[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"fda-warning-letters-search:[\"Medtronic Vascular, Inc.\",\"\",\"\",\"\",\"\",1]":3,"fda-latest-sync-dates":72},{"warningLetters":4,"total":71},[5,33,53],{"id":6,"raw":7,"subject":12,"body_html":15,"body_text":16,"firm_name":17,"letter_id":18,"created_at":19,"fei_number":20,"letter_url":21,"updated_at":22,"action_type":23,"case_status":24,"posted_date":25,"marcs_cms_no":26,"product_type":27,"closeout_date":28,"issuing_office":11,"recipient_name":29,"body_fetched_at":30,"delivery_method":31,"recipient_title":20,"reference_number":20,"action_taken_date":32,"medical_device_id":20,"response_letter_date":20},2944,[8,9,10,11,12,13,14,13],"\u003Ctime datetime=\"2021-12-28T14:20:00Z\">12\u002F28\u002F2021\u003C\u002Ftime>\n","\u003Ctime datetime=\"2021-12-09T05:00:00Z\">12\u002F09\u002F2021\u003C\u002Ftime>\n","\u003Ca href=\"\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Fmedtronic-inc-617539-12092021\">Medtronic, Inc.\u003C\u002Fa>","Center for Devices and Radiological Health","CGMP\u002FQSR\u002FMedical Devices\u002FAdulterated","","\u003Ca href=\"\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Fmedtronic-minimed-inc-617539-04252023\">\u003Ctime datetime=\"2023-04-28T04:00:00Z\">04\u002F28\u002F2023\u003C\u002Ftime>\n\u003C\u002Fa>","\n\n                            \n                            \n                            \n                            \n                                              \n  \n \n\n                 \n\n  \u003Chr>\n \n\n\u003Cdiv>\n  \u003Cdl>\n\n              \u003Cdt>Delivery Method:\u003C\u002Fdt> \n        \u003Cdd>VIA Electronic Mail\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              \u003C\u002Fdd>\n      \n      \n              \u003Cdt>Product:\u003C\u002Fdt> \n        \u003Cdd>Medical Devices                          \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n             \n            \n            \n            \n              \n            \n            \n            \u003C\u002Fdd>\n      \n          \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>            \n\n\n\u003Chr>\n\n\u003Cdiv>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdl>\n\n        \u003Cdt>Recipient:\u003C\u002Fdt>\n\n                      \u003Cdd>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdiv>Recipient Name\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n              \u003Cdiv>Geoff S. Martha\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n          \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\u003C\u002Fdd>\n                                \u003Cdd>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdiv>Recipient Title\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n              \u003Cdiv>Chief Executive Officer\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n          \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\u003C\u002Fdd>\n          \n            \u003Cdd>Medtronic, Inc.\u003C\u002Fdd>\n\n          \n                      \u003Cdd>\u003Cp>\u003Cspan>710 Medtronic Parkway\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cspan>Minneapolis\u003C\u002Fspan>, \u003Cspan>MN\u003C\u002Fspan> \u003Cspan>55432\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cspan>United States\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n          \n          \n            \n            \u003Cdd>\n\n    \u003C\u002Fdd>\u003Cdd>\u003Cspan>\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Ca href=\"mailto:Geoff.martha@medtronic.com\"> Geoff.martha@medtronic.com\u003C\u002Fa>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n\n          \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>            \n\n       \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdl>\n          \n          \u003Cdt>Issuing Office:\u003C\u002Fdt>\n        \n         \n          \u003Cdd>Center for Devices and Radiological Health\u003C\u002Fdd>\n        \n         \n          \u003Cdd>\u003Cp>\u003Cspan>United States\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n        \n        \n        \n        \n        \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n    \u003Cdl> \n      \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>  \n      \n\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\n \n\n \n\n\u003Chr>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>WARNING LETTER \u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>CMS 617539\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>December 9, 2021\u003Cbr>\n&nbsp;\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Dear Mr. Martha:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>During an inspection of your firm located in Northridge, California, on June 7, 2021 through July&nbsp;7, 2021, an investigator from the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determined that&nbsp;your firm manufactures the MiniMed 600 series insulin infusion pumps, and software and remote&nbsp;controllers used in conjunction with the Paradigm and MiniMed series insulin infusion pumps. &nbsp;Under&nbsp;section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act) [21 U.S.C. § 321(h)], these&nbsp;products are devices because they are intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other&nbsp;conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or to affect the&nbsp;structure or any function of the body.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>This inspection revealed the devices are adulterated within the meaning of section 501(h) of the&nbsp;Act [21 U.S.C. § 351(h)] in that the methods used in, or the facilities or controls used for, the&nbsp;manufacture, packing, storage, or installation are not in conformity with the current good&nbsp;manufacturing practice requirements of the Quality System regulation found at Title 21, Code of&nbsp;Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 820. &nbsp;You may find the Act and FDA’s regulations through links in the FDA’s home page \u003Ca>www.fda.gov.\u003C\u002Fa> &nbsp;We received your responses from Sean Salmon, Executive Vice President and President Diabetes Operating Unit, and Chirag Tilara, Vice President,&nbsp;Quality Management Representative, dated July 28, September 3, October 8, November 5, and December&nbsp;3, 2021, concerning our investigator’s observations noted on the Form FDA 483, Inspectional&nbsp;Observations, that was issued to your firm on July 7, 2021. &nbsp;We have considered these responses in&nbsp;relation to our observations noted during the inspection, which include, but are not limited to,&nbsp;the following:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>1. &nbsp;You failed to adequately establish procedures for corrective and preventive action, as required&nbsp;by 21 CFR 820.100(a).\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>a. &nbsp;Specifically, in June 2016, your firm initiated CAPA&nbsp;\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677 to address anincrease in complaints of damaged retainer rings (clear retainer rings) in the MiniMed 600 Series&nbsp;Insulin Infusion Pumps. &nbsp;Your investigation determined the device failures were caused by the&nbsp;\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> retainer ring, which in turn caused a \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. &nbsp;A damaged&nbsp;retainer ring may result in the over or under-delivery of insulin, which may lead to hypoglycemia&nbsp;or hyperglycemia.Beginning August 2019, your firm began releasing the re-designed pumps (which were manufactured&nbsp;with a black retainer ring) for distribution. &nbsp;You began notifying customers of retainer ring&nbsp;failures in November 2019. &nbsp;FDA determined that there was a reasonable probability that the use of,&nbsp;or exposure to, the pumps manufactured with the clear retainer ring would cause serious adverse&nbsp;health consequences, including severe hypoglycemia which can result in loss of consciousness,&nbsp;seizure; severe hyperglycemia which can result in diabetic ketoacidosis or hyperosmolar&nbsp;hyperglycemic state, metabolic abnormalities; or death and classified the recall (RES84430) as&nbsp;class 1. &nbsp;However, your firm failed to adequately implement procedures for corrective and&nbsp;preventive action (CAPA) in that you failed to adequately analyze all sources of quality data,&nbsp;failed to identify actions needed to correct nonconforming product, and you did not appropriately&nbsp;verify or validate the change to your device to ensure corrective and preventive actions taken were&nbsp;effective and did not adversely affect the finished device. &nbsp;While you implemented your procedure,&nbsp;we disagree with your characterization of the risk threshold which led to a conclusion of a lower&nbsp;risk than was appropriate. &nbsp;For example:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>i. &nbsp; Your CAPA \u003Cem>System\u003C\u002Fem> procedure (SOP114-01DOC, Effective Date 5\u002F19\u002F2015, Version L) requires your&nbsp;firm to determine whether distributed product is potentially affected by a nonconformance and to&nbsp;conduct additional risk assessment activities per the \u003Cem>Product Risk Management Process\u003C\u002Fem> (SOP104- 08,&nbsp;Version W). &nbsp;In June 2016, your firm conducted a \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>16-1051, Version A) which, per your Product Risk Management Process, outlines affected product&nbsp;in the field, and is a risk assessment and health hazard evaluation for informing field corrective&nbsp;action (“FCA”) decisions. &nbsp;Based on FDA’s own evaluation of risk, your outcomes of risk assessment&nbsp;do not appear to be appropriate. &nbsp;In conducting your \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> you did not accurately calculate the risk&nbsp;associated with the failed retainer rings in the MiniMed 600 Series Insulin Infusion Pumps because&nbsp;your risk calculation formula underestimated the probability of occurrence of harm, resulting in&nbsp;your firm classifying the risk as “\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>” (zone \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>)&nbsp;\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>” (zone \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>). &nbsp;Consequently, your firm did not&nbsp;initiate a correction or removal to address the defective devices from the field because per your&nbsp;\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, the risk of serious adverse health consequences was “improbable.”\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>ii. &nbsp; In March 2021, your firm revised your \u003Cem>Product Risk Management Process\u003C\u002Fem> (SOP104-08, Version&nbsp;AL), which updated the formula for risk calculation; however, this also did not result in accurate&nbsp;risk calculation. &nbsp;The updated formula uses the “total shipment of affected product” which again&nbsp;underestimates the probability of occurrence because the number of products shipped includes&nbsp;devices not in use by patients (e.g., devices shipped to distributors that have not yet been&nbsp;distributed to customers). Further, the update also changed the parameters on the risk evaluation&nbsp;matrix, increasing the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> parameters (zones \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>) and \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> parameters (zone \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>), thus requiring a higher occurrence for a harm to be classified as “\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>”&nbsp;(zone \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>). &nbsp;In June 2021 your firm again repeated the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, but due to the changes made in your risk&nbsp;evaluation formula and matrix, your firm again classified the risk as “\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>” (zone \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>&nbsp;(zone \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>).\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>iii. &nbsp; Your firm did not identify the actions needed to control devices already in distribution. As previously discussed, your firm’s justification in June 2016 for not initiating a recall was&nbsp;based on your firm’s underestimated risk calculation. &nbsp;Per your Product Review Board Decision Form,&nbsp;dated September 2, 2016 and signed by your VP\u002FPresident IIM Diabetes on October 3, 2016, while your&nbsp;firm initially planned to develop a customer communication regarding the reservoir retainer ring&nbsp;issue, the decision to not initiate a customer communication was based on “\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.” &nbsp;Your firm then \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, each time using&nbsp;the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and each time \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>; your firm consequently did not initiate a recall until November 20, 2019. &nbsp;From initiation of&nbsp;CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677 in June 2016 to November 20, 2019, the date you initiated the recall, you received&nbsp;over 74,000 retainer ring complaints, with over 57,000 of those reported to FDA as MDRs.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>iv. &nbsp; After you initiated the recall of the MiniMed 600 Series Insulin Infusion Pumps on November&nbsp;20, 2019, your firm further failed to implement changes in your methods and procedures needed to&nbsp;correct and prevent the recurrence of quality problems. &nbsp;Your recall consisted of a customer&nbsp;notification informing customers with affected insulin pumps to examine their devices for retainer&nbsp;ring damage and to contact Medtronic for a replacement pump if damage was noted; if no damage was&nbsp;noted by the customer, your&nbsp;notification instructed customers to continue using the device and to examine the retainer ring if&nbsp;the device was dropped or bumped. &nbsp;Thus, after redesigning the retainer ring to prevent further&nbsp;risk, you failed to adequately remove the pumps containing the older, less robust ring from the&nbsp;market.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>v. &nbsp; Your firm failed to verify and\u002For validate the corrective and preventive actions to ensure the&nbsp;action taken was effective to prevent recurrence of the nonconformance and did not adversely affect&nbsp;the finished device. &nbsp;Your firm began releasing the re-designed pump with the black retainer ring&nbsp;beginning August 2019 and closed CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677 as effective on October 2, 2020. Per your CAPA&nbsp;effectiveness plan, your firm compared the complaint rate of the newly released pumps \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> to the complaint rate of the previous pump design with the clear retainer ring \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>…” &nbsp;You concluded the&nbsp;effectiveness criteria were met because the complaint rate for the re-designed pumps was \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)&nbsp;\u003C\u002Fstrong>while the complaint rate for the previous design was \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. &nbsp;However, you received 322 complaints&nbsp;during the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> effectiveness check period (\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> to \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>), and as of May 25, 2021, you had&nbsp;received a total of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> complaints of defective black retainer rings. &nbsp;You did not re-evaluate the&nbsp;effectiveness of your corrective and preventive actions to determine whether CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677 should&nbsp;be re-evaluated.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>b. &nbsp;Specifically, your firm initiated CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#401464 on June 29, 2018, to address a cybersecurity&nbsp;vulnerability with the remote controllers used with your Medtronic MiniMed 508 Insulin Infusion&nbsp;Pump and your MiniMed Paradigm Insulin Infusion Pumps. &nbsp;The identified cybersecurity vulnerability&nbsp;revealed unauthorized individuals could \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.” &nbsp;The root cause&nbsp;investigation in CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#401464 indicated the “\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.” &nbsp;In evaluating the risk of patient harm, your firm&nbsp;determined the lack of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> that could lead to delivery of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> could result in&nbsp;catastrophic harm to patients. &nbsp;Per your CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#401464, to address the root cause of the lack of&nbsp;cyber security requirements in the design, all current and future Medtronic Diabetes software&nbsp;products would be evaluated for encryption security requirements. &nbsp;Your firm also discontinued the&nbsp;manufacture and distribution of the&nbsp;Paradigm Pump products and scrapped remaining inventory of the remote controllers; however, these&nbsp;corrective actions did not address the devices in the field. &nbsp;While your firm initiated a recall of&nbsp;15,787 remote controllers shipped to customers in the previous four years, you have distributed&nbsp;over \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> remote controllers since its release in 1999, and you did not notify all customers of&nbsp;this safety issue.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>We have reviewed your responses and conclude that they are not adequate because you have not yet&nbsp;provided evidence of implementation for all corrections and corrective actions. We acknowledge your&nbsp;firm has committed to replacing MiniMed 600 Series Insulin Infusion Pumps with the clear retainer&nbsp;ring for all US customers, regardless of warranty status, and will retrieve all Medtronic MiniMed&nbsp;remote controllers from active users, and opened CAPA 539888 in order to track completion of your&nbsp;proposed corrective actions.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>You stated you have updated relevant procedures, including but not limited to the risk management&nbsp;procedures, including \u003Cem>Product Risk Management Process\u003C\u002Fem> (SOP104- 08DOC), \u003Cem>Risk Management Post&nbsp;Production Procedure\u003C\u002Fem> (DOP104-068DOC), your recall procedure, \u003Cem>Diabetes FCA Program Governance&nbsp;\u003C\u002Fem>(10578148DOC), to address observation 1 on the FDA 483. You also state you will no longer use a&nbsp;device’s warranty status as a factor in determining the scope of recalls associated with the risk&nbsp;patient harm.&nbsp;Additionally, you state you have updated the \u003Cem>Medtronic Internal Message Guide\u003C\u002Fem> to characterize the&nbsp;field action as a recall to US customers, and opened CAPA 539942 to investigate reports of black&nbsp;retainer ring damage “in light of complaints that have been received.”\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>We acknowledge that you provided a copy of Engineering Report; \u003Cem>NGP 6015265-020 Retainer Ring Damage&nbsp;Investigation\u003C\u002Fem>, Version B in which you conclude that no manufacturing or design non-conformance was&nbsp;identified. However, you also stated that you have opened CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#539942 to further investigate&nbsp;damaged retainer rings and that activity is still ongoing.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>You have also provided DOP104-068DOC, \u003Cem>Risk Management Post Production Procedure\u003C\u002Fem>, Revision U. This&nbsp;procedure is not adequate. &nbsp;You have \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> for the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> “Medtronic MiniMed believes the&nbsp;\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> is common&nbsp;practice in the industry”, however you have not provided adequate justification to demonstrate that&nbsp;it is appropriate for your risk calculation. &nbsp;For example, on pg. 200 of “Appendix B_1 of 2”&nbsp;provided in your response dated July 28, 2021 you provided the number of MiniMed 600 Series pumps&nbsp;with clear&nbsp;retainer rings shipped to the field as of February 28, 2021. &nbsp;There is a large difference between&nbsp;the number of products shipped (\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>) and number of products actually in use in the field&nbsp;(\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>% of product shipped). &nbsp;It is unclear to us if the difference was due to the&nbsp;number of devices currently with distributors. &nbsp;If that is not the case, using the number of&nbsp;products shipped (including devices that are not in use by patients) could under- estimate the&nbsp;probability of occurrence of hazardous situations, even after subtracting products currently with&nbsp;distributors.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>In addition, you started \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> in \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> but did not&nbsp;\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> (SOP104-08DOC, Revision AP), stating that the one-year&nbsp;delay was “\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>”, however you should not have delayed implementing the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>&nbsp;method. &nbsp;You further attempted to justify your interpretation of the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> in your July 2021&nbsp;response as follows: “\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, etc.) \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>”. &nbsp;However, you have not explained how your \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>&nbsp;i.e., that for \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>” as the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, especially when the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Following change in the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> situations, you&nbsp;have also re-evaluated your risk zone classification matrix in March 2021 (Change Order&nbsp;QCH00047208, SOP104-08 DOC, Revision AL), stating that “t\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>”, which resulted in changes in classification of risk zones. \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>: specifically, “\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>&nbsp;from \u003Cstrong>(b)(4).\u003C\u002Fstrong>&nbsp; In Attachment 1.6 of your response&nbsp;provided on July 28, 2021 you stated that your assessment of suitability of the risk acceptability&nbsp;criteria was conducted based on mortality rates associated with type 1 diabetes, however death is&nbsp;not the only serious consequence for population for which insulin pump therapy is indicated. &nbsp;Other&nbsp;adverse events such as severe hypoglycemia (SH) and diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA) can also present&nbsp;serious harms to users and should be considered in your hazard analysis. &nbsp;Similarly, your&nbsp;justification for the reassignment of risk zones for \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> events relies heavily on the above&nbsp;calculation of mortality rates only. Furthermore, you argued that, with the removal of the factor&nbsp;of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> from your \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.” &nbsp;However, the risk calculation for \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and severity of the&nbsp;risk zones are separate issues and should be assessed separately; addressing the risk calculation&nbsp;does not justify changing the risk zone classification to maintain the overall risk levels. &nbsp;You&nbsp;have not provided adequate information to support that your revised risk zones are clinically&nbsp;acceptable because they appear to be based only on mortality rates, and not all the adverse events&nbsp;that can occur in the intended use population.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>In your response, you should explain how your mortality-based risk calculation is appropriate to&nbsp;address all health risks especially as it led to a down-classification of the risk severity, and&nbsp;update your risk zone classifications if necessary. Finally, in your November 5, 2021 update you&nbsp;stated that you evaluated the Issue Impact Assessments (IIAs) initiated in the last \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and&nbsp;identified 20 IIAs that require remediation to reflect the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> per&nbsp;DOP104-068DOC, \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> that is planned to be complete by \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. However, as it is&nbsp;unclear if your revised procedure is adequate and because this corrective action is not yet&nbsp;complete, we cannot evaluate the adequacy at this time.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>In summary, your corrective actions are still in process, and you have not yet conducted&nbsp;effectiveness checks to ensure the updated procedures and required employee training &nbsp;will prevent&nbsp;reoccurrence of the identified deficiencies. &nbsp;In your November 5, 2021 update you stated that you&nbsp;completed a retrospective review of CAPA effectiveness criteria and of CAPA effectiveness&nbsp;monitoring thresholds but 38 CAPAs were identified as requiring remediation and\u002For clarification&nbsp;and 14 CAPAs were identified as requiring a new complaint monitoring plan. &nbsp;You should remediate&nbsp;those CAPAs using an adequate risk analysis and provide a summary of your review and remediation&nbsp;efforts.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>2. &nbsp;You failed to review, evaluate, and investigate complaints involving the possible failure of a&nbsp;device to meet any of its specifications, as required by 21 CFR 820.198(c).\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>a. &nbsp;Your firm failed to investigate over 800 complaints of defective black retainer rings. In June&nbsp;2016, your firm initiated CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677 to address an increase in complaints of damaged retainer&nbsp;rings in the MiniMed 600 Series Insulin Infusion Pumps; as part of the CAPA investigation, your&nbsp;firm determined the retainer ring required re-design, and you changed the retainer ring from a&nbsp;clear \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> ring to a black \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> ring. &nbsp;You began&nbsp;releasing the re-designed pump with black retainer ring in August 2019, and you closed CAPA&nbsp;\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677 as effective October 2020. &nbsp;From December 2019 to May 2021, you received 887 complaints&nbsp;of defective black retainer rings; in 772 of the 887 complaints your firm referenced CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677&nbsp;as the “Formal Investigation\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Reference Number” even though this CAPA was an investigation of the previous clear retainer ring&nbsp;design. &nbsp;For example:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>i.&nbsp; On January 21, 2020, you received a complaint (CASE-2020-00056605) from a customer&nbsp;reporting a crack on their insulin pump reservoir compartment, and damage to the retainer ring. &nbsp;Your product analysis on the returned device confirmed the device had a “partially broken retainer,&nbsp;cracked reservoir tube lip, missing reservoir tube lip O-ring, and broken reservoir tube lip.” &nbsp;On&nbsp;April 24, 2020, you determined no formal investigation was necessary due to existing\u002Fprevious&nbsp;formal investigation and referenced CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677. &nbsp;You closed this complaint on April 24, 2020.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>ii.&nbsp; On February 20, 2020, you received a complaint (CASE-2020-00139368) from a customer&nbsp;reporting they experience hyperglycemia, with blood glucose levels of 450 mg\u002FdL. &nbsp;The customer&nbsp;stated that the lip ring was missing. &nbsp;Your product analysis on the returned device confirmed the&nbsp;device was missing the reservoir retainer ring and the reservoir tube lip O-ring, and the reservoir&nbsp;would not stay locked in place due to the missing retainer. &nbsp;On May 8, 2020, you determined no&nbsp;formal investigation was necessary due to existing\u002Fprevious formal investigation and referenced&nbsp;CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677. You closed this complaint on May 8, 2020.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>iii.&nbsp; On April 7, 2020, you received a complaint (CASE-2020-00260639) from a customer&nbsp;experiencing a high blood glucose level of 434 mg\u002FdL. &nbsp;The customer reported that the retainer ring&nbsp;was loose, and the reservoir did not lock into place when inserted into the pump. &nbsp;Your product&nbsp;analysis on the returned device confirmed a broken retainer and missing reservoir tube O- ring, and&nbsp;the reservoir did not lock into place. &nbsp;On June 5, 2020, you determined no formal investigation was&nbsp;necessary due to existing\u002Fprevious formal investigation and referenced CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677. &nbsp;You closed&nbsp;this complaint on June 6, 2020.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>b. &nbsp;Your firm failed to adequately investigate a complaint in which the customer reported \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> of insulin that were not programmed by the customer. You received a complaint on December&nbsp;25, 2019 (CASE-2019-00921665) where the customer alleged that their low blood glucose was the&nbsp;result of over-delivery of insulin by their Paradigm Insulin Infusion Pump (Model MMT-715WWS),&nbsp;which per the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, reflected \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> that were not programmed by the customer. The&nbsp;device was returned to your firm for analysis and the complaint was escalated to your cybersecurity&nbsp;Incident Response Management Team. Your investigation included a review of the downloaded CareLink data, in which the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> reported by&nbsp;the customer were not reflected. However, your firm’s investigation did not include reviewing the&nbsp;actual pump history to verify the presence of the additional \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. This complaint was closed&nbsp;June 26, 2021 as “the cause of the event cannot be determined, as product analysis found no failure&nbsp;or anomaly in the device.”\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>c. &nbsp; Your firm failed to adequately investigate complaints of Enlite3 MMT-7020A glucose sensor&nbsp;failures. &nbsp;You received two complaints of sensor failures, both of which were closed as “analysis&nbsp;is not required as this complaint is not reportable, and the sensor lot number is unknown.” &nbsp;However, there is no evidence in either complaint record that technical support attempted to&nbsp;determine the lot numbers when communicating with the complainants, even though your \u003Cem>Guides,&nbsp;Troubleshooting, Glucose Sensor\u003C\u002Fem> procedure (DOP114-691DOC, Revisions AL and AM) requires all service&nbsp;notifications to include a lot or batch number for the product. &nbsp;Furthermore, while your \u003Cem>Failure&nbsp;Analysis-Glucose Sensor Products\u003C\u002Fem> procedure (DOP830DOC, Version V) indicates expired sensors are not&nbsp;required to be analyzed, it is not clear how your firm determined the sensors were expired when&nbsp;neither complaint record lists an expiration date, and you failed to determine the lot or batch&nbsp;number of the returned sensors. &nbsp;Last, your \u003Cem>Failure Analysis-Glucose Sensor Products\u003C\u002Fem> procedure does&nbsp;not include MDR reportability as a requirement for sensor analysis.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>d. &nbsp;Your firm failed to adequately investigate reported issues with your CareLink software that&nbsp;your firm manufactures; this software uses information transmitted from insulin infusion pumps and&nbsp;glucose meters to create reports intended to assist users with diabetes management. &nbsp;Of the 25&nbsp;complaints reviewed during our inspection, your firm documented “software error unknown” in 20 of&nbsp;the complaints; however, there is no evidence in your complaint records that technical support&nbsp;attempted to determine the version of software used by the device in order to conduct an&nbsp;investigation. &nbsp;During the inspection, your VP of Quality Assurance explained to our investigator&nbsp;that all versions of the software are maintained and could be analyzed to investigate the reported&nbsp;software errors.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>We have reviewed your responses and acknowledge you have opened CAPA 539889 to track completion of&nbsp;your proposed corrective actions, including updating complaint investigation and post market&nbsp;trending, as well as implementation of an enhanced training program for complaint handling,&nbsp;technical support, and failure analysis personnel. &nbsp;You have also committed to performing a&nbsp;retrospective review of complaint files for the issues identified on the FDA 483, Inspectional&nbsp;Observations.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>In your initial response, you acknowledge CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677 should not have been used to justify not&nbsp;investigating complaints of the re-designed insulin infusion pumps, and you recognize complaints of&nbsp;damaged black retainer rings should have been escalated to a new formal investigation; you have&nbsp;opened CAPA 539942 to conduct this formal investigation. &nbsp;However, your response does not address&nbsp;why your firm deemed the original CAPA \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>#299677 as adequate justification for not investigating&nbsp;over 800 complaints in the re-designed pump, nor does it address changes made to prevent recurrence&nbsp;of similar events.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Your response indicates you conducted further analysis of complaint CASE-2019-00921665, in which&nbsp;the customer received \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> not programmed into the device; in your supplementary&nbsp;investigation, your firm reviewed the downloaded pump history file and found \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> of similar&nbsp;size to those recorded in the complaint. &nbsp;Your supplementary investigation concluded the extra&nbsp;\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> were not received over \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, which “rules out the possibility of a cyber security incident.” &nbsp;We acknowledge your firm has updated your \u003Cem>Failure Analysis\u003C\u002Fem>, \u003Cem>Paradigm\u003C\u002Fem> (DOP114-858DOC) and \u003Cem>Failure&nbsp;Analysis\u003C\u002Fem>, NGP (DOP114- 888DOC) procedures, and will update failure analyses as warranted; however,&nbsp;your response does not address your firm’s initial limited investigation, nor does it address&nbsp;changes made to prevent recurrence of similar events.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Your response also describes further investigations of the two complaints of Enlite3 MMT- 7020A&nbsp;glucose sensor failures. &nbsp;Per your response, your firm was able to narrow down and\u002For determine lot&nbsp;numbers of the sensors via patient history and reassessment of complaint files. In your&nbsp;reassessment you conducted a Lot History Review (LHR) and determined for both complaints “there&nbsp;were no process deviations or out of specification test results observed that would have&nbsp;contributed to a sensor performance issues.” &nbsp;We acknowledge you opened CAPA 541992 to investigate&nbsp;methods to reliably investigate and analyze sensors; however, as this corrective action is not yet&nbsp;complete, we cannot evaluate the adequacy at this time.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>We also acknowledge your firm committed to implementing a new failure analysis process specific to&nbsp;software complaints, and opened CAPA 541994 to investigate and identify actions needed, and&nbsp;complaints with “software error unknown” will be investigated as part of that CAPA. &nbsp; However, as&nbsp;part of your corrective actions are not yet complete, including your, retrospective complaint&nbsp;review and systemic complaint investigation processes and training, we cannot evaluate the adequacy&nbsp;of your response at this time.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Our inspection also revealed that your insulin infusion pump devices are misbranded under section&nbsp;502(t)(2) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(t)(2), in that your firm failed or refused to furnish&nbsp;material or information respecting the device that is required by or under section 519 of the Act,&nbsp;21 U.S.C. § 360i, and 21 CFR Part 803 – Medical Device Reporting. &nbsp;Significant deficiencies&nbsp;include, but are not limited to, the following:\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>3. &nbsp;Your firm failed to submit a report to FDA no later than 30 calendar days of receiving or&nbsp;otherwise becoming aware of information that reasonably suggests that a marketed device may have&nbsp;caused or contributed to a death or serious injury, as required by 21 CFR 803.50(a)(1).\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>For example, the information included for complaint #CASE-2020-00236012 describes an event in which&nbsp;your firm’s MiniMed Insulin Pump malfunctioned; after using the device the patient exhibited low&nbsp;glucose reading of 36 mg\u002FdL and was treated with food. &nbsp;We believe that the treatment received by&nbsp;the patient was necessitated to preclude permanent impairment of a body function or permanent&nbsp;damage to a body structure. &nbsp;There is no information included in the firm’s complaint file that&nbsp;rules out the device may not have caused or contributed to the referenced serious injury. &nbsp;As such,&nbsp;the referenced complaint meets the definition of a reportable serious injury, as defined in 21 CFR&nbsp;803.3. The firm became aware of the event on March 27, 2020. However, your firm did not submit an&nbsp;MDR to the FDA.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The adequacy of your firm’s response dated July 28, 2021 cannot be determined at this time. &nbsp;The&nbsp;response noted that your firm is implementing systemic corrective actions, including updates to its&nbsp;reportability criteria, a retrospective review of the complaints and staff training. &nbsp;However, your&nbsp;firm did not provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions,&nbsp;including submission of the referenced serious injury MDR, have been implemented and completed as&nbsp;they are still in progress.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The adequacy of your firm’s response dated September 3, 2021 also cannot be determined at this&nbsp;time. &nbsp;Your response provided an update to its planned or newly added corrective actions, including&nbsp;identification and submission of reportable events associated with retainer ring damage complaints,&nbsp;and implementation of late regulatory review process. &nbsp;However, your firm did not provide&nbsp;documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including submission of&nbsp;the referenced serious injury MDR and planned re-evaluation of its reportability criteria, have&nbsp;been implemented and completed as they are still in progress.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The adequacy of your firm’s responses dated October 8, November 5, and December 2, 2021 also cannot&nbsp;be determined at this time. &nbsp;Your responses provided an update to the planned corrective actions. &nbsp;You provided your new MDR Training Program. &nbsp;However, you also report that training of personnel&nbsp;will not be completed until \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. You also provided \u003Cem>D00603958 MDR Decision Alignment with Risk Management Remediation Plan for&nbsp;Diabetes\u003C\u002Fem>. &nbsp;It is unclear if this plan incorporates an adequate risk analysis (see review under item&nbsp;#1) and you state that your planned actions will not be completed until \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. You did not&nbsp;provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including&nbsp;submission of the referenced serious injury MDR and planned re-evaluation of its reportability&nbsp;criteria, have been implemented and completed as they are still in progress.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>4. &nbsp;Your firm failed to submit a report to FDA no later than 30 calendar days after the day that&nbsp;the firm received or otherwise became aware of information, from any source, that reasonably&nbsp;suggests that a device that the firm markets has malfunctioned and this device or a similar device&nbsp;that it markets would be likely to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury, if the&nbsp;malfunction were to recur, as required by 21 CFR 803.50(a)(2).\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>For example, the information included for Complaints #CASE-2018-00270399 and #CASE-2018-00437534&nbsp;reasonably suggests that your firm’s insulin pump malfunctioned (e.g. broken or missing retainer&nbsp;ring) while in use. &nbsp;The same malfunction is the subject of the recall Z-0956-2020 for the same&nbsp;device. &nbsp;Per the 1995 Preamble, a malfunction is reportable if the manufacturer takes, or would be&nbsp;required to take, an action under section 518 or 519(g) of the FD&amp;C as a result of the malfunction&nbsp;of the device or other similar devices {60 FR 63578, 63585 (Dec. 11, 1995)}. Please note that the&nbsp;preamble reference is section 519(f), but the appropriate designation for the section is now&nbsp;section 519(g) due to amendments to the FD&amp;C Act. &nbsp;There is no information included for the&nbsp;complaint files that justifies that the malfunction would not be likely to cause or contribute to a&nbsp;death or serious injury, if it were to recur. &nbsp;As such, your firm should have submitted within the&nbsp;required timeframes, an MDR for each MDR reportable event subject of the referenced complaints. &nbsp;The corresponding MDRs 2032227-2021-157630 and 2032227-2021-157620 were received by FDA beyond the&nbsp;required 30 calendar days timeframe.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The adequacy of your firm’s response dated July 28, 2021 cannot be determined at this time. &nbsp;The&nbsp;response noted that your firm is implementing systemic corrective actions, including updates to its&nbsp;reportability criteria, a retrospective review of the complaints and staff training. However, your&nbsp;firm did not provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions,&nbsp;including the planned assessment of its reportability criteria, have been implemented and completed&nbsp;as they are still in progress.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The adequacy of your firm’s response dated September 3, 2021 also cannot be determined at this&nbsp;time. &nbsp;Your response provided an update to its planned or newly added corrective actions, including&nbsp;identification and submission of reportable events associated with retainer ring damage complaints,&nbsp;and implementation of late regulatory review process. &nbsp;However, your firm did not provide&nbsp;documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including the planned&nbsp;re-evaluation of its reportability criteria, have been implemented and completed as they are still&nbsp;in progress.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>The adequacy of your firm’s responses dated October 8, November 5, and December 2, 2021 also cannot&nbsp;be determined at this time. &nbsp;Your response provided an update to the planned corrective actions. &nbsp;You provided your new MDR Training Program. &nbsp;However, you also report that training of personnel&nbsp;will not be completed until \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.&nbsp; You also provided \u003Cem>D00603958 MDR Decision Alignment with Risk Management Remediation Plan for&nbsp;Diabetes\u003C\u002Fem>. &nbsp;It is unclear if this plan incorporates an adequate risk analysis (see review under item&nbsp;#1) and you state that your planned actions will not be completed until \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.&nbsp; You did not&nbsp;provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including&nbsp;submission of the referenced serious injury MDR and planned re-evaluation of its reportability&nbsp;criteria, have been implemented and completed as they are still in progress.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>This letter notifies you of our findings and provides you an opportunity to address the above&nbsp;deficiencies. &nbsp;Your firm should investigate and determine the causes of any deficiencies, and take&nbsp;prompt actions to correct the deficiencies and bring the products into compliance. Failure to&nbsp;promptly correct these deficiencies may result in regulatory action being initiated by the FDA&nbsp;without further notice. &nbsp;These actions include, but are not limited to, seizure, injunction, and&nbsp;civil money penalties. &nbsp;Additionally, premarket approval applications for Class III devices to&nbsp;which the Quality System regulation deficiencies are reasonably related will not be approved until&nbsp;the deficiencies have been corrected. &nbsp;Also, should FDA determine that your devices do not meet&nbsp;requirements of the Act, requests for Certificates to Foreign Governments (CFG) may not be granted.&nbsp;More information on processes for persons denied a CFG can be found at:&nbsp;\u003Ca href=\"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Fregulatory-information\u002Fsearch-fda-guidance-documents\u002Fprocess-request-review-fdas-decision-not-issue-certain-export-certificates-devices\">https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Fregulatory-information\u002Fsearch-fda-guidance-documents\u002Fprocess-request-review-fdas-decision-not-issue-certain-export-certificates-devices\u003C\u002Fa>. If you believe that your&nbsp;products are not in violation of the FD&amp;C Act and FDA regulations, please provide us with your&nbsp;reasoning and any supporting information for our consideration within fifteen business days.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>You should schedule a teleconference with FDA to further discuss your response to this Warning&nbsp;Letter, particularly in response to your revised risk assessment (please see item 1 above) in more&nbsp;detail. Please notify FDA in writing within fifteen business days from the date you receive this&nbsp;letter of the specific steps your firm has taken to correct the noted Quality System and MDR&nbsp;reporting deficiencies, as well as an explanation of how your firm plans to prevent these deficiencies, or similar deficiencies, from occurring again. &nbsp;Include documentation of the&nbsp;corrections and\u002For corrective actions (which must address systemic problems) that your firm has&nbsp;taken. &nbsp;If your firm’s planned corrections and\u002For corrective actions will occur over time, please&nbsp;include a timetable for implementation of those activities. &nbsp;If corrections and\u002For corrective&nbsp;actions cannot be completed within fifteen business days, state the reason for the delay and the&nbsp;time within which these activities will be completed. &nbsp;Your firm’s response should be comprehensive&nbsp;and address all deficiencies included in this Warning Letter.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Your response should be sent to: US Food and Drug Administration, Division 3\u002FWest, Office of&nbsp;Medical Device and Radiological Health Operations at oradevices3firmresponse@fda.hhs.gov. Please&nbsp;identify your response with CMS Case #617539. &nbsp;If you have questions about the contents of this&nbsp;letter, please contact Compliance Officer Jamie M. Bumpas at 214-253-5336 or via email at Jamie.bumpas@fda.hhs.gov.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Finally, you should know that this letter is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of the&nbsp;deficiencies at your firm’s facility. &nbsp;It is your firm’s responsibility to ensure compliance with&nbsp;applicable laws and regulations administered by FDA. &nbsp;The specific deficiencies noted in this&nbsp;letter and in the Inspectional Observations, FDA 483, issued at the close of the inspection may be&nbsp;symptomatic of serious problems in your firm’s manufacturing and quality management systems. &nbsp;Your&nbsp;firm should investigate and determine the causes of the deficiencies, and take prompt actions to&nbsp;correct the deficiencies and bring the products into compliance.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cbr>\nSincerely,\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u002FS\u002F\u003Cbr>\nShari J. Shambaugh\u003Cbr>\nProgram Division Director\u003Cbr>\nOffice of Medical Device &amp; Radiological Health\u003Cbr>\nWest\u002FDivision 3\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u002FS\u002F\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Timothy T. Stenzel, M.D., Ph.D.\u003Cbr>\nDirector\u003Cbr>\nOHT 7: Office of In Vitro Diagnostics and\u003Cbr>\nRadiological Health\u003Cbr>\nOffice of Product Evaluation and Quality\u003Cbr>\nCenter for Devices and Radiological Health\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cbr>\nCc:\u003Cbr>\nSean Salmon, Executive Vice President &amp; President\u003Cbr>\nDiabetes Operating Unit\u003Cbr>\nMedtronic, Inc.\u003Cbr>\nSean.salmon@medtronic.com\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003Cp>Chirag Tilara, Vice President, Quality\u003Cbr>\nMedtronic, Inc.\u003Cbr>\nChirag.m.tilara@medtronic.com\u003Cbr>\n&nbsp;\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n              \n                                            \n              \n            ","Delivery Method:\n\nVIA Electronic Mail\n\nProduct:\n\nMedical Devices\n\nRecipient:\n\nRecipient Name\n\nGeoff S. Martha\n\nRecipient Title\n\nChief Executive Officer\n\nMedtronic, Inc.\n\n710 Medtronic Parkway\n\nMinneapolis, MN 55432\n\nUnited States\n\nGeoff.martha@medtronic.com\n\nIssuing Office:\n\nCenter for Devices and Radiological Health\n\nUnited States\n\nWARNING LETTER\n\nCMS 617539\n\nDecember 9, 2021\n\nDear Mr. Martha:\n\nDuring an inspection of your firm located in Northridge, California, on June 7, 2021 through July 7, 2021, an investigator from the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determined that your firm manufactures the MiniMed 600 series insulin infusion pumps, and software and remote controllers used in conjunction with the Paradigm and MiniMed series insulin infusion pumps. Under section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act) [21 U.S.C. § 321(h)], these products are devices because they are intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or to affect the structure or any function of the body.\n\nThis inspection revealed the devices are adulterated within the meaning of section 501(h) of the Act [21 U.S.C. § 351(h)] in that the methods used in, or the facilities or controls used for, the manufacture, packing, storage, or installation are not in conformity with the current good manufacturing practice requirements of the Quality System regulation found at Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 820. You may find the Act and FDA’s regulations through links in the FDA’s home page www.fda.gov. We received your responses from Sean Salmon, Executive Vice President and President Diabetes Operating Unit, and Chirag Tilara, Vice President, Quality Management Representative, dated July 28, September 3, October 8, November 5, and December 3, 2021, concerning our investigator’s observations noted on the Form FDA 483, Inspectional Observations, that was issued to your firm on July 7, 2021. We have considered these responses in relation to our observations noted during the inspection, which include, but are not limited to, the following:\n\n1. You failed to adequately establish procedures for corrective and preventive action, as required by 21 CFR 820.100(a).\n\na. Specifically, in June 2016, your firm initiated CAPA (b)(4)#299677 to address anincrease in complaints of damaged retainer rings (clear retainer rings) in the MiniMed 600 Series Insulin Infusion Pumps. Your investigation determined the device failures were caused by the (b)(4) retainer ring, which in turn caused a (b)(4). A damaged retainer ring may result in the over or under-delivery of insulin, which may lead to hypoglycemia or hyperglycemia.Beginning August 2019, your firm began releasing the re-designed pumps (which were manufactured with a black retainer ring) for distribution. You began notifying customers of retainer ring failures in November 2019. FDA determined that there was a reasonable probability that the use of, or exposure to, the pumps manufactured with the clear retainer ring would cause serious adverse health consequences, including severe hypoglycemia which can result in loss of consciousness, seizure; severe hyperglycemia which can result in diabetic ketoacidosis or hyperosmolar hyperglycemic state, metabolic abnormalities; or death and classified the recall (RES84430) as class 1. However, your firm failed to adequately implement procedures for corrective and preventive action (CAPA) in that you failed to adequately analyze all sources of quality data, failed to identify actions needed to correct nonconforming product, and you did not appropriately verify or validate the change to your device to ensure corrective and preventive actions taken were effective and did not adversely affect the finished device. While you implemented your procedure, we disagree with your characterization of the risk threshold which led to a conclusion of a lower risk than was appropriate. For example:\n\ni. Your CAPA System procedure (SOP114-01DOC, Effective Date 5\u002F19\u002F2015, Version L) requires your firm to determine whether distributed product is potentially affected by a nonconformance and to conduct additional risk assessment activities per the Product Risk Management Process (SOP104- 08, Version W). In June 2016, your firm conducted a (b)(4)16-1051, Version A) which, per your Product Risk Management Process, outlines affected product in the field, and is a risk assessment and health hazard evaluation for informing field corrective action (“FCA”) decisions. Based on FDA’s own evaluation of risk, your outcomes of risk assessment do not appear to be appropriate. In conducting your (b)(4) you did not accurately calculate the risk associated with the failed retainer rings in the MiniMed 600 Series Insulin Infusion Pumps because your risk calculation formula underestimated the probability of occurrence of harm, resulting in your firm classifying the risk as “(b)(4)” (zone (b)(4)) (b)(4)” (zone (b)(4)). Consequently, your firm did not initiate a correction or removal to address the defective devices from the field because per your (b)(4), the risk of serious adverse health consequences was “improbable.”\n\nii. In March 2021, your firm revised your Product Risk Management Process (SOP104-08, Version AL), which updated the formula for risk calculation; however, this also did not result in accurate risk calculation. The updated formula uses the “total shipment of affected product” which again underestimates the probability of occurrence because the number of products shipped includes devices not in use by patients (e.g., devices shipped to distributors that have not yet been distributed to customers). Further, the update also changed the parameters on the risk evaluation matrix, increasing the (b)(4) parameters (zones (b)(4)) and (b)(4) parameters (zone (b)(4)), thus requiring a higher occurrence for a harm to be classified as “(b)(4)” (zone (b)(4)). In June 2021 your firm again repeated the (b)(4), but due to the changes made in your risk evaluation formula and matrix, your firm again classified the risk as “(b)(4)” (zone (b)(4) (zone (b)(4)).\n\niii. Your firm did not identify the actions needed to control devices already in distribution. As previously discussed, your firm’s justification in June 2016 for not initiating a recall was based on your firm’s underestimated risk calculation. Per your Product Review Board Decision Form, dated September 2, 2016 and signed by your VP\u002FPresident IIM Diabetes on October 3, 2016, while your firm initially planned to develop a customer communication regarding the reservoir retainer ring issue, the decision to not initiate a customer communication was based on “(b)(4).” Your firm then (b)(4) and (b)(4), each time using the (b)(4) and each time (b)(4); your firm consequently did not initiate a recall until November 20, 2019. From initiation of CAPA (b)(4)#299677 in June 2016 to November 20, 2019, the date you initiated the recall, you received over 74,000 retainer ring complaints, with over 57,000 of those reported to FDA as MDRs.\n\niv. After you initiated the recall of the MiniMed 600 Series Insulin Infusion Pumps on November 20, 2019, your firm further failed to implement changes in your methods and procedures needed to correct and prevent the recurrence of quality problems. Your recall consisted of a customer notification informing customers with affected insulin pumps to examine their devices for retainer ring damage and to contact Medtronic for a replacement pump if damage was noted; if no damage was noted by the customer, your notification instructed customers to continue using the device and to examine the retainer ring if the device was dropped or bumped. Thus, after redesigning the retainer ring to prevent further risk, you failed to adequately remove the pumps containing the older, less robust ring from the market.\n\nv. Your firm failed to verify and\u002For validate the corrective and preventive actions to ensure the action taken was effective to prevent recurrence of the nonconformance and did not adversely affect the finished device. Your firm began releasing the re-designed pump with the black retainer ring beginning August 2019 and closed CAPA (b)(4)#299677 as effective on October 2, 2020. Per your CAPA effectiveness plan, your firm compared the complaint rate of the newly released pumps (b)(4) to the complaint rate of the previous pump design with the clear retainer ring (b)(4)…” You concluded the effectiveness criteria were met because the complaint rate for the re-designed pumps was (b)(4) while the complaint rate for the previous design was (b)(4). However, you received 322 complaints during the (b)(4) effectiveness check period ((b)(4) to (b)(4)), and as of May 25, 2021, you had received a total of (b)(4) complaints of defective black retainer rings. You did not re-evaluate the effectiveness of your corrective and preventive actions to determine whether CAPA (b)(4)#299677 should be re-evaluated.\n\nb. Specifically, your firm initiated CAPA (b)(4)#401464 on June 29, 2018, to address a cybersecurity vulnerability with the remote controllers used with your Medtronic MiniMed 508 Insulin Infusion Pump and your MiniMed Paradigm Insulin Infusion Pumps. The identified cybersecurity vulnerability revealed unauthorized individuals could (b)(4).” The root cause investigation in CAPA (b)(4)#401464 indicated the “(b)(4).” In evaluating the risk of patient harm, your firm determined the lack of (b)(4) that could lead to delivery of (b)(4) could result in catastrophic harm to patients. Per your CAPA (b)(4)#401464, to address the root cause of the lack of cyber security requirements in the design, all current and future Medtronic Diabetes software products would be evaluated for encryption security requirements. Your firm also discontinued the manufacture and distribution of the Paradigm Pump products and scrapped remaining inventory of the remote controllers; however, these corrective actions did not address the devices in the field. While your firm initiated a recall of 15,787 remote controllers shipped to customers in the previous four years, you have distributed over (b)(4) remote controllers since its release in 1999, and you did not notify all customers of this safety issue.\n\nWe have reviewed your responses and conclude that they are not adequate because you have not yet provided evidence of implementation for all corrections and corrective actions. We acknowledge your firm has committed to replacing MiniMed 600 Series Insulin Infusion Pumps with the clear retainer ring for all US customers, regardless of warranty status, and will retrieve all Medtronic MiniMed remote controllers from active users, and opened CAPA 539888 in order to track completion of your proposed corrective actions.\n\nYou stated you have updated relevant procedures, including but not limited to the risk management procedures, including Product Risk Management Process (SOP104- 08DOC), Risk Management Post Production Procedure (DOP104-068DOC), your recall procedure, Diabetes FCA Program Governance (10578148DOC), to address observation 1 on the FDA 483. You also state you will no longer use a device’s warranty status as a factor in determining the scope of recalls associated with the risk patient harm. Additionally, you state you have updated the Medtronic Internal Message Guide to characterize the field action as a recall to US customers, and opened CAPA 539942 to investigate reports of black retainer ring damage “in light of complaints that have been received.”\n\nWe acknowledge that you provided a copy of Engineering Report; NGP 6015265-020 Retainer Ring Damage Investigation, Version B in which you conclude that no manufacturing or design non-conformance was identified. However, you also stated that you have opened CAPA (b)(4)#539942 to further investigate damaged retainer rings and that activity is still ongoing.\n\nYou have also provided DOP104-068DOC, Risk Management Post Production Procedure, Revision U. This procedure is not adequate. You have (b)(4) for the (b)(4) “Medtronic MiniMed believes the (b)(4) is common practice in the industry”, however you have not provided adequate justification to demonstrate that it is appropriate for your risk calculation. For example, on pg. 200 of “Appendix B_1 of 2” provided in your response dated July 28, 2021 you provided the number of MiniMed 600 Series pumps with clear retainer rings shipped to the field as of February 28, 2021. There is a large difference between the number of products shipped ((b)(4)) and number of products actually in use in the field ((b)(4)% of product shipped). It is unclear to us if the difference was due to the number of devices currently with distributors. If that is not the case, using the number of products shipped (including devices that are not in use by patients) could under- estimate the probability of occurrence of hazardous situations, even after subtracting products currently with distributors.\n\nIn addition, you started (b)(4) in (b)(4) but did not (b)(4) (SOP104-08DOC, Revision AP), stating that the one-year delay was “(b)(4)”, however you should not have delayed implementing the (b)(4) method. You further attempted to justify your interpretation of the (b)(4) in your July 2021 response as follows: “(b)(4), etc.) (b)(4)”. However, you have not explained how your (b)(4) i.e., that for (b)(4)” as the (b)(4), especially when the (b)(4).\n\nFollowing change in the (b)(4) situations, you have also re-evaluated your risk zone classification matrix in March 2021 (Change Order QCH00047208, SOP104-08 DOC, Revision AL), stating that “t(b)(4)”, which resulted in changes in classification of risk zones. (b)(4): specifically, “(b)(4) from (b)(4). In Attachment 1.6 of your response provided on July 28, 2021 you stated that your assessment of suitability of the risk acceptability criteria was conducted based on mortality rates associated with type 1 diabetes, however death is not the only serious consequence for population for which insulin pump therapy is indicated. Other adverse events such as severe hypoglycemia (SH) and diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA) can also present serious harms to users and should be considered in your hazard analysis. Similarly, your justification for the reassignment of risk zones for (b)(4) events relies heavily on the above calculation of mortality rates only. Furthermore, you argued that, with the removal of the factor of (b)(4) from your (b)(4) of (b)(4).” However, the risk calculation for (b)(4) and severity of the risk zones are separate issues and should be assessed separately; addressing the risk calculation does not justify changing the risk zone classification to maintain the overall risk levels. You have not provided adequate information to support that your revised risk zones are clinically acceptable because they appear to be based only on mortality rates, and not all the adverse events that can occur in the intended use population.\n\nIn your response, you should explain how your mortality-based risk calculation is appropriate to address all health risks especially as it led to a down-classification of the risk severity, and update your risk zone classifications if necessary. Finally, in your November 5, 2021 update you stated that you evaluated the Issue Impact Assessments (IIAs) initiated in the last (b)(4) and identified 20 IIAs that require remediation to reflect the (b)(4) per DOP104-068DOC, (b)(4) that is planned to be complete by (b)(4). However, as it is unclear if your revised procedure is adequate and because this corrective action is not yet complete, we cannot evaluate the adequacy at this time.\n\nIn summary, your corrective actions are still in process, and you have not yet conducted effectiveness checks to ensure the updated procedures and required employee training will prevent reoccurrence of the identified deficiencies. In your November 5, 2021 update you stated that you completed a retrospective review of CAPA effectiveness criteria and of CAPA effectiveness monitoring thresholds but 38 CAPAs were identified as requiring remediation and\u002For clarification and 14 CAPAs were identified as requiring a new complaint monitoring plan. You should remediate those CAPAs using an adequate risk analysis and provide a summary of your review and remediation efforts.\n\n2. You failed to review, evaluate, and investigate complaints involving the possible failure of a device to meet any of its specifications, as required by 21 CFR 820.198(c).\n\na. Your firm failed to investigate over 800 complaints of defective black retainer rings. In June 2016, your firm initiated CAPA (b)(4)#299677 to address an increase in complaints of damaged retainer rings in the MiniMed 600 Series Insulin Infusion Pumps; as part of the CAPA investigation, your firm determined the retainer ring required re-design, and you changed the retainer ring from a clear (b)(4) ring to a black (b)(4) ring. You began releasing the re-designed pump with black retainer ring in August 2019, and you closed CAPA (b)(4)#299677 as effective October 2020. From December 2019 to May 2021, you received 887 complaints of defective black retainer rings; in 772 of the 887 complaints your firm referenced CAPA (b)(4)#299677 as the “Formal Investigation\n\nReference Number” even though this CAPA was an investigation of the previous clear retainer ring design. For example:\n\ni. On January 21, 2020, you received a complaint (CASE-2020-00056605) from a customer reporting a crack on their insulin pump reservoir compartment, and damage to the retainer ring. Your product analysis on the returned device confirmed the device had a “partially broken retainer, cracked reservoir tube lip, missing reservoir tube lip O-ring, and broken reservoir tube lip.” On April 24, 2020, you determined no formal investigation was necessary due to existing\u002Fprevious formal investigation and referenced CAPA (b)(4)#299677. You closed this complaint on April 24, 2020.\n\nii. On February 20, 2020, you received a complaint (CASE-2020-00139368) from a customer reporting they experience hyperglycemia, with blood glucose levels of 450 mg\u002FdL. The customer stated that the lip ring was missing. Your product analysis on the returned device confirmed the device was missing the reservoir retainer ring and the reservoir tube lip O-ring, and the reservoir would not stay locked in place due to the missing retainer. On May 8, 2020, you determined no formal investigation was necessary due to existing\u002Fprevious formal investigation and referenced CAPA (b)(4)#299677. You closed this complaint on May 8, 2020.\n\niii. On April 7, 2020, you received a complaint (CASE-2020-00260639) from a customer experiencing a high blood glucose level of 434 mg\u002FdL. The customer reported that the retainer ring was loose, and the reservoir did not lock into place when inserted into the pump. Your product analysis on the returned device confirmed a broken retainer and missing reservoir tube O- ring, and the reservoir did not lock into place. On June 5, 2020, you determined no formal investigation was necessary due to existing\u002Fprevious formal investigation and referenced CAPA (b)(4)#299677. You closed this complaint on June 6, 2020.\n\nb. Your firm failed to adequately investigate a complaint in which the customer reported (b)(4) of insulin that were not programmed by the customer. You received a complaint on December 25, 2019 (CASE-2019-00921665) where the customer alleged that their low blood glucose was the result of over-delivery of insulin by their Paradigm Insulin Infusion Pump (Model MMT-715WWS), which per the (b)(4), reflected (b)(4) that were not programmed by the customer. The device was returned to your firm for analysis and the complaint was escalated to your cybersecurity Incident Response Management Team. Your investigation included a review of the downloaded CareLink data, in which the (b)(4) reported by the customer were not reflected. However, your firm’s investigation did not include reviewing the actual pump history to verify the presence of the additional (b)(4). This complaint was closed June 26, 2021 as “the cause of the event cannot be determined, as product analysis found no failure or anomaly in the device.”\n\nc. Your firm failed to adequately investigate complaints of Enlite3 MMT-7020A glucose sensor failures. You received two complaints of sensor failures, both of which were closed as “analysis is not required as this complaint is not reportable, and the sensor lot number is unknown.” However, there is no evidence in either complaint record that technical support attempted to determine the lot numbers when communicating with the complainants, even though your Guides, Troubleshooting, Glucose Sensor procedure (DOP114-691DOC, Revisions AL and AM) requires all service notifications to include a lot or batch number for the product. Furthermore, while your Failure Analysis-Glucose Sensor Products procedure (DOP830DOC, Version V) indicates expired sensors are not required to be analyzed, it is not clear how your firm determined the sensors were expired when neither complaint record lists an expiration date, and you failed to determine the lot or batch number of the returned sensors. Last, your Failure Analysis-Glucose Sensor Products procedure does not include MDR reportability as a requirement for sensor analysis.\n\nd. Your firm failed to adequately investigate reported issues with your CareLink software that your firm manufactures; this software uses information transmitted from insulin infusion pumps and glucose meters to create reports intended to assist users with diabetes management. Of the 25 complaints reviewed during our inspection, your firm documented “software error unknown” in 20 of the complaints; however, there is no evidence in your complaint records that technical support attempted to determine the version of software used by the device in order to conduct an investigation. During the inspection, your VP of Quality Assurance explained to our investigator that all versions of the software are maintained and could be analyzed to investigate the reported software errors.\n\nWe have reviewed your responses and acknowledge you have opened CAPA 539889 to track completion of your proposed corrective actions, including updating complaint investigation and post market trending, as well as implementation of an enhanced training program for complaint handling, technical support, and failure analysis personnel. You have also committed to performing a retrospective review of complaint files for the issues identified on the FDA 483, Inspectional Observations.\n\nIn your initial response, you acknowledge CAPA (b)(4)#299677 should not have been used to justify not investigating complaints of the re-designed insulin infusion pumps, and you recognize complaints of damaged black retainer rings should have been escalated to a new formal investigation; you have opened CAPA 539942 to conduct this formal investigation. However, your response does not address why your firm deemed the original CAPA (b)(4)#299677 as adequate justification for not investigating over 800 complaints in the re-designed pump, nor does it address changes made to prevent recurrence of similar events.\n\nYour response indicates you conducted further analysis of complaint CASE-2019-00921665, in which the customer received (b)(4) not programmed into the device; in your supplementary investigation, your firm reviewed the downloaded pump history file and found (b)(4) of similar size to those recorded in the complaint. Your supplementary investigation concluded the extra (b)(4) were not received over (b)(4), which “rules out the possibility of a cyber security incident.” We acknowledge your firm has updated your Failure Analysis, Paradigm (DOP114-858DOC) and Failure Analysis, NGP (DOP114- 888DOC) procedures, and will update failure analyses as warranted; however, your response does not address your firm’s initial limited investigation, nor does it address changes made to prevent recurrence of similar events.\n\nYour response also describes further investigations of the two complaints of Enlite3 MMT- 7020A glucose sensor failures. Per your response, your firm was able to narrow down and\u002For determine lot numbers of the sensors via patient history and reassessment of complaint files. In your reassessment you conducted a Lot History Review (LHR) and determined for both complaints “there were no process deviations or out of specification test results observed that would have contributed to a sensor performance issues.” We acknowledge you opened CAPA 541992 to investigate methods to reliably investigate and analyze sensors; however, as this corrective action is not yet complete, we cannot evaluate the adequacy at this time.\n\nWe also acknowledge your firm committed to implementing a new failure analysis process specific to software complaints, and opened CAPA 541994 to investigate and identify actions needed, and complaints with “software error unknown” will be investigated as part of that CAPA. However, as part of your corrective actions are not yet complete, including your, retrospective complaint review and systemic complaint investigation processes and training, we cannot evaluate the adequacy of your response at this time.\n\nOur inspection also revealed that your insulin infusion pump devices are misbranded under section 502(t)(2) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(t)(2), in that your firm failed or refused to furnish material or information respecting the device that is required by or under section 519 of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360i, and 21 CFR Part 803 – Medical Device Reporting. Significant deficiencies include, but are not limited to, the following:\n\n3. Your firm failed to submit a report to FDA no later than 30 calendar days of receiving or otherwise becoming aware of information that reasonably suggests that a marketed device may have caused or contributed to a death or serious injury, as required by 21 CFR 803.50(a)(1).\n\nFor example, the information included for complaint #CASE-2020-00236012 describes an event in which your firm’s MiniMed Insulin Pump malfunctioned; after using the device the patient exhibited low glucose reading of 36 mg\u002FdL and was treated with food. We believe that the treatment received by the patient was necessitated to preclude permanent impairment of a body function or permanent damage to a body structure. There is no information included in the firm’s complaint file that rules out the device may not have caused or contributed to the referenced serious injury. As such, the referenced complaint meets the definition of a reportable serious injury, as defined in 21 CFR 803.3. The firm became aware of the event on March 27, 2020. However, your firm did not submit an MDR to the FDA.\n\nThe adequacy of your firm’s response dated July 28, 2021 cannot be determined at this time. The response noted that your firm is implementing systemic corrective actions, including updates to its reportability criteria, a retrospective review of the complaints and staff training. However, your firm did not provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including submission of the referenced serious injury MDR, have been implemented and completed as they are still in progress.\n\nThe adequacy of your firm’s response dated September 3, 2021 also cannot be determined at this time. Your response provided an update to its planned or newly added corrective actions, including identification and submission of reportable events associated with retainer ring damage complaints, and implementation of late regulatory review process. However, your firm did not provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including submission of the referenced serious injury MDR and planned re-evaluation of its reportability criteria, have been implemented and completed as they are still in progress.\n\nThe adequacy of your firm’s responses dated October 8, November 5, and December 2, 2021 also cannot be determined at this time. Your responses provided an update to the planned corrective actions. You provided your new MDR Training Program. However, you also report that training of personnel will not be completed until (b)(4). You also provided D00603958 MDR Decision Alignment with Risk Management Remediation Plan for Diabetes. It is unclear if this plan incorporates an adequate risk analysis (see review under item #1) and you state that your planned actions will not be completed until (b)(4). You did not provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including submission of the referenced serious injury MDR and planned re-evaluation of its reportability criteria, have been implemented and completed as they are still in progress.\n\n4. Your firm failed to submit a report to FDA no later than 30 calendar days after the day that the firm received or otherwise became aware of information, from any source, that reasonably suggests that a device that the firm markets has malfunctioned and this device or a similar device that it markets would be likely to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury, if the malfunction were to recur, as required by 21 CFR 803.50(a)(2).\n\nFor example, the information included for Complaints #CASE-2018-00270399 and #CASE-2018-00437534 reasonably suggests that your firm’s insulin pump malfunctioned (e.g. broken or missing retainer ring) while in use. The same malfunction is the subject of the recall Z-0956-2020 for the same device. Per the 1995 Preamble, a malfunction is reportable if the manufacturer takes, or would be required to take, an action under section 518 or 519(g) of the FD&C as a result of the malfunction of the device or other similar devices {60 FR 63578, 63585 (Dec. 11, 1995)}. Please note that the preamble reference is section 519(f), but the appropriate designation for the section is now section 519(g) due to amendments to the FD&C Act. There is no information included for the complaint files that justifies that the malfunction would not be likely to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury, if it were to recur. As such, your firm should have submitted within the required timeframes, an MDR for each MDR reportable event subject of the referenced complaints. The corresponding MDRs 2032227-2021-157630 and 2032227-2021-157620 were received by FDA beyond the required 30 calendar days timeframe.\n\nThe adequacy of your firm’s response dated July 28, 2021 cannot be determined at this time. The response noted that your firm is implementing systemic corrective actions, including updates to its reportability criteria, a retrospective review of the complaints and staff training. However, your firm did not provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including the planned assessment of its reportability criteria, have been implemented and completed as they are still in progress.\n\nThe adequacy of your firm’s response dated September 3, 2021 also cannot be determined at this time. Your response provided an update to its planned or newly added corrective actions, including identification and submission of reportable events associated with retainer ring damage complaints, and implementation of late regulatory review process. However, your firm did not provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including the planned re-evaluation of its reportability criteria, have been implemented and completed as they are still in progress.\n\nThe adequacy of your firm’s responses dated October 8, November 5, and December 2, 2021 also cannot be determined at this time. Your response provided an update to the planned corrective actions. You provided your new MDR Training Program. However, you also report that training of personnel will not be completed until (b)(4). You also provided D00603958 MDR Decision Alignment with Risk Management Remediation Plan for Diabetes. It is unclear if this plan incorporates an adequate risk analysis (see review under item #1) and you state that your planned actions will not be completed until (b)(4). You did not provide documentation or evidence that all the corrections and corrective actions, including submission of the referenced serious injury MDR and planned re-evaluation of its reportability criteria, have been implemented and completed as they are still in progress.\n\nThis letter notifies you of our findings and provides you an opportunity to address the above deficiencies. Your firm should investigate and determine the causes of any deficiencies, and take prompt actions to correct the deficiencies and bring the products into compliance. Failure to promptly correct these deficiencies may result in regulatory action being initiated by the FDA without further notice. These actions include, but are not limited to, seizure, injunction, and civil money penalties. Additionally, premarket approval applications for Class III devices to which the Quality System regulation deficiencies are reasonably related will not be approved until the deficiencies have been corrected. Also, should FDA determine that your devices do not meet requirements of the Act, requests for Certificates to Foreign Governments (CFG) may not be granted. More information on processes for persons denied a CFG can be found at: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Fregulatory-information\u002Fsearch-fda-guidance-documents\u002Fprocess-request-review-fdas-decision-not-issue-certain-export-certificates-devices. If you believe that your products are not in violation of the FD&C Act and FDA regulations, please provide us with your reasoning and any supporting information for our consideration within fifteen business days.\n\nYou should schedule a teleconference with FDA to further discuss your response to this Warning Letter, particularly in response to your revised risk assessment (please see item 1 above) in more detail. Please notify FDA in writing within fifteen business days from the date you receive this letter of the specific steps your firm has taken to correct the noted Quality System and MDR reporting deficiencies, as well as an explanation of how your firm plans to prevent these deficiencies, or similar deficiencies, from occurring again. Include documentation of the corrections and\u002For corrective actions (which must address systemic problems) that your firm has taken. If your firm’s planned corrections and\u002For corrective actions will occur over time, please include a timetable for implementation of those activities. If corrections and\u002For corrective actions cannot be completed within fifteen business days, state the reason for the delay and the time within which these activities will be completed. Your firm’s response should be comprehensive and address all deficiencies included in this Warning Letter.\n\nYour response should be sent to: US Food and Drug Administration, Division 3\u002FWest, Office of Medical Device and Radiological Health Operations at oradevices3firmresponse@fda.hhs.gov. Please identify your response with CMS Case #617539. If you have questions about the contents of this letter, please contact Compliance Officer Jamie M. Bumpas at 214-253-5336 or via email at Jamie.bumpas@fda.hhs.gov.\n\nFinally, you should know that this letter is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of the deficiencies at your firm’s facility. It is your firm’s responsibility to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations administered by FDA. The specific deficiencies noted in this letter and in the Inspectional Observations, FDA 483, issued at the close of the inspection may be symptomatic of serious problems in your firm’s manufacturing and quality management systems. Your firm should investigate and determine the causes of the deficiencies, and take prompt actions to correct the deficiencies and bring the products into compliance.\n\nSincerely,\n\n\u002FS\u002F\n\nShari J. Shambaugh\n\nProgram Division Director\n\nOffice of Medical Device & Radiological Health\n\nWest\u002FDivision 3\n\n\u002FS\u002F\n\nTimothy T. Stenzel, M.D., Ph.D.\n\nDirector\n\nOHT 7: Office of In Vitro Diagnostics and\n\nRadiological Health\n\nOffice of Product Evaluation and Quality\n\nCenter for Devices and Radiological Health\n\nCc:\n\nSean Salmon, Executive Vice President & President\n\nDiabetes Operating Unit\n\nMedtronic, Inc.\n\nSean.salmon@medtronic.com\n\nChirag Tilara, Vice President, Quality\n\nMedtronic, Inc.\n\nChirag.m.tilara@medtronic.com","Medtronic, Inc.","medtronic-inc-617539-12092021","2026-08-18T06:42:29.262718+00:00",null,"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Fmedtronic-inc-617539-12092021","2026-10-26T08:09:23.659714+00:00","Warning Letter","Closed Out","2021-12-28","617539","Medical Devices","2023-04-28","Geoff S. Martha","2026-08-20T02:18:05.754+00:00","VIA Electronic Mail","2021-12-09",{"id":34,"raw":35,"subject":39,"body_html":40,"body_text":41,"firm_name":42,"letter_id":43,"created_at":44,"fei_number":20,"letter_url":45,"updated_at":46,"action_type":23,"case_status":47,"posted_date":48,"marcs_cms_no":49,"product_type":27,"closeout_date":20,"issuing_office":11,"recipient_name":50,"body_fetched_at":51,"delivery_method":31,"recipient_title":20,"reference_number":20,"action_taken_date":52,"medical_device_id":20,"response_letter_date":20},190,[36,37,38,11,39,13,13,13],"\u003Ctime datetime=\"2026-05-05T04:00:00Z\">05\u002F05\u002F2026\u003C\u002Ftime>\n","\u003Ctime datetime=\"2026-04-15T04:00:00Z\">04\u002F15\u002F2026\u003C\u002Ftime>\n","\u003Ca href=\"\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Funetixs-vascular-inc-724245-04152026\">Unetixs Vascular, Inc.\u003C\u002Fa>","Premarket Approval\u002FAdulterated","\n\n                            \n                            \n                            \n                            \n                                              \n  \n \n\n                 \n\n  \u003Chr>\n \n\n\u003Cdiv>\n  \u003Cdl>\n\n              \u003Cdt>Delivery Method:\u003C\u002Fdt> \n        \u003Cdd>VIA Electronic Mail\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              \u003C\u002Fdd>\n      \n      \n              \u003Cdt>Product:\u003C\u002Fdt> \n        \u003Cdd>Medical Devices                          \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n             \n            \n            \n            \n              \n            \n            \n            \u003C\u002Fdd>\n      \n          \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>            \n\n\n\u003Chr>\n\n\u003Cdiv>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdl>\n\n        \u003Cdt>Recipient:\u003C\u002Fdt>\n\n                      \u003Cdd>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdiv>Recipient Name\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n              \u003Cdiv>Mr. Neeraj Jha\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n          \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\u003C\u002Fdd>\n                                \u003Cdd>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdiv>Recipient Title\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n              \u003Cdiv>President\u002FCEO\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n          \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\u003C\u002Fdd>\n          \n            \u003Cdd>Unetixs Vascular, Inc.\u003C\u002Fdd>\n\n          \n                      \u003Cdd>\u003Cp>\u003Cspan>6901 TPC Drive, Suite 300\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cspan>Orlando\u003C\u002Fspan>, \u003Cspan>FL\u003C\u002Fspan> \u003Cspan>32822\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cspan>United States\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n          \n          \n            \n            \u003Cdd>\n\n    \u003C\u002Fdd>\u003Cdd>\u003Cspan>\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Ca href=\"mailto:(b)(4)\"> (b)(4)\u003C\u002Fa>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n\n          \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>            \n\n       \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdl>\n          \n          \u003Cdt>Issuing Office:\u003C\u002Fdt>\n        \n         \n          \u003Cdd>Center for Devices and Radiological Health\u003C\u002Fdd>\n        \n         \n          \u003Cdd>\u003Cp>\u003Cspan>United States\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n        \n        \n        \n        \n        \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n    \u003Cdl> \n      \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>  \n      \n\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\n \n\n \n\n\u003Chr>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>WARNING LETTER\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003Cbr>CMS # 724245\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>April 15, 2026\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Dear Neeraj Jha:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>During an inspection of your firm, Unetixs Vascular, Inc., located in Warwick, RI from September 19, 2025, through December 4, 2025, an investigator from the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determined that your firm manufactures vascular diagnostic ultrasound systems, including the ROODRA and 2CP devices. Under section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act), 21 U.S.C. § 321(h), these products are devices because they are intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or to affect the structure or any function of the body.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Our inspection revealed that the MultiLab Series ROODRA and 2CP vascular diagnostic devices are adulterated under section 501(f)(1)(B) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 351(f)(1)(B), because your firm does not have an approved application for premarket approval (PMA) in effect pursuant to section 515(a) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360e(a), or an approved application for an investigational device exemption under section 520(g) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g). The devices are also misbranded under section 502(o) the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(o), because your firm did not notify the agency of its intent to introduce the device with its current modifications into commercial distribution, as required by section 510(k) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k). For a device requiring premarket approval, the notification required by section 510(k) is deemed satisfied when a PMA is pending before the agency [21 CFR 807.81(b)]. The kind of information that your firm needs to submit in order to obtain approval or clearance for the device is described on the Internet at http:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002FMedicalDevices\u002FDeviceRegulationandGuidance\u002FHowtoMarketYourDevice\u002Fdefault.htm. The FDA will evaluate the information that your firm submits and decide whether the product may be legally marketed.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Specifically, the modified MultiLab Series ROODRA and 2CP vascular diagnostic devices that you are distributing do not have 510(k) clearance. While MultiLab Series ROODRA and 2CP vascular diagnostic devices have a prior 510(k) clearance (K904392), the modified devices include both design and labeling modifications – as documented in your firm’s “Regulatory Change Assessment - ENGINEERING CHANGE RECORD ECR # 0137 - Changing all applicable items from luer connections to bayonet connections” – which could significantly affect the safety and effectiveness of the device and, under 21 CFR 807.81(a)(3)(i), require a new 510(k) submission. Our review found that the change was implemented to significantly mitigate a known risk in response to an adverse event. Specifically, the device design, construction materials and labeling changes, to physically prevent device misconnections, were implemented to address a complaint of a death caused by air embolism.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>We also remind you on February 4, 2020, a Warning Letter, CMS Case #598016, was issued to you for significant quality system violations related to your vascular diagnostic ultrasound systems. We understand that while you have made progress in implementing corrective actions, deficiencies remain as documented during the recent inspection. You should continue to ensure that you are making further progress to be in compliance with all of our regulations. On February 2, 2024, the FDA issued a final rule amending the device current good manufacturing practice (CGMP) requirements of the Quality System (QS) Regulation under 21 CFR 820 to align more closely with the international consensus standard for Quality Management Systems for medical devices used by many other regulatory authorities around the world. The revised part 820, referred to as the Quality Management System Regulation (QMSR), became effective on February 2, 2026. Your most recent inspection on September 19, 2025, through December 4, 2025, was conducted pursuant to the QS Regulation, which was in effect at the time of the inspection. However, any corrective actions you propose or implement must be pursuant to the QMSR requirements in effect as of February 2, 2026. For more information on the QMSR please refer to our frequently asked questions webpage: Quality Management System Regulation – Frequently Asked Questions. The 2020 Warning Letter will remain open until we verify that you have successfully implemented all necessary corrections.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Your firm should take prompt action to address any violations identified in this letter. Failure to adequately address this matter may result in regulatory action being initiated by the FDA without further notice. These actions include, but are not limited to, seizure, injunction, and civil money penalties.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Other federal agencies may take your compliance with the FD&amp;C Act and its implementing regulations into account when considering the award of federal contracts.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Please notify this office in writing within fifteen business days from the date you receive this letter of the specific steps your firm has taken to address the noted violations, as well as an explanation of how your firm plans to prevent these violations, or similar violations, from occurring again. Include documentation of the corrections and\u002For corrective actions (which must address systemic problems) that your firm has taken. If your firm’s planned corrections and\u002For corrective actions will occur over time, please include a timetable for implementation of those activities. If corrections and\u002For corrective actions cannot be completed within fifteen business days, state the reason for the delay and the time within which these activities will be completed. Your firm’s response should be comprehensive and address any violations included in this Warning Letter. If you believe that your products are not in violation of the FD&amp;C Act, include your reasoning and any supporting information for our consideration as part of your response.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Your firm’s response should be sent via email to Gina Brackett, Assistant Director at CDRHEnforcement@fda.hhs.gov. Please include in the subject line, “CMS Case # 724245” when replying. If you have any questions about the contents of this letter, please contact: Karen Archdeacon at karen.archdeacon@fda.hhs.gov.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Finally, you should know that this letter is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of the violations at your firm’s facility. It is your firm’s responsibility to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations administered by FDA. The specific violations noted in this letter and in the Inspectional Observations, FDA 483, issued at the close of the inspection may be symptomatic of serious problems in your firm’s manufacturing and quality management systems. Your firm should investigate and determine the causes of any violations and take prompt actions to address any violations and bring the products into compliance.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Sincerely,\u003Cbr>\u002FS\u002F\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Barbara C. Marsden\u003Cbr>Director\u003Cbr>Office of Regulatory Programs\u003Cbr>Office of Product Evaluation and Quality\u003Cbr>Center for Devices and Radiological Health\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Cc:&nbsp;\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Vinod Ramani, Chairman, Opto Circuits (India) Ltd. \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003Cbr>John Haefele, Vice President, and General Manager, \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003Cbr>Denise Stone, Deputy General Manager, \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n              \n                                            \n              \n            ","Delivery Method:\n\nVIA Electronic Mail\n\nProduct:\n\nMedical Devices\n\nRecipient:\n\nRecipient Name\n\nMr. Neeraj Jha\n\nRecipient Title\n\nPresident\u002FCEO\n\nUnetixs Vascular, Inc.\n\n6901 TPC Drive, Suite 300\n\nOrlando, FL 32822\n\nUnited States\n\n(b)(4)\n\nIssuing Office:\n\nCenter for Devices and Radiological Health\n\nUnited States\n\nWARNING LETTER\nCMS # 724245\nApril 15, 2026\nDear Neeraj Jha:\nDuring an inspection of your firm, Unetixs Vascular, Inc., located in Warwick, RI from September 19, 2025, through December 4, 2025, an investigator from the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determined that your firm manufactures vascular diagnostic ultrasound systems, including the ROODRA and 2CP devices. Under section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act), 21 U.S.C. § 321(h), these products are devices because they are intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or to affect the structure or any function of the body.\nOur inspection revealed that the MultiLab Series ROODRA and 2CP vascular diagnostic devices are adulterated under section 501(f)(1)(B) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 351(f)(1)(B), because your firm does not have an approved application for premarket approval (PMA) in effect pursuant to section 515(a) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360e(a), or an approved application for an investigational device exemption under section 520(g) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g). The devices are also misbranded under section 502(o) the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(o), because your firm did not notify the agency of its intent to introduce the device with its current modifications into commercial distribution, as required by section 510(k) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k). For a device requiring premarket approval, the notification required by section 510(k) is deemed satisfied when a PMA is pending before the agency [21 CFR 807.81(b)]. The kind of information that your firm needs to submit in order to obtain approval or clearance for the device is described on the Internet at http:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002FMedicalDevices\u002FDeviceRegulationandGuidance\u002FHowtoMarketYourDevice\u002Fdefault.htm. The FDA will evaluate the information that your firm submits and decide whether the product may be legally marketed.\nSpecifically, the modified MultiLab Series ROODRA and 2CP vascular diagnostic devices that you are distributing do not have 510(k) clearance. While MultiLab Series ROODRA and 2CP vascular diagnostic devices have a prior 510(k) clearance (K904392), the modified devices include both design and labeling modifications – as documented in your firm’s “Regulatory Change Assessment - ENGINEERING CHANGE RECORD ECR # 0137 - Changing all applicable items from luer connections to bayonet connections” – which could significantly affect the safety and effectiveness of the device and, under 21 CFR 807.81(a)(3)(i), require a new 510(k) submission. Our review found that the change was implemented to significantly mitigate a known risk in response to an adverse event. Specifically, the device design, construction materials and labeling changes, to physically prevent device misconnections, were implemented to address a complaint of a death caused by air embolism.\nWe also remind you on February 4, 2020, a Warning Letter, CMS Case #598016, was issued to you for significant quality system violations related to your vascular diagnostic ultrasound systems. We understand that while you have made progress in implementing corrective actions, deficiencies remain as documented during the recent inspection. You should continue to ensure that you are making further progress to be in compliance with all of our regulations. On February 2, 2024, the FDA issued a final rule amending the device current good manufacturing practice (CGMP) requirements of the Quality System (QS) Regulation under 21 CFR 820 to align more closely with the international consensus standard for Quality Management Systems for medical devices used by many other regulatory authorities around the world. The revised part 820, referred to as the Quality Management System Regulation (QMSR), became effective on February 2, 2026. Your most recent inspection on September 19, 2025, through December 4, 2025, was conducted pursuant to the QS Regulation, which was in effect at the time of the inspection. However, any corrective actions you propose or implement must be pursuant to the QMSR requirements in effect as of February 2, 2026. For more information on the QMSR please refer to our frequently asked questions webpage: Quality Management System Regulation – Frequently Asked Questions. The 2020 Warning Letter will remain open until we verify that you have successfully implemented all necessary corrections.\nYour firm should take prompt action to address any violations identified in this letter. Failure to adequately address this matter may result in regulatory action being initiated by the FDA without further notice. These actions include, but are not limited to, seizure, injunction, and civil money penalties.\nOther federal agencies may take your compliance with the FD&C Act and its implementing regulations into account when considering the award of federal contracts.\nPlease notify this office in writing within fifteen business days from the date you receive this letter of the specific steps your firm has taken to address the noted violations, as well as an explanation of how your firm plans to prevent these violations, or similar violations, from occurring again. Include documentation of the corrections and\u002For corrective actions (which must address systemic problems) that your firm has taken. If your firm’s planned corrections and\u002For corrective actions will occur over time, please include a timetable for implementation of those activities. If corrections and\u002For corrective actions cannot be completed within fifteen business days, state the reason for the delay and the time within which these activities will be completed. Your firm’s response should be comprehensive and address any violations included in this Warning Letter. If you believe that your products are not in violation of the FD&C Act, include your reasoning and any supporting information for our consideration as part of your response.\nYour firm’s response should be sent via email to Gina Brackett, Assistant Director at CDRHEnforcement@fda.hhs.gov. Please include in the subject line, “CMS Case # 724245” when replying. If you have any questions about the contents of this letter, please contact: Karen Archdeacon at karen.archdeacon@fda.hhs.gov.\nFinally, you should know that this letter is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of the violations at your firm’s facility. It is your firm’s responsibility to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations administered by FDA. The specific violations noted in this letter and in the Inspectional Observations, FDA 483, issued at the close of the inspection may be symptomatic of serious problems in your firm’s manufacturing and quality management systems. Your firm should investigate and determine the causes of any violations and take prompt actions to address any violations and bring the products into compliance.\nSincerely,\n\u002FS\u002F\nBarbara C. Marsden\nDirector\nOffice of Regulatory Programs\nOffice of Product Evaluation and Quality\nCenter for Devices and Radiological Health\nCc:\nVinod Ramani, Chairman, Opto Circuits (India) Ltd. (b)(4)\nJohn Haefele, Vice President, and General Manager, (b)(4)\nDenise Stone, Deputy General Manager, (b)(4)","Unetixs Vascular, Inc.","unetixs-vascular-inc-724245-04152026","2026-08-18T06:42:28.498414+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Funetixs-vascular-inc-724245-04152026","2026-10-26T08:10:17.395391+00:00","Issued","2026-05-05","724245","Mr. Neeraj Jha","2026-08-19T04:45:17.638+00:00","2026-04-15",{"id":54,"raw":55,"subject":12,"body_html":59,"body_text":60,"firm_name":61,"letter_id":62,"created_at":63,"fei_number":20,"letter_url":64,"updated_at":65,"action_type":23,"case_status":47,"posted_date":66,"marcs_cms_no":67,"product_type":27,"closeout_date":20,"issuing_office":11,"recipient_name":68,"body_fetched_at":69,"delivery_method":31,"recipient_title":20,"reference_number":20,"action_taken_date":70,"medical_device_id":20,"response_letter_date":20},693,[56,57,58,11,12,13,13,13],"\u003Ctime datetime=\"2025-08-26T04:00:00Z\">08\u002F26\u002F2025\u003C\u002Ftime>\n","\u003Ctime datetime=\"2025-08-11T04:00:00Z\">08\u002F11\u002F2025\u003C\u002Ftime>\n","\u003Ca href=\"\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Flemaitre-vascular-inc-713502-08112025\">LeMaitre Vascular, Inc. \u003C\u002Fa>","\n\n                            \n                            \n                            \n                            \n                                              \n  \n \n\n                 \n\n  \u003Chr>\n \n\n\u003Cdiv>\n  \u003Cdl>\n\n              \u003Cdt>Delivery Method:\u003C\u002Fdt> \n        \u003Cdd>VIA Electronic Mail\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              \u003C\u002Fdd>\n      \n      \n              \u003Cdt>Product:\u003C\u002Fdt> \n        \u003Cdd>Medical Devices                          \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n            \n             \n            \n            \n            \n              \n            \n            \n            \u003C\u002Fdd>\n      \n          \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>            \n\n\n\u003Chr>\n\n\u003Cdiv>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdl>\n\n        \u003Cdt>Recipient:\u003C\u002Fdt>\n\n                      \u003Cdd>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdiv>Recipient Name\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n              \u003Cdiv>Mr. George LeMaitre\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n          \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\u003C\u002Fdd>\n                                \u003Cdd>\n  \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdiv>Recipient Title\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n              \u003Cdiv>Chairman and CEO \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n          \u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\u003C\u002Fdd>\n          \n            \u003Cdd>LeMaitre Vascular, Inc. \u003C\u002Fdd>\n\n          \n                      \u003Cdd>\u003Cp>\u003Cspan>63 Second Ave.\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cspan>Burlington\u003C\u002Fspan>, \u003Cspan>MA\u003C\u002Fspan> \u003Cspan>01803\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Cbr>\n\u003Cspan>United States\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n          \n          \n            \n            \u003Cdd>\n\n    \u003C\u002Fdd>\u003Cdd>\u003Cspan>\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003Ca href=\"mailto:glemaitre@lemaitre.com\"> glemaitre@lemaitre.com \u003C\u002Fa>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n\n          \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>            \n\n       \u003Cdiv>\n    \u003Cdl>\n          \n          \u003Cdt>Issuing Office:\u003C\u002Fdt>\n        \n         \n          \u003Cdd>Center for Devices and Radiological Health\u003C\u002Fdd>\n        \n         \n          \u003Cdd>\u003Cp>\u003Cspan>United States\u003C\u002Fspan>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003C\u002Fdd>\n        \n        \n        \n        \n        \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n    \u003Cdl> \n      \n    \u003C\u002Fdl>\n  \u003C\u002Fdiv>  \n      \n\u003C\u002Fdiv>\n\n \n\n \n\n\u003Chr>\n\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>WARNING LETTER\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003Cbr>CMS # 713502\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>August 11, 2025\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Dear Mr. LeMaitre:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>During an inspection of your firm located in North Brunswick, NJ from March 4, 2025, through April 16, 2025, investigators from the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determined that your firm manufactures Artegraft Collagen Vascular Grafts. Under section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act), 21 U.S.C. § 321(h), these products are devices because they are intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or to affect the structure or any function of the body.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>\u003Cu>Quality System Regulation Violations\u003C\u002Fu>\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>This inspection revealed that these devices are adulterated within the meaning of section 501(h) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 351(h), in that the methods used in, or the facilities or controls used for, their manufacture, packing, storage, or installation are not in conformity with the current good manufacturing practice requirements of the Quality System regulation found at Title 21, \u003Cu>Code of Federal Regulations\u003C\u002Fu> (CFR), Part 820. We received responses from Monte Nelson, Sr. Director, Quality Affairs - Artegraft dated May 7, 2025, and August 5, 2025, concerning our investigators’ observations noted on the Form FDA 483 (FDA 483), List of Inspectional Observations, that was issued to your firm. We address the May 7, 2025, response below, in relation to each of the noted violations. Any additional responses will be reviewed as part of your response to this letter.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>These violations include, but are not limited to, the following:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>1. Failure to establish and maintain procedures to prevent contamination of equipment or product by substances that could reasonably be expected to have an adverse effect on product quality, as required by 21 CFR 820.70(e). Specifically,\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>a. USP water sampling procedures utilized by your firm for testing of conductivity, Total Organic Carbon (TOC), endotoxin, and microbial contamination contain inconsistent and conflicting requirements that ensure water being sampled is representative of water used in production of the Artegraft Collagen Vascular Graft devices. Specifically,\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>i. Water samples for monitoring are being taken through a \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and not \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> from the Point of Use (POU) as required by SOP 103, Sampling of the USP \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> Water Systems, section 6.5 states that \u003Cstrong>(b)(4) \u003C\u002Fstrong>samples be tested from points of use (POU) according to FRM 103-03.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>ii. SOP 103 is not adequate since it requires the water to be purged after system sanitization for \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> sampling (section 6.12.1), requires the system to be flushed for at least \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> sampling (section 6.12.2), and requires the sample port to be sprayed with \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> sampling (section 6.12.5). The purging, cleaning, and spraying the sample port with \u003Cstrong>(b)(4) \u003C\u002Fstrong>sampling are not representative of the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> use of the water system used during production.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>iii. WI MFG-040, Operation of the USP \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> Water system Equipment ID #\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> is not adequate since it states sample valves (SVs) will be cleaned when sampling is performed in accordance with SOP 103 (section 6.8.11.2) and states that \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> POUs (\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>-POU) only will be cleaned when \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> is necessary, and \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> system sanitation has been performed (section 6.8.11.3). This cleaning and sanitation \u003Cstrong>(b)(4) \u003C\u002Fstrong>sampling are not representative of the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> use of the water system used during production.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>b. Your firm changed the sterilant solution used for sanitization of the USP \u003Cstrong>(b)(4) \u003C\u002Fstrong>Water Systems utilized in the manufacturing process. Your firm utilizes procedure MP-059, Preventive Maintenance of the USP \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> Water Systems which in sections 6.4.2 and 6.4.3 specify that \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> Solution is used. However, the Maintenance Log Sheet for the USP Water System Monitoring (FRM MP-06; dated 11\u002F27\u002F24) states that \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> was used for system sanitization. During the inspection, your firm’s Sr. Quality Engineer stated that \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> was discontinued sometime in 2024. Your firm was unable to provide any documentation during the inspection that allowed for a different sterilant solution to be used per procedure MP-059, nor that your firm has assessed the impact of the new sterilant on devices manufactured by your firm such as on the biocompatibility or if the new sterilant has different ingredients (e.g., potential contaminants).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>c. Your firm is not documenting the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> replacement of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> during water sampling (section 6.5.2) which is required per SOP 103, Sampling of the USP \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> Water Systems, which states that \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> is to be replaced by a member of the quality team during \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> water sampling as per SOP 102 – Workstation Cleaning Procedures for Within the LeMaitre Production Facility.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>d. The records for the Equipment ID #\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> sanitizations performed on \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> do not include written documentation that no residual sanitant remains in the system as required by MP 059, Preventive Maintenance for the USP \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> Water System, which states in Section 6.4.5 (Section 5.5.5 of Exhibit F), that the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> utilized for system sterilization will provide written assurance that there is no sanitizer solution left in the system prior to releasing the system for use. WI-MFG-040, Operation of the USP \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> Water system Equipment ID #\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, and section 6.8.12.1 states the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> will provide written documentation stating that there is no residual sanitant in the system, post sanitation.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>We reviewed your firm’s response and conclude that it is not adequate. In your response, you provided data collected from an additional water sampling that is aligned with \u003Cstrong>(b)(4) \u003C\u002Fstrong>manufacturing that showed the water system conformed to USP \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> Water specifications, revised SOP 103 to remove \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> actions not reflective of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> use of the water system, WI MFR-40 to specify cleaning of the POU\u002FSV\u002F\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>-POU should occur \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> system sampling, and FRM 103-03 to allow for documentation of each required activity during water sampling. Your response also promises to revise SOP 001, PS 01, and FRM PS 01. Additionally, you provided updated MP-059 and FRM MP-006 documents that replaces \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> with \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> as well plans to update SOP 053 to require supplier change notifications to be sent to a new email address. However, your response did not provide an assessment of the new sanitant on the biocompatibility of the product or any other differences in ingredients (e.g., potential contaminants) and how your firm plans to monitor residual sanitant levels. Please provide this information and additional promised revised documents in your response to this letter.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>2. Failure to establish and maintain procedures to adequately control environmental conditions that could reasonably be expected to have an adverse effect on product quality, as required by 21 CFR 820.70(c). Specifically, your environmental monitoring procedure, SOP 101, does not allow for environmental samples to be collected in a manner that is reflective of the production (\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>) environment. For example:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>a. Section 6.5.2.3 of SOP 101 related to surface sampling states that \u003Cem>each designated workstation surface shall be cleaned per the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> method as described in SOP 102 prior to sample collection\u003C\u002Fem>.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>b. Section 6.10.2 of SOP 101 related to swab sampling states that \u003Cem>each designated surface shall be cleaned per the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> method as described in SOP 102 prior to sample collection\u003C\u002Fem>.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>c. Section 6.6.3 of SOP 101 related to viable air sampling states that t\u003Cem>he personnel traffic around the air sampler should be kept to a minimum so as not to artificially affect the data\u003C\u002Fem>.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>d. Section 6.7 of SOP 101 related to non-viable air sampling does not specify when samples are to be taken (\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> conditions).\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The adequacy of your firm’s response cannot be determined at this time. In your response you provided test results from preliminary sampling collected during normal production which exhibited nominal results and were within specification along with a revised SOP 101 that now requires sampling during \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> production for all test locations and the removal of any requirement for cleaning \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> sampling. Your response also promises to create a form to document all sampling during \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> production, updates to SOP 001, and performance of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> sampling during \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> production following the revised SOP 101. In your response, please provide an update on the status of these corrective actions.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>3. Failure to validate with a high degree of assurance and approve according to established procedures, a process whose results cannot be fully verified by subsequent inspection and test, as required by 21 CFR § 820.75(a). Specifically, your firm failed to adequately validate the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> sterilization process for the Artegraft Collagen Vascular Graft in accordance with recognized standards. According to your Sterilization Validation and Requalification document (WI-QA-012), your firm based the process sterilization validation on the requirements found in \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> - \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> - \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> for validating the sterilization process used to sterilize your Artegraft devices. During review of the most recent 2023 performance qualification of the Artegraft Collagen Vascular Graft: \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> sterilization process validation (VAL-PO2023) protocol and report it was noted that your firm failed to consider the bioburden of raw materials and\u002For components and their subsequent storage, and the control of the environment in which the product is manufactured, assembled, and packaged as required by \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> – \u003Cem>Part 1: Application of Risk Management\u003C\u002Fem>.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The adequacy of your firm’s response cannot be determined at this time. In your response you conducted a risk assessment and began testing raw materials and components. Additionally, you plan to create a procedure for sampling, testing, and analyzing raw materials and sterile barrier bioburden, as well as performing an assessment to inform testing of future raw materials and components based on results and risk. In your response, please provide an update on the status of these corrective actions.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>4. Failure to establish and maintain procedures for monitoring and control of process parameters for validated processes to ensure that the specified requirements continue to be met, as required by 21 CFR 820.75(b). Specifically, your firm has not provided a documented rationale establishing the following:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>a. Section 6.1 of SOP 100, Routine Product Bioburden Testing, states that \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> \u003Cem>Product Bioburden testing will be performed on a calendar\u003C\u002Fem> \u003Cem>\u003Cstrong>(b)(4) \u003C\u002Fstrong>bases, at a minimum\u003C\u002Fem>. Your firm lacks documentation for how a \u003Cstrong>(b)(4) \u003C\u002Fstrong>frequency for bioburden testing was determined to be adequate to monitor and control the Artegraft grafts. In response to the previous FDA inspection, your firm initiated CAPA 00065. As part of this CAPA, you wrote a memo justifying the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> bioburden sampling frequency stating that the \u003Cem>current frequency follows the guidance in Annex A, Section A8.1of BS EN ISO 11737-1 :2018\u003C\u002Fem>. However, six non-conformances for out of specification product bioburden samples were collected between September 2024 and March 2025 from the following lot numbers: \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. There is no documented evaluation to determine if the testing frequency should be updated when out of specification bioburden test results are received. Your firm took no action based on these out of specification results justifying that decision as the organisms identified in the test were not as challenging as the sterilization challenge organism and repeat testing on a different lot of product did not result in out of specification product bioburden. Additionally, it is unclear if the sterilization process is capable of \u003Cstrong>(b)(4) \u003C\u002Fstrong>sterilization for bioburden levels as high as the challenge organism used during validation.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>b. Section 3.2 of SOP 100 defines Bioburden as: \u003Cem>The quantity of viable microorganisms on or in product and\u002For sterile barrier system\u003C\u002Fem>. However, your firm does not perform \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> bioburden sampling of raw material and\u002For the sterile barrier components to assess their bioburden. The only documented testing of the sterile barrier was performed during the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> assessment of the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> primary packaging, performed in August 2006. Additional testing of the primary packaging has not been conducted.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The adequacy of your firm’s response cannot be determined at this time. In your response you provided an updated justification of bioburden testing frequency, updates made to SOP 100 that clarify the scope of pre-sterile arteries \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, plans to create a procedure for sampling, testing, and analyzing raw materials and sterile barrier bioburden, as well as performing an assessment to inform testing of future raw materials and components based on results and risk. In your response, please provide an update on the status of these corrective actions. Additionally, please clarify whether there were any updates considered for Section 6.10.3 of SOP 100 to include the need for increased bioburden monitoring frequency if any action level is exceeded.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>5. Failure to verify or validate the corrective and preventive action to ensure that such action is effective and does not adversely affect the finished device, as required by 21 820.100(a)(4). Your firm utilizes SOP 053, Supplier Management, for supplier monitoring and issuance of supplier corrective action reports (SCARs) if necessary. Section 6.6.6 of SOP 053 states \u003Cem>If Corrective and\u002For preventive actions are deemed necessary CAPA may be initiated per SOP 050\u003C\u002Fem>. Section 6.5.6 of SOP 050 lists the requirements to perform CAPA effectiveness verification. In review of the following three closed\u002Fcompleted supplier corrective action reports (SCARs) verification of effectiveness was not documented.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>a. 2023-02 – issued on May 26, 2023, for an identified trend of failing sterility test results from a testing \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>b. 2023-03 – issued on June 20, 2023, for concerns of growth on sterility samples, including growth on the negative control, from a testing \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>c. 2023-004 – Concerns nonconformances\u002Fobservations identified during a \u003Cstrong>(b)(4) \u003C\u002Fstrong>audit for a sterility and bioburden testing \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>We reviewed your firm’s response and conclude that it is not adequate. In your response you provided updated versions of SOP 053 (which now includes all criteria related to corrective actions; including but not limited to verification of effectiveness. Your response did not include effectiveness verification for previously closed\u002Fcompleted SCARs. Additionally, regarding SCAR 2023-02, please clarify the final disposition of grafts from lots \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>, and \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> and provide additional justification for repeating the sterility test given that the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> investigation concluded (documented in a memo dated August 10, 2023) that “\u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>.” Per USP &lt;71&gt; \u003Cem>Sterility Tests\u003C\u002Fem>, a sterility test can be determined to be invalid only if it can be clearly demonstrated that the test was invalid for causes unrelated to the product to be examined. In your response, please provide the above information.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>6. Failure to establish and maintain procedures for implementing corrective and preventive action, as required by 21 CFR 820.100(a). Specifically, your Corrective and Preventive Action (CAPA) procedure (SOP 050) is not being implemented in that section 6.5.3.1 of SOP 050 lists deadlines according to the identified risk of each CAPA according to Table 2 of SOP 050. There are three risk levels each with a deadline from starting an investigation to implementing a corrective or preventive action: High Risk – \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>; Medium Risk – \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>; Low Risk – \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong>. The following are examples of CAPAs that did not meet your firm’s timeframes:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>a. High Risk CAPA\u003Cbr>i. CAPA-00068, concerns inadvertent release of nonconforming product. A total of 81 days elapsed from investigation to implementation.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>b. Medium Risk CAPAs\u003Cbr>i. CAPA-00075, environmental monitoring \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> swab samples that were out of specification. A total of 216 days elapsed from investigation to implementation.\u003Cbr>ii. CAPA-00078, concerns out of specification bioburden results. A total of 120 days elapsed from investigation to implementation.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>c. Low Risk CAPAs\u003Cbr>i. CAPA-00072, concerns a trend of nonconformances related to differential pressure. A total of 121 days from investigation to implementation.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>The adequacy of your firm’s response cannot be determined at this time. In your response you provided an updated version of SOP 050 to include time for formal review and revisions if necessary and promise to review current open CAPAs and write formal extension plans, if necessary. In your response, please provide any extension plans created and an example of a CAPA that required additional investigation\u002Fplanning time, including the justification for the additional time.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>\u003Cstrong>\u003Cu>Corrections and Removals Violation\u003C\u002Fu>\u003C\u002Fstrong>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Our inspection also revealed that your firm’s Artegraft Collagen Vascular Graft devices are misbranded under section 502(t)(2) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(t)(2), in that your firm failed or refused to furnish material or information respecting the device that is required by or under section 519 of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360i, and 21 CFR Part 806 – Medical Devices; Reports of Corrections and Removals. Significant violations include, but are not limited to, the following:\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Failure to submit any report required within 10 working days of initiating a correction or removal, as required by 21 CFR 806.10\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>For example, your firm distributed \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> grafts from lot 23DD203 manufactured using raw material Bovine Carotid Arteries control number \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> from a non‐approved supplier, one of which was implanted in a patient. You recalled the devices sometime after 6\u002F23\u002F2023. Since the product was released prior to completion of the \u003Cstrong>(b)(4)\u003C\u002Fstrong> evaluation, as required by your firm’s procedure, and without notifying the FDA of the change in the supplier of critical materials for a Class III device, this lot of material is violative. Graft devices manufactured using raw material from an unapproved supplier could have compromised sterility or mechanical integrity, which may present a risk to health such as infection, aneurysm, pseudoaneurysm, rupture, or mechanical failure at the anastomosis leading to bleeding or explantation of the failed device. Therefore, your firm’s removal of grafts in lot 23DD203 meets the definition of a medical device removal initiated to remedy a violation which may present a risk to health, for which you are required to submit a Report of Correction or Removal to FDA. As of 7\u002F1\u002F2025, you did not submit a Medical Device Report of Correction or Removal to FDA for this action.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Your firm should take prompt action to address any violations identified in this letter. Failure to adequately address this matter may result in regulatory action being initiated by the FDA without further notice. These actions include, but are not limited to, seizure, injunction, and civil money penalties.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Other federal agencies may take your compliance with the FD&amp;C Act and its implementing regulations into account when considering the award of federal contracts. Additionally, should FDA determine that you have Quality System regulation violations that are reasonably related to premarket approval applications for Class III devices, such devices will not be approved until the violations have been addressed. Should FDA determine that your devices or facilities do not meet the requirements of the Act, requests for Certificates to Foreign Governments (CFG) may not be granted.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Please notify this office in writing within fifteen business days from the date you receive this letter of the specific steps your firm has taken to address the noted violations, as well as an explanation of how your firm plans to prevent these violations, or similar violations, from occurring again. Include documentation of the corrections and\u002For corrective actions (which must address systemic problems) that your firm has taken. If your firm’s planned corrections and\u002For corrective actions will occur over time, please include a timetable for implementation of those activities. If corrections and\u002For corrective actions cannot be completed within fifteen business days, state the reason for the delay and the time within which these activities will be completed. Your firm’s response should be comprehensive and address any violations included in this Warning Letter. If you believe that your products are not in violation of the FD&amp;C Act, include your reasoning and any supporting information for our consideration as part of your response.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Your firm’s response should be sent via email to Establishment Assessment Team Assistant Director Gina Brackett at CDRHEnforcement@fda.hhs.gov. Please include in the subject line, “CMS Case 713502” when replying. If you have any questions about the contents of this letter, please contact: Sean Moynihan at sean.moynihan@fda.hhs.gov.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Finally, you should know that this letter is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of the violations at your firm’s facility. It is your firm’s responsibility to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations administered by FDA. The specific violations noted in this letter and in the Inspectional Observations, FDA 483, issued at the close of the inspection may be symptomatic of serious problems in your firm’s manufacturing and quality management systems. Your firm should investigate and determine the causes of any violations and take prompt actions to address any violations and bring the products into compliance.\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Sincerely,\u003Cbr>\u002FS\u002F\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Matthew G. Hillebrenner\u003Cbr>Deputy Director\u003Cbr>Office of Product Evaluation and Quality\u003Cbr>Center for Devices and Radiological Health\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cp>Cc: Ms. Cathleen I. VanDerVeer, Senior Vice President Operations, cvanderveer@lemaitre.com\u003Cbr>Mr. Monte Nelson, Director of Quality Affairs, mnelson@lemaitre.com\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n              \n                                            \n              \n            ","Delivery Method:\n\nVIA Electronic Mail\n\nProduct:\n\nMedical Devices\n\nRecipient:\n\nRecipient Name\n\nMr. George LeMaitre\n\nRecipient Title\n\nChairman and CEO\n\nLeMaitre Vascular, Inc.\n\n63 Second Ave.\n\nBurlington, MA 01803\n\nUnited States\n\nglemaitre@lemaitre.com\n\nIssuing Office:\n\nCenter for Devices and Radiological Health\n\nUnited States\n\nWARNING LETTER\nCMS # 713502\nAugust 11, 2025\nDear Mr. LeMaitre:\nDuring an inspection of your firm located in North Brunswick, NJ from March 4, 2025, through April 16, 2025, investigators from the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determined that your firm manufactures Artegraft Collagen Vascular Grafts. Under section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act), 21 U.S.C. § 321(h), these products are devices because they are intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or to affect the structure or any function of the body.\nQuality System Regulation Violations\nThis inspection revealed that these devices are adulterated within the meaning of section 501(h) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 351(h), in that the methods used in, or the facilities or controls used for, their manufacture, packing, storage, or installation are not in conformity with the current good manufacturing practice requirements of the Quality System regulation found at Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 820. We received responses from Monte Nelson, Sr. Director, Quality Affairs - Artegraft dated May 7, 2025, and August 5, 2025, concerning our investigators’ observations noted on the Form FDA 483 (FDA 483), List of Inspectional Observations, that was issued to your firm. We address the May 7, 2025, response below, in relation to each of the noted violations. Any additional responses will be reviewed as part of your response to this letter.\nThese violations include, but are not limited to, the following:\n1. Failure to establish and maintain procedures to prevent contamination of equipment or product by substances that could reasonably be expected to have an adverse effect on product quality, as required by 21 CFR 820.70(e). Specifically,\na. USP water sampling procedures utilized by your firm for testing of conductivity, Total Organic Carbon (TOC), endotoxin, and microbial contamination contain inconsistent and conflicting requirements that ensure water being sampled is representative of water used in production of the Artegraft Collagen Vascular Graft devices. Specifically,\ni. Water samples for monitoring are being taken through a (b)(4) and not (b)(4) from the Point of Use (POU) as required by SOP 103, Sampling of the USP (b)(4) Water Systems, section 6.5 states that (b)(4) samples be tested from points of use (POU) according to FRM 103-03.\nii. SOP 103 is not adequate since it requires the water to be purged after system sanitization for (b)(4) sampling (section 6.12.1), requires the system to be flushed for at least (b)(4) sampling (section 6.12.2), and requires the sample port to be sprayed with (b)(4) sampling (section 6.12.5). The purging, cleaning, and spraying the sample port with (b)(4) sampling are not representative of the (b)(4) use of the water system used during production.\niii. WI MFG-040, Operation of the USP (b)(4) Water system Equipment ID #(b)(4) is not adequate since it states sample valves (SVs) will be cleaned when sampling is performed in accordance with SOP 103 (section 6.8.11.2) and states that (b)(4) POUs ((b)(4)-POU) only will be cleaned when (b)(4) is necessary, and (b)(4) system sanitation has been performed (section 6.8.11.3). This cleaning and sanitation (b)(4) sampling are not representative of the (b)(4) use of the water system used during production.\nb. Your firm changed the sterilant solution used for sanitization of the USP (b)(4) Water Systems utilized in the manufacturing process. Your firm utilizes procedure MP-059, Preventive Maintenance of the USP (b)(4) Water Systems which in sections 6.4.2 and 6.4.3 specify that (b)(4) Solution is used. However, the Maintenance Log Sheet for the USP Water System Monitoring (FRM MP-06; dated 11\u002F27\u002F24) states that (b)(4) was used for system sanitization. During the inspection, your firm’s Sr. Quality Engineer stated that (b)(4) was discontinued sometime in 2024. Your firm was unable to provide any documentation during the inspection that allowed for a different sterilant solution to be used per procedure MP-059, nor that your firm has assessed the impact of the new sterilant on devices manufactured by your firm such as on the biocompatibility or if the new sterilant has different ingredients (e.g., potential contaminants).\nc. Your firm is not documenting the (b)(4) replacement of (b)(4) during water sampling (section 6.5.2) which is required per SOP 103, Sampling of the USP (b)(4) Water Systems, which states that (b)(4) is to be replaced by a member of the quality team during (b)(4) water sampling as per SOP 102 – Workstation Cleaning Procedures for Within the LeMaitre Production Facility.\nd. The records for the Equipment ID #(b)(4) sanitizations performed on (b)(4) do not include written documentation that no residual sanitant remains in the system as required by MP 059, Preventive Maintenance for the USP (b)(4) Water System, which states in Section 6.4.5 (Section 5.5.5 of Exhibit F), that the (b)(4) utilized for system sterilization will provide written assurance that there is no sanitizer solution left in the system prior to releasing the system for use. WI-MFG-040, Operation of the USP (b)(4) Water system Equipment ID #(b)(4), and section 6.8.12.1 states the (b)(4) will provide written documentation stating that there is no residual sanitant in the system, post sanitation.\nWe reviewed your firm’s response and conclude that it is not adequate. In your response, you provided data collected from an additional water sampling that is aligned with (b)(4) manufacturing that showed the water system conformed to USP (b)(4) Water specifications, revised SOP 103 to remove (b)(4) actions not reflective of (b)(4) use of the water system, WI MFR-40 to specify cleaning of the POU\u002FSV\u002F(b)(4)-POU should occur (b)(4) system sampling, and FRM 103-03 to allow for documentation of each required activity during water sampling. Your response also promises to revise SOP 001, PS 01, and FRM PS 01. Additionally, you provided updated MP-059 and FRM MP-006 documents that replaces (b)(4) with (b)(4) as well plans to update SOP 053 to require supplier change notifications to be sent to a new email address. However, your response did not provide an assessment of the new sanitant on the biocompatibility of the product or any other differences in ingredients (e.g., potential contaminants) and how your firm plans to monitor residual sanitant levels. Please provide this information and additional promised revised documents in your response to this letter.\n2. Failure to establish and maintain procedures to adequately control environmental conditions that could reasonably be expected to have an adverse effect on product quality, as required by 21 CFR 820.70(c). Specifically, your environmental monitoring procedure, SOP 101, does not allow for environmental samples to be collected in a manner that is reflective of the production ((b)(4)) environment. For example:\na. Section 6.5.2.3 of SOP 101 related to surface sampling states that each designated workstation surface shall be cleaned per the (b)(4) method as described in SOP 102 prior to sample collection.\nb. Section 6.10.2 of SOP 101 related to swab sampling states that each designated surface shall be cleaned per the (b)(4) method as described in SOP 102 prior to sample collection.\nc. Section 6.6.3 of SOP 101 related to viable air sampling states that the personnel traffic around the air sampler should be kept to a minimum so as not to artificially affect the data.\nd. Section 6.7 of SOP 101 related to non-viable air sampling does not specify when samples are to be taken ((b)(4) conditions).\nThe adequacy of your firm’s response cannot be determined at this time. In your response you provided test results from preliminary sampling collected during normal production which exhibited nominal results and were within specification along with a revised SOP 101 that now requires sampling during (b)(4) production for all test locations and the removal of any requirement for cleaning (b)(4) sampling. Your response also promises to create a form to document all sampling during (b)(4) production, updates to SOP 001, and performance of (b)(4) sampling during (b)(4) production following the revised SOP 101. In your response, please provide an update on the status of these corrective actions.\n3. Failure to validate with a high degree of assurance and approve according to established procedures, a process whose results cannot be fully verified by subsequent inspection and test, as required by 21 CFR § 820.75(a). Specifically, your firm failed to adequately validate the (b)(4) sterilization process for the Artegraft Collagen Vascular Graft in accordance with recognized standards. According to your Sterilization Validation and Requalification document (WI-QA-012), your firm based the process sterilization validation on the requirements found in (b)(4) - (b)(4) - (b)(4) for validating the sterilization process used to sterilize your Artegraft devices. During review of the most recent 2023 performance qualification of the Artegraft Collagen Vascular Graft: (b)(4) sterilization process validation (VAL-PO2023) protocol and report it was noted that your firm failed to consider the bioburden of raw materials and\u002For components and their subsequent storage, and the control of the environment in which the product is manufactured, assembled, and packaged as required by (b)(4) and (b)(4), (b)(4) – Part 1: Application of Risk Management.\nThe adequacy of your firm’s response cannot be determined at this time. In your response you conducted a risk assessment and began testing raw materials and components. Additionally, you plan to create a procedure for sampling, testing, and analyzing raw materials and sterile barrier bioburden, as well as performing an assessment to inform testing of future raw materials and components based on results and risk. In your response, please provide an update on the status of these corrective actions.\n4. Failure to establish and maintain procedures for monitoring and control of process parameters for validated processes to ensure that the specified requirements continue to be met, as required by 21 CFR 820.75(b). Specifically, your firm has not provided a documented rationale establishing the following:\na. Section 6.1 of SOP 100, Routine Product Bioburden Testing, states that (b)(4) Product Bioburden testing will be performed on a calendar (b)(4) bases, at a minimum. Your firm lacks documentation for how a (b)(4) frequency for bioburden testing was determined to be adequate to monitor and control the Artegraft grafts. In response to the previous FDA inspection, your firm initiated CAPA 00065. As part of this CAPA, you wrote a memo justifying the (b)(4) bioburden sampling frequency stating that the current frequency follows the guidance in Annex A, Section A8.1of BS EN ISO 11737-1 :2018. However, six non-conformances for out of specification product bioburden samples were collected between September 2024 and March 2025 from the following lot numbers: (b)(4). There is no documented evaluation to determine if the testing frequency should be updated when out of specification bioburden test results are received. Your firm took no action based on these out of specification results justifying that decision as the organisms identified in the test were not as challenging as the sterilization challenge organism and repeat testing on a different lot of product did not result in out of specification product bioburden. Additionally, it is unclear if the sterilization process is capable of (b)(4) sterilization for bioburden levels as high as the challenge organism used during validation.\nb. Section 3.2 of SOP 100 defines Bioburden as: The quantity of viable microorganisms on or in product and\u002For sterile barrier system. However, your firm does not perform (b)(4) bioburden sampling of raw material and\u002For the sterile barrier components to assess their bioburden. The only documented testing of the sterile barrier was performed during the (b)(4) assessment of the (b)(4) primary packaging, performed in August 2006. Additional testing of the primary packaging has not been conducted.\nThe adequacy of your firm’s response cannot be determined at this time. In your response you provided an updated justification of bioburden testing frequency, updates made to SOP 100 that clarify the scope of pre-sterile arteries (b)(4), plans to create a procedure for sampling, testing, and analyzing raw materials and sterile barrier bioburden, as well as performing an assessment to inform testing of future raw materials and components based on results and risk. In your response, please provide an update on the status of these corrective actions. Additionally, please clarify whether there were any updates considered for Section 6.10.3 of SOP 100 to include the need for increased bioburden monitoring frequency if any action level is exceeded.\n5. Failure to verify or validate the corrective and preventive action to ensure that such action is effective and does not adversely affect the finished device, as required by 21 820.100(a)(4). Your firm utilizes SOP 053, Supplier Management, for supplier monitoring and issuance of supplier corrective action reports (SCARs) if necessary. Section 6.6.6 of SOP 053 states If Corrective and\u002For preventive actions are deemed necessary CAPA may be initiated per SOP 050. Section 6.5.6 of SOP 050 lists the requirements to perform CAPA effectiveness verification. In review of the following three closed\u002Fcompleted supplier corrective action reports (SCARs) verification of effectiveness was not documented.\na. 2023-02 – issued on May 26, 2023, for an identified trend of failing sterility test results from a testing (b)(4)\nb. 2023-03 – issued on June 20, 2023, for concerns of growth on sterility samples, including growth on the negative control, from a testing (b)(4).\nc. 2023-004 – Concerns nonconformances\u002Fobservations identified during a (b)(4) audit for a sterility and bioburden testing (b)(4)\nWe reviewed your firm’s response and conclude that it is not adequate. In your response you provided updated versions of SOP 053 (which now includes all criteria related to corrective actions; including but not limited to verification of effectiveness. Your response did not include effectiveness verification for previously closed\u002Fcompleted SCARs. Additionally, regarding SCAR 2023-02, please clarify the final disposition of grafts from lots (b)(4), (b)(4), and (b)(4) and provide additional justification for repeating the sterility test given that the (b)(4) investigation concluded (documented in a memo dated August 10, 2023) that “(b)(4).” Per USP \u003C71> Sterility Tests, a sterility test can be determined to be invalid only if it can be clearly demonstrated that the test was invalid for causes unrelated to the product to be examined. In your response, please provide the above information.\n6. Failure to establish and maintain procedures for implementing corrective and preventive action, as required by 21 CFR 820.100(a). Specifically, your Corrective and Preventive Action (CAPA) procedure (SOP 050) is not being implemented in that section 6.5.3.1 of SOP 050 lists deadlines according to the identified risk of each CAPA according to Table 2 of SOP 050. There are three risk levels each with a deadline from starting an investigation to implementing a corrective or preventive action: High Risk – (b)(4); Medium Risk – (b)(4); Low Risk – (b)(4). The following are examples of CAPAs that did not meet your firm’s timeframes:\na. High Risk CAPA\ni. CAPA-00068, concerns inadvertent release of nonconforming product. A total of 81 days elapsed from investigation to implementation.\nb. Medium Risk CAPAs\ni. CAPA-00075, environmental monitoring (b)(4) swab samples that were out of specification. A total of 216 days elapsed from investigation to implementation.\nii. CAPA-00078, concerns out of specification bioburden results. A total of 120 days elapsed from investigation to implementation.\nc. Low Risk CAPAs\ni. CAPA-00072, concerns a trend of nonconformances related to differential pressure. A total of 121 days from investigation to implementation.\nThe adequacy of your firm’s response cannot be determined at this time. In your response you provided an updated version of SOP 050 to include time for formal review and revisions if necessary and promise to review current open CAPAs and write formal extension plans, if necessary. In your response, please provide any extension plans created and an example of a CAPA that required additional investigation\u002Fplanning time, including the justification for the additional time.\nCorrections and Removals Violation\nOur inspection also revealed that your firm’s Artegraft Collagen Vascular Graft devices are misbranded under section 502(t)(2) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(t)(2), in that your firm failed or refused to furnish material or information respecting the device that is required by or under section 519 of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360i, and 21 CFR Part 806 – Medical Devices; Reports of Corrections and Removals. Significant violations include, but are not limited to, the following:\nFailure to submit any report required within 10 working days of initiating a correction or removal, as required by 21 CFR 806.10\nFor example, your firm distributed (b)(4) grafts from lot 23DD203 manufactured using raw material Bovine Carotid Arteries control number (b)(4) from a non‐approved supplier, one of which was implanted in a patient. You recalled the devices sometime after 6\u002F23\u002F2023. Since the product was released prior to completion of the (b)(4) evaluation, as required by your firm’s procedure, and without notifying the FDA of the change in the supplier of critical materials for a Class III device, this lot of material is violative. Graft devices manufactured using raw material from an unapproved supplier could have compromised sterility or mechanical integrity, which may present a risk to health such as infection, aneurysm, pseudoaneurysm, rupture, or mechanical failure at the anastomosis leading to bleeding or explantation of the failed device. Therefore, your firm’s removal of grafts in lot 23DD203 meets the definition of a medical device removal initiated to remedy a violation which may present a risk to health, for which you are required to submit a Report of Correction or Removal to FDA. As of 7\u002F1\u002F2025, you did not submit a Medical Device Report of Correction or Removal to FDA for this action.\nYour firm should take prompt action to address any violations identified in this letter. Failure to adequately address this matter may result in regulatory action being initiated by the FDA without further notice. These actions include, but are not limited to, seizure, injunction, and civil money penalties.\nOther federal agencies may take your compliance with the FD&C Act and its implementing regulations into account when considering the award of federal contracts. Additionally, should FDA determine that you have Quality System regulation violations that are reasonably related to premarket approval applications for Class III devices, such devices will not be approved until the violations have been addressed. Should FDA determine that your devices or facilities do not meet the requirements of the Act, requests for Certificates to Foreign Governments (CFG) may not be granted.\nPlease notify this office in writing within fifteen business days from the date you receive this letter of the specific steps your firm has taken to address the noted violations, as well as an explanation of how your firm plans to prevent these violations, or similar violations, from occurring again. Include documentation of the corrections and\u002For corrective actions (which must address systemic problems) that your firm has taken. If your firm’s planned corrections and\u002For corrective actions will occur over time, please include a timetable for implementation of those activities. If corrections and\u002For corrective actions cannot be completed within fifteen business days, state the reason for the delay and the time within which these activities will be completed. Your firm’s response should be comprehensive and address any violations included in this Warning Letter. If you believe that your products are not in violation of the FD&C Act, include your reasoning and any supporting information for our consideration as part of your response.\nYour firm’s response should be sent via email to Establishment Assessment Team Assistant Director Gina Brackett at CDRHEnforcement@fda.hhs.gov. Please include in the subject line, “CMS Case 713502” when replying. If you have any questions about the contents of this letter, please contact: Sean Moynihan at sean.moynihan@fda.hhs.gov.\nFinally, you should know that this letter is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of the violations at your firm’s facility. It is your firm’s responsibility to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations administered by FDA. The specific violations noted in this letter and in the Inspectional Observations, FDA 483, issued at the close of the inspection may be symptomatic of serious problems in your firm’s manufacturing and quality management systems. Your firm should investigate and determine the causes of any violations and take prompt actions to address any violations and bring the products into compliance.\nSincerely,\n\u002FS\u002F\nMatthew G. Hillebrenner\nDeputy Director\nOffice of Product Evaluation and Quality\nCenter for Devices and Radiological Health\nCc: Ms. Cathleen I. VanDerVeer, Senior Vice President Operations, cvanderveer@lemaitre.com\nMr. Monte Nelson, Director of Quality Affairs, mnelson@lemaitre.com","LeMaitre Vascular, Inc.","lemaitre-vascular-inc-713502-08112025","2026-08-18T06:42:28.676509+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.fda.gov\u002Finspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations\u002Fwarning-letters\u002Flemaitre-vascular-inc-713502-08112025","2026-10-26T08:09:13.557964+00:00","2025-08-26","713502","Mr. George LeMaitre","2026-08-19T16:28:55.866+00:00","2025-08-11",3,{"510k":73,"classification":74,"enforcement":75,"event":76,"event_backfill":77,"pma":78,"warning_letter":79},"2026-11-16T02:00:55.89+00:00","2026-11-16T02:00:41.999+00:00","2026-11-16T02:00:49.415+00:00","2026-11-17T04:00:34.414+00:00","2026-09-07T05:17:28.839+00:00","2026-11-16T02:01:03.155+00:00","2026-11-17T01:02:55.859+00:00"]