, they serve distinct purposes in regulatory compliance and quality assurance.\nCopies of the Federal Performance Standards, compliance guides, radiation safety product report guides, and other documents related to laser products are available on FDA’s web site at: http:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002FRadiation-EmittingProducts\u002Fdefault.htm, and https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Fradiation-emitting-products\u002Fsurgical-and-therapeutic-products\u002Fmedical-lasers.\nPlease submit the missing radiation safety reports for all models that are already imported into the US, or that you plan to enter the US market. Please use Form FDA 3632 to prepare your radiation safety product reports, and form FDA 3636 for the annual report. All Radiation Safety reports and supporting materials can be submitted to the FDA by email at: RadHealthCustomerService@fda.hhs.gov.\nOther federal agencies may take your compliance with the FD&C Act and its implementation regulations into account when considering the award of federal contracts. Additionally, should FDA determine that you have Quality System regulation violations that are reasonably related to premarket approval applications for Class III devices, such devices will not be approved until the violations have been addressed.\nThis letter notifies you of our findings and provides you an opportunity to correct the above deficiencies. Please notify this office in writing within fifteen business days from the date you receive this letter of the specific steps your firm has taken to address the noted violations, including an explanation of how your firm plans to prevent these violations, or similar violations, from occurring again. Include documentation of the corrections and\u002For corrective action (which must address systemic problems) that your firm has taken. If your firm’s planned corrections and\u002For corrective actions will occur over time, please include a timetable for implementation of those activities. If corrections and\u002For corrective actions cannot be completed within fifteen business days, state the reason for the delay and the time within which these activities will be completed.\nPlease provide a translation of documentation not in English to facilitate our review. We will notify you regarding the adequacy of your firm’s response and the need to re-inspect your firm’s facility to verify that the appropriate corrections and\u002For corrective actions have been made. If you believe that your products are not in violation of the FD&C Act, include your reasoning and any supporting information for our consideration as part of your response.\nYour firm’s response should be sent via email to James Jang at CDRHEnforcement@fda.hhs.gov. Please include in the subject line, “CMS Case 707997” when replying. If you have any questions about the contents of this letter, please contact: Andrew Keys at Andrew.Keys@FDA.HHS.Gov\nFinally, you should know that this letter is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of the violations at your firm’s facility or associated with your firm’s devices and electronic products. It is your firm’s responsibility to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations administered by FDA. The specific violations noted in this letter and in the Inspectional Observations, FDA 483, issued at the close of the inspection may be symptomatic of serious problems in your firm’s manufacturing and quality management systems. Your firm should investigate and determine the causes of any violations and take prompt actions to address any violations and bring the products into compliance.\nSincerely,\n\u002FS\u002F\nBleta Vuniqi Houtkamp\nDeputy Office Director\nOHT4: Office of Surgical and Infection Control Devices\nOffice of Product Evaluation and Quality\nCenter for Devices and Radiological Health\nCC:\nJerry Doane\nPragmatic Compliance dba FDAbasics\n15815 SW 11th Court Rd\nOcala, FL US 34473\nUsagent@fdabasics.com","Mectronic Medicale S.R.L.","mectronic-medicale-srl-707997-06272025","2026-08-18T06:42:28.676509+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Fmectronic-medicale-srl-707997-06272025","2026-10-26T08:09:22.482246+00:00","Issued","2025-08-05","707997","Ennio Aloisini","2026-08-19T16:31:34.745+00:00","2025-06-27",2,{"510k":54,"classification":55,"enforcement":56,"event":57,"event_backfill":58,"pma":59,"warning_letter":60},"2026-11-16T02:00:55.89+00:00","2026-11-16T02:00:41.999+00:00","2026-11-16T02:00:49.415+00:00","2026-11-17T04:00:34.414+00:00","2026-09-07T05:17:28.839+00:00","2026-11-16T02:01:03.155+00:00","2026-11-17T01:02:55.859+00:00"]